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ABSTRACT
The Quasi-War was an undeclared conflict fought between the young United
States of America and the French Republic at sea during the years 1798-1801. It began
when the French mounted a guerre de course against the significant American blue-water
merchant marine in response to America concluding Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain. At
the time, the U.S. had no navy whatsoever with which to combat these French corsairs
primarily operating from bases in the West Indies. Seeing there was little hope of
immediately ending the matter diplomatically after the infamous XYZ Affair, President
John Adams convinced a normally divided Congress to build a small but effective navy.
However, the Americans were lacking in needed resources and ordnance to
construct and arm a fleet which could keep the sea in the distant Caribbean, which
became the primary theatre of war. Fortunately, Great Britain, America’s great trading
partner, and ironically her former enemy in the Revolutionary War, was also at war with
France in the Wars of the French Revolution. This thesis examines the informal naval
alliance which formed between the two former enemies during the Quasi-War. It argues
that the British were instrumental in providing the material aid which allowed John
Adams to build his new navy, and that the U.S. Navy was in many ways modeled after
Britain’s venerable Royal Navy. It also examines the informal naval cooperation which
developed between serving units of the two fleets in the West Indies. This impromptu
relationship would be tested by ongoing disputes between the United States, namely
vii

impressment of American seamen, and British seizure of technically neutral, American
merchantmen trading to England’s non-French enemies in the islands. Despite these
stressors, it would last to the end of the Quasi-War. The work also examines U.S./British
naval involvement with Toussaint l’Ouverture on St. Domingue, now known as Haiti.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1798 the United States went to war with France. There was no declaration of
war by either side. The war, lasting until 1801, was fought nearly entirely at sea and in
the Caribbean. Stranger yet, the U.S. fought against France, its ally in the American
Revolutionary War, and alongside Great Britain, its enemy in that same war. This
conflict, known to history as the Quasi-War, or Undeclared War, was one of the side
shows of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) which erupted as the crowned
heads of Europe reacted to events of the French Revolution, especially, the 1792
deposition and then 1793 regicide of King Louis XVI of France and subsequent
execution of his Queen, Marie Antoinette. Although Prussia and Austria had actually
gone to war against Revolutionary France in 1792, it was only following the execution of
the French royal couple that England prepared for war by issuing the necessary orders to
bring the Royal Navy to wartime strength. But the French had not waited for a British
declaration of war; they had declared war upon their old foe first. As the years of war
ground on, Great Britain and France would remain the only two constant belligerents,
splitting Europe into two camps. Even across the Atlantic, the United States reluctantly
found itself stuck between the two of them. In 1778, during the darkest days of the
American Revolutionary War, France had befriended the infant nation, offering military
and financial aid given with the quid pro quo of binding itself to that country in a
1

perpetual treaty of mutual amity and alliance. As to Great Britain, after the Peace of Paris
she had resumed her role as America’s greatest trading partner.
The Washington Administration sought to steer a neutral course between the
French and British Scylla and Charybdis, but the course became ever more treacherous.
Finally, friction caused by British commerce restrictions and the consequent seizures of
neutral American merchantmen trading to the French, remaining border disputes over
British North America, and British sponsored Indian trouble in the western Ohio
Territory forced the Administration to treat with the British whatever the consequences.
The result was Jay’s Treaty of 1794 ratified in 1796, which left the French feeling
betrayed by their “perfidious” ally. The Gallic response was to attack American shipping
throughout the world and so teach the Americans the cost of spurning former friends. The
Yankee merchant marine was especially vulnerable to such a guerre de course. It was
already the second largest in the world after that of Great Britain. It had grown fat
carrying the cargoes of both the British and French during the war. And most
significantly, U.S. merchantmen sailed unarmed and unprotected by any navy
whatsoever. Even a minor sea power, let alone one like France, possessed of the world’s
second largest navy and numerous privateers, could menace it. While the French battle
fleet, courtesy of the Royal Navy, remained primarily bottled up in its bases at Brest,
Rochefort and Toulon, French corsairs operated in ports throughout the globe, preying on
Britain’s world-wide commerce. Now the attention of these corsairs turned to American
merchantmen as well. Worse, one of the French privateer fleet’s chief theaters of
operations was also one of the primary American trading zones, the West Indies.
Operating out of Guadeloupe and St. Domingue, these private warriors jumped upon the
2

rich, unarmed American cargo ships plying those waters. The Windward Passage, the
primary highway out of the Caribbean, leading between St. Domingue and Cuba, proved
especially dangerous for American bottoms. But this danger of French spoliation did not
end as ships left the tropics. Corsairs also operated off the U.S. coast with Americans
utterly unable to cope with the threat directly outside their harbors.
Britain viewed this French move against the United States as a godsend. The war
against Revolutionary France was a disaster. British arms and money had produced little
in the way of victories, on land or sea—including the Glorious First of June—but had
cost the nation dearly in men and treasure. Her feckless continental allies remained more
interested in their own local territorial gains at British taxpayer expense—the government
of William Pitt was bankrolling them—rather than pursuing any coherent campaign
against the French Republic. Expeditions to seize French possessions in the West Indies
had left British Armies utterly decimated by fever. Now the young, energetic and highly
effective General Napoleon Bonaparte stood poised on the French coast with his Armee
d’Angleterre, waiting to invade the island nation and the Royal Navy, the only effective
fighting force keeping these would be invaders at bay, in 1797 had suffered a mutiny of
the entire fleet anchored at Spithead. This prospect terrified the British government.
Although, the issue for the sailors was not loyalty to the Crown, but wages—there had
been no raise for common tars since the Interregnum—it presented real doubt as to the
reliability of Britain’s wooden walls. When another, more radical mutiny reared up at the
Nore anchorage at the mouth of the Thames, the prospect became even graver. These
Nore sailors, in order to enforce their demands, actually blocked the delivery of London’s
coal and food supply serviced by Thames shipping. And when the North Sea squadron,
3

standing guard against the enemy Dutch fleet ready to come out at the Texel, sailed
instead to join the Nore Mutiny, the country panicked. Although the Navy was able to
crush this mutiny and amicably settled the Spithead pay dispute, the situation had had its
effects upon the British economy and people. The Bank of England, short of specie, had
been forced to stop payments to the country and corresponding banks due to the fear of a
French landing fueling a run on them. England appeared on the verge of financial
collapse as well as invasion.
It was in this context that the French, playing what appeared to be a winning
hand, blundered in their treatment of the United States. Instead of knuckling under to
French depredations, the Americans chose to fight. They assembled a navy of their own
in record time and chased the French corsairs from the U.S. coast. Next they sent that
fleet to hunt French privateers in Caribbean waters, near their island bases. The British
government took one look at this situation and said thank you very much. It became the
aim of Pitt’s Administration to immediately take advantage of this French bungling and
befriend the Americans in any way it could, short of direct meddling in American
domestic affairs. They had already witnessed the clumsy French attempts to do so in the
early 1790s, which had only earned the French Republic the contempt of much of the
American public. The British would offer their former subjects naval vessels, stores and
ordnance, small arms, saltpeter from India for gunpowder, copper for warship bottoms,
and even half-pay Royal Navy officers not then in a sea command or “on the beach,” as
the saying went. The British minister to Philadelphia, Sir Robert Liston, received
instructions to take any reasonable steps to promote friendship with and hopefully the
assistance of the Americans against their common enemy, the French.
4

This thesis, in four substantive chapters, will examine the relationship which
consequently developed between the United States and Great Britain, former enemies, in
that hot house of war. The author will argue that these two nations formed an informal
alliance to fight their mutual foe, the French, at sea. This quasi-entente took two forms.
First, the British aided the young Republic in establishing its navy. Second, the line
officers and men of the two fleets serving in the Caribbean, the primary theatre of
operations for the Americans, worked out an informal understanding which often saw
them acting like formal allies. This operational quasi-alliance at sea lasted until the
Americans ceased hostilities, despite significant stress placed upon it by deep-seated
disputes between the two countries, at times made worse by the actions of one of the
British station Admirals.
Chapter II, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” will provide needed background
material but also offer insight into how the relationship changed between the United
States, Great Britain, and France during the choppy fifteen years leading from the Treaty
of Paris in 1783 to the beginning of the American Quasi War with France in May 1798,
such that roles reversed. France became the de facto enemy of the United States while
Britain, an informal ally, in the undeclared war at sea—undeclared for the Americans that
is—which resulted. It lays out the argument that which side made a friend, and which a
foe out of the United States was a function of how the governing elites, especially the
diplomats, in Britain and France, respectively, perceived the problems posed by
American neutrality during the Wars of the French Revolution and, consequently,
undertook radically different strategies to deal with them.

5

Chapter III, ‘To Found a Fleet,” scrutinizes how the naval relationship between
the two countries began. It explores the critical role Britain played in bringing the new
American fleet into existence. From the outset of the war, Great Britain intentionally
provided America essential material aid that helped establish the new United States
Navy. Most importantly, the British Government generously allowed the Americans to
import from England the critical copper plates and fasteners without which fashioning
any kind of modern fleet would have been impossible. American industry was not yet up
to manufacturing them. The British also sold, and even on one occasion, gifted the United
States desperately needed ordnance—supplying over the course of the war perhaps half
of that used at sea—to arm her men of war and shore installations. Additionally, the
island kingdom, perhaps unwittingly, hugely influenced the developing American naval
culture. The infant U.S. Navy adopted the Royal Navy as a kind of informal blue print
upon which it modeled its new sea service; American commodores and captains came
almost to act as protégés of the Royal Navy. Chapter III argues that but for this vital
British assistance, both direct and indirect, the small but highly effective American fleet
that the newly minted Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, committed nearly in full
to combat the French in the Caribbean, would have remained only a dream.
Chapter IV, “Operations,” continues the story of the blossoming naval
cooperation between the two maritime powers begun in chapter III. This chapter makes
the case that after formally providing material assistance to the United States to establish
the American navy, the British began an informal naval cooperation with the Americans,
predominantly in the West Indies Theatre. This took the form of allowing the American
navy use of British island ports, convoying each other’s merchantmen, sharing signals,
6

and even patrolling together. But all of this cooperation would remain informal, instituted
largely by the serving commanders at sea. The Admiralty and the Navy Department in
London and Philadelphia, respectively, would largely stay outside of the equation. The
chapter concludes that this “quasi-alliance,” as one scholar styled it, while it never
became the de jure agreement craved by London, was never the less very much a
practical reality on the various West Indies stations and certainly significant to the way
the serving captains of both sides conducted their war against the French. Among other
things, it was a major early step towards reconciliation between Britain and her former
colonies following the American Revolution. Bradford Perkins has dubbed this period
that of the “First Rapprochement,” as opposed to the “Great” one, which occurred
roughly a century later in the 1890s.
Chapter V, “The Relationship Tested,” illustrates how this informal alliance
between the two navies, from the beginning, came under stress from various forces
threatening to cleave them apart. Some were rooted in venerable disputes between the
two nations, problems which appeared intractable because of the very institutional
structures of one, or both. Some might be chalked up to human frailty: the history of
personal animus existing between two neighboring station commanders, one from each
service, blind racial or ethnic prejudice and fear, the bitter memories of their last war, or
simple greed. This study by design focuses upon the day to day contacts between the
ships and men of the two navies during the entire period of the Quasi War as recorded in
the ships’ logs, journals, and letters to tell the story of the operational side of this
improvised naval entente from its “honeymoon” through its “tough times.” And these
documents, especially in the latter stages of the conflict, from time to time did reveal
7

tensions which American naval officers and men felt and voiced about their informal
allies in the Royal Navy. These might stem from perceived slights, honest
misunderstandings, or sheer bloody-mindedness at the hands of the British naval officers.
Never the less, I have found it was most often not so much what sailors, their officers,
captains, admirals, or administrators, might say in such letters which was the most telling
as to the true state of affairs, but what they did. Chapter five establishes that despite these
pressures threatening to cast them asunder, at the end of the Quasi-War the two navies
continued to function much as they had during the fighting. The relationship remained a
reality.
The main primary documents utilized in this study come from those collected and
printed in the 1930s by the United States Navy Department as the seven volume, some
3,500 page, Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and
France: Naval Operations (Quasi-War).1 This collection received funding during the
Roosevelt Administration, presumably the brainchild of a naval enthusiast president who
sought to achieve two goals: to increase access to naval records previously scattered in
archives throughout the United States and Britain and, secondly, at a time when he could
justify expending the funds, to provide work for “starving” historians as with so many
other New Deal initiatives. One of the by-products of this project was to provide
researchers with a window into the day to day encounters between warships of both
fleets, primarily in the chief theatre of operations of the Quasi-War, the Caribbean Sea.
The resulting set of documents is styled as an operational collection, meaning it is

1

United States Navy Department (U.S.N.), Office of Naval Records and Library, Naval Documents Related
to the Quasi-War between the United States and France, 7 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1935-38).
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primarily concerned with the everyday functioning of the relevant American warships at
sea and in port. Records often appear as mundane as the various tacks and maneuvers
ships took, or as major as ship to ship actions against the enemy. Sightings of any strange
sail are recorded, and the result of any chase which followed, and whether it proved to be
friend or foe. It is quite possible that the researchers who unearthed the documents, or the
editors who collated this collection, might have missed critical information, but it would
appear doubtful, in light of the importance they placed upon the actions taken by the
various American vessels which were relatively few on station. Consequently, it is hard
to imagine that these scholars missed much. With this caveat I present my arguments and
conclusions to the reader.
No study should begin without some treatment of the relevant historiography.
However, very little history has been done on the undeclared naval war fought for nearly
three years between the French Republic and the United States from 1798 to 1801. And
practically nothing has been written about any naval relationship which developed
between the new American Navy and the Royal Navy fighting the same foe in the same
tropical waters. Certainly no scholar so far has undertaken any major study of the topic.
Perhaps the first non- contemporary work of naval history focusing upon this naval war at
all was Gardner Allen’s Our Naval War with France,2 which Professor Michael A.
Palmer described as one preoccupied with “ . . . some of the most stirring exploits in the
history of the navy . . . .”3 He decried it as containing “only a sprinkling of strategy, and

2

Gardiner W, Allen, Our Naval War with France (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909).
Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), ix-x.

3
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no operational analysis.”4 It was a kind of naval history “potboiler” published in the wake
of the round the world tour of Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, a time of heightened
public enthusiasm for all things navy.5 This was still in the time of Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s Sea Power series6 when American naval proponents were trying to sustain
Congressional recognition of the American need for a big battle fleet.7 Palmer’s
assessment of the work is largely correct and it is virtually silent upon American Navy
co-operation with the Royal Navy—the one tiny exception being a fleeting mention of
the two services’ sharing of recognition signals.8 Allen’s omission of this early
British/American naval rapprochement came despite having been written during the
years of the “Great Rapprochement” of the 1890s to 1914, as Bradford Perkins dubbed
the substantial warming of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the
United States during that period in his eponymous work on that subject.9 Perhaps that is
because Our Naval War with France is largely a chronicle of ship to ship actions and
little more.

4

Ibid., x.
The Great White Fleet circumnavigated the entire world in 1907-9. It was comprised of sixteen modern,
but pre-dreadnought battleships of the U.S.N. Atlantic fleet painted white. President Theodore Roosevelt
ordered the fleet to cruise around the world on a good will tour. It would show the American flag with
twenty stops on six continents. Department of the Navy—Naval History and Heritage Command, “The
Great White Fleet,” in Naval History and Command [website online]; available from
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq42-1.htm; internet; most recently accessed 19 June 2012.
6
A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783, twelfth ed. (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1943), 219-220; The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire: 17931812, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1898); reprint, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1968); The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1897); Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1905).
7
N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain: 660-1649, Norton paperback ed.
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), xxiii-xxiv.
8
Allen, 67.
9
Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York:
Atheneum, 1968).
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In contrast, Professor Palmer’s own work, Stoddert’s War, a study concentrating
upon American naval operations in the Quasi-War gives some, though relatively minor,
treatment to the cooperation between the two forces. He mentions it in his preface,
subtitled as “Unrattling History,” where he very correctly observed the following:
American naval operations of the Quasi-War cannot be understood
in isolation. When the ships of the United States Navy made landfall in
the Caribbean, they entered a European theater where the war had been
underway since 1793. The Royal Navy deployed four to five times more
men-of-war in the West Indies than the Americans. British ships chased
and fought the same French cruisers and privateers. Both navies escorted
each other’s merchantmen. American warships operated from British
bases. And most importantly, as this study demonstrates, British policies
and shifts in deployment within the Antilles had dramatic effects on American
operations.10
Palmer acknowledges the initial material aid provided by Whitehall to assist building the
American fleet, but what is most significant to him about it is that this formal aid never
gave birth to a de jure naval agreement between diplomats in Philadelphia and London,
or even a formal protocol between the British Admiralty and the American Navy
Department. There would be no joint operations directed from the Admirals in Whitehall,
nor Mr. Stoddert in Philadelphia. There would be no formal strategy between the powers
to combat the French guerre de course.11 Palmer’s study never went on to explore—as
this thesis will—what if any spontaneous relationship might have existed on station
between serving British and American units and how important it might have been to the
actual war effort at sea. This is understandable. Such an investigation would have been
beyond the focus of his work: a study of U.S. naval operations during that war. As
Palmer relates in his preface, operational studies are by definition concerned with

10
11

Palmer, Stoddert’s War, x.
Ibid., 74, 77-79.
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strategy and planning at the highest level;12 they are not necessarily as interested in
conditions “on the water” so to speak. And Palmer’s was not, at least as related to regular
contacts with the Royal Navy.
Palmer again wrote of the American and British navies during the Quasi-War in
an article specifically tuned to the relationship between them entitled: “Anglo-American
Naval Cooperation, 1798-1801.”13 In this seven page article Palmer once more
acknowledged the part the British played in assisting the founding of the U.S. Navy and
the operational cooperation and support they did supply in the Caribbean. However,
Palmer also reiterated his point that the relationship between the two countries never
would blossom into an official alliance. He further added that the services would not even
“cooperate as closely as might have been expected.”14 “Anglo-American Naval
Cooperation” was not an in-depth product, but a brief overview of the relationship
between the navies in which Palmer finally presented the point that because of a return to
British seizures of American merchant shipping in the Caribbean, and continued Royal
Navy impressment of American seamen, the naval relationship had deteriorated by 1801
to the point that the two countries were headed for war.
Bradford Perkins, while not a naval scholar, in two chapters of his work, The First
Rapprochement, argued that the naval relationship which did develop between the United
States and Great Britain during the Quasi-War with France was a critical part, if not the
most obvious manifestation, of a remarkable softening of relations between the two

12

Ibid., x.
Michael A. Palmer, “Anglo-American Naval Cooperation, 1798-1801,” Naval History 4, no. 22 (1990):
14-20.
14
Ibid., 16.
13
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former enemies during those years.15 While acknowledging the Adams Administration’s
desire to, if at all possible, adhere to former President George Washington’s credo to
avoid European entanglements,16 Perkins thought that the informal contacts he
chronicled, even at the highest levels of both governments, were also significant, and the
goodwill garnered outlasted the Adams presidency and Pitt’s government which fell in
February1801.17 Some of the relational afterglow between the powers remained even into
Jefferson’s Administration, at least until 1804-05.18 Peace with France through the Treaty
of Mortefontaine did not necessarily mean the automatic breakdown of relations with
Great Britain or presage the War of 1812. Perkins concluded that issues which inevitably
caused friction between England and America such as R.N. pressing of U.S. merchant
and naval tars and the seizure of American trading ships attempting neutral shipping
voyages did not return until sometime after Britain’s war with France resumed in1803.19
In truth, he pointed out that the seizure of American merchantmen, really did not hit its
stride until after the 1805 British Admiralty Court decision of the Essex reversed the
eminent admiralty jurist William Scott’s Polly decision of 1800, which had sanctioned
the doctrine of broken voyages for neutrals.20 Without this doctrine favoring neutral
American shipping, U.S. merchant vessel seizures would again increase and with them
15

Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States 1795-1805 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), chap. 8-9 passim.
16
Ibid., 112-15.
17
Ibid., chap. 8-9, 10 passim.
18
Ibid., 170-71.
19
Ibid., 171.
20
Ibid., 88-89, 177-79. The doctrine of a broken voyages had allowed American neutral shippers a loophole
for transshipment of goods in their neutral bottoms originally received from a nation or possession at war
with Britain if the shipper off loaded the goods in an American (neutral) port, paid duties upon them, and
then reshipped them as nominally American (neutral) owned goods. The Polly decision had made it the
duty of the party seeking condemnation of the goods (captor) to prove intentional subterfuge to violate the
prohibition against re-exporting those goods to Britain or elsewhere as part of a continuous voyage. Ibid.,
86-89.
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heightened tensions between the two nations.21 Inconveniently, this roughly also
coincided with the sunset of the economic provisions of Jay’s treaty which were never
renewed.22
Again the pressures upon the Royal Navy during the first decade of the nineteenth
century were tremendous as Britain now alone bore the brunt of a Napoleonic
Continental trade embargo and the Emperor’s military might in Spain. These later
pressures Perkins would argue, led to the War of 1812.23 But as the Quasi-War was
winding down, so was the last of the Wars of the French Revolution. By 1802, England
and the French Republic had signed and ratified the Treaty of Amiens, which kept peace
for one year. So during that time, the R.N. could demobilize, releasing sailors from their
ships and sating its tremendous need to press them into the fleet. The necessity of seizing
Yankee ships trading to French possessions also temporarily vanished. Consequently, the
major sources of diplomatic tensions between the United States and England lessened
during Jefferson’s first term in office.24 Certainly, Perkins’s conclusions differ strikingly
from those Palmer reached in Stoddert’s War, and “Anglo-American Naval
Cooperation.”
As mentioned above, no scholar has to date mounted a major study specifically
exploring the relationship which existed between the American and British navies during
the years of the Quasi-War. This thesis represents an attempt to remedy this situation. As
described above, both Palmer and Perkins referenced the Anglo-American naval entente
as part of their studies focusing on other, often related topics, and Palmer’s brief article,
21

Ibid., 179.
Ibid., 182.
23
Ibid., 181.
24
Ibid., 171.
22
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“Anglo-American Naval Cooperation” was intended as a mere sketch of the topic. In
contrast, that naval relationship is the focus of this thesis. As a byproduct of exploring
that naval relationship, the work also demonstrates how critical the Royal Navy was to
the development of the fledgling U.S. Navy. This vital British contribution to the
founding of the American fleet, both material and cultural, is most often forgotten, or
glossed over. It is the building of Joshua Humphrey’s “Six Frigates,” and the exploits of
Thomas Truxtun which have come to dominate the narrative, as if these occurred in a
vacuum.25
Additionally, this work brings a fresh approach to largely the same sources Palmer
and Perkins utilized in their research concerning the naval war, especially Dudley Knox’s
collection, Quasi-War: namely looking for the frequency and nature of the contacts made
between the ships and men of the two navies on station. This study is less concerned with
command decisions made in the two capitals by distant officials than was Professor
Palmer. In the days when message transmissions were painfully slow, and hence even the
concept of command was much looser than we are used to in our world of instant
communication, orders to station commanders, and their orders to their ship captains,
were more in the way of suggestions. Their decisions would not and could not be
instantly countermanded. This author submits that what the actors actually did at sea was
of more significance to the carrying out of the war than what distant admiralty lords or
navy secretaries had ordered them to do. Scrutinizing documents for those sometimes
very minor, routine contacts between serving officers and men of the two navies aboard

25

Ian Toll’s book on the founding of the U.S. Navy is even entitled: Six Frigates: The Epic History of the
Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).
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their ships at sea provides powerful insight into what was actually occurring on station
rather than what simply examining orders might produce.
Finally, while the historiography relating to the relationship between the U.S. and
Royal Navies in the Caribbean is certainly sparse, Palmer’s and Perkins’s work do set up
key questions this work has promised to examine and attempt to answer: namely whether
the budding Anglo-American informal naval alliance was significant within the context
of its times, and whether it remained functional even as the United States Navy ceased
hostilities against the French in February 1801. Of course, this study presents the
argument that the answer was definitely affirmative to both.
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CHAPTER II
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Britain showed little interest in the new United States formed from its thirteen
Atlantic Seaboard colonies in the first decade following independence. Although the
Americans sent an accredited minister, John Adams, to the Court of St. James’s in 1785,
His Majesty’s Government failed to reciprocate.1 There would be no British Minister to
the U.S. until 1791.2 Likewise, any formal commercial connection between the two
nations vanished with America’s colonial status. There was no commercial treaty
whatsoever between them. Britain refused to open its West Indies possessions to
American merchantmen.3 The influential Earl of Sheffield, not a subscriber to the new
economic free trade philosophy espoused in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations,
released in 1776,4 in his Observations on the Commerce of the American States,
published in 1783, thoroughly adhered to the older mercantile creed and feared
competition from a new source, the United States. In Lord Sheffield’s view, the U.S. had
wanted its independence; then fine, it had its independence, and like every other foreign
nation, should be kept locked outside the Imperial trading system established by the
1
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venerable Navigation Laws. Furthermore, Sheffield argued that the American States were
so dependent upon their commerce with Britain that they would still continue doing
business with her merchants with or without a commercial treaty and even at the distinct
tariff disadvantage of now being shut outside the mercantilist wall of the Navigation
Acts.5 However, William Pitt, the young First Lord of the Treasury, was a believer in
Smith’s new gospel of free trade. Pitt sought to bring in a bill to foster a much more open
commerce with the United States. However, Parliament sided with Sheffield and Pitt’s
legislation failed.6 And with that the American states began their disastrous decade in the
economic wilderness.
To be fair to Lord Sheffield and the British Government, there were sound
reasons not to have free trade with the American states. With whom should such a treaty
be enacted? Each state separately conducted foreign and domestic trading policy. The
merchants of the United States, as Sheffield quite correctly observed, lived in a state of
economic chaos, where the national government had no powers to coerce the states or
their citizens to do anything.7 Consequently, the American Confederation Government
had no regular power of taxation, and, hence, no steady income, essentially subsisting
upon “voluntary” contributions from the state governments to conduct its business as
needed.8 As the British government agents observed, this national government had
already demonstrated its powerlessness to get the various states to enforce the debt
repayment provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which had granted their independence.
5
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Hence, American debtors ignored British creditors’ pre-independence debts.9
Furthermore, some in London circles anticipated that this weak American confederation
would spin apart and the several states beg to be returned to the Empire. Shays’ Rebellion
in Western Massachusetts, brought on by financial instability during the mid 1780s,
certainly provided evidence in support of this view.10
The ratification of the new federal constitution in 178811 meant the end of most of
this self inflicted economic chaos for the United States. The new American Federal
Government now had the power through the United States Congress to bind the several
states in the realm of national finance and taxation, as well as interstate and foreign
commerce.12 The Constitution conferred the executive authority to enforce the economic
legislation enacted by Congress upon the Office of the President.13 Foreign relations were
no longer the province of the several states but that of the central government, although
the role of the president and congress as to dictating foreign policy might yet be the
subject of debate.14 Congress soon lost no time contemplating the use of this new
economic policy muscle. Early Congressional debates concerned whether it should enact
retaliatory and discriminatory measures aimed specifically at British imports. The idea
was to give back to Britain what she had been dishing out to the U.S. for the previous ten
9
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years and perhaps bring her to the bargaining table to consider an Anglo-American trade
agreement.15 No such legislation emerged from this early congress,16 but it produced one
salutary effect for Anglo-American relations. It woke British government circles to the
threat that America’s new federal institutions now might be able to mount a credible
retaliatory trade threat.17 His Majesty’s Government now saw reason to open formal
diplomatic relations with the United States by sending a Minister Plenipotentiary, George
Hammond, to Philadelphia.18 In his “particular instructions” to Hammond then assuming
his American appointment, His Majesty’s new foreign minister, William Wyndham,
Baron Grenville, specifically directed that the diplomat keep abreast of, and find ways to
discourage Congressional action on discriminatory trade legislation impacting British
imports to the U.S.19 Prior to this, Britain had made do with the surreptitious intelligence
gathering of George Beckwith, a British confidential agent, who had no official
credentials to the American government, but had his own clandestine sources deep within
it, one in fact at cabinet rank, the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.20
The French Revolution begun in 1789 was to radically alter the existing
American/British relationship. The revolution originally enjoyed universal approbation in
America, and support in Britain, at least among the Whigs. The hope in both countries
15

Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, 38-40.
Congress did enact tariff and tonnage duties on imports but the final product gave advantages only to
American, or partly American, owned ships. All foreign ships paid at the same rate whether or not the U.S.
had a commercial treaty with them. Ibid.
17
Ibid., 41-43.
18
Bemis, Diplomatic History, 91. The U.S. had reciprocated by sending Thomas Pinckney as the first
American minister to the Court of St. James’s since John Adams had vacated the post in 1788. Ibid., 70, 91.
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson had vowed not to have the U.S. send another minister to Great Britain
until His Majesty’s Government had sent a diplomatic representative to Philadelphia. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty,
94-95.
19
William, Lord Grenville, “Particular Instructions to Hammond” in Instructions to the British Ministers to
the United States: 1791-1812 ed. Bernard Mayo (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1941), 10-11.
20
Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, 41-43, 45-48.
16

20

was that the French experience would be moderate, relatively bloodless and introduce to
Europe another constitutional government.21 But by 1792 things were already careening
out of control. The Prussian King and Austrian Emperor, watching from Berlin and
Vienna, became more and more alarmed, threatening invasion on behalf of the
“besieged” Louis XVI. Finally, as a preemptive measure, France declared war upon
Austria in April 1792. Prussia soon joined Austria and invaded France. Meanwhile,
Britons followed events from across the channel as the Paris mob raised its head again,
and effectively deposed Louis XVI in August 1792. The newly elected Constitutional
Convention abolished the monarchy and declared the French Republic on 22 September.
During the autumn of 1792 the French Republican Army forced the Austrians back into
the Austrian Netherlands and then followed with an invasion of their own, occupying that
region. The British, who considered the independence of the Low Countries essential to
their commercial survival, began to mobilize the Royal Navy to wartime strength. The
French preempted a British declaration of war with one of their own.22 And with that the
two main actors of the Wars of the French Revolution and later Napoleonic Wars were
joined in combat.
Britain and France would remain at war for some twenty years, except for the brief
one year Peace of Amiens (1802-1803). It is true that they had remained at war on and off
since 1689, through King William’s War (1689-1697), The War of the Spanish
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Succession (1701-1713), King George’s War (1744-1748 ), The Seven Years War (17561763), and the American War (1778-1783). Each of these conflicts, except perhaps the
first two had been solely over colonies, or trading rights.23 But in this new revolutionary
war, the French Revolutionaries believed their Republic itself was threatened by all of
Europe.24 The original war aim of the Allies was not to gain colonies or dynastic
territories, it was purely and simply regime change. They sought to fundamentally change
the government of France back to absolutist monarchy, by restoring the Bourbons at
gunpoint.25 It was not hard to imagine what the lot of the revolutionaries themselves
would be if France lost this war. They had killed thousands of suspected reactionary
enemies of the Revolution, many without any trial. With all Europe against them, the
Jacobins in power at the time rallied the entire population to war, the men, the women,
and the children. In a declaration of this new sense of nationhood they proclaimed:
The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall make arms and transport
provisions; the women shall make tents and uniforms, and shall serve in hospitals;
the children shall make old clothes into bandages; the old men shall go out into the
public squares to boost the soldiers’ courage and to preach the unity of the republic
and the hatred of kings.26
For the first time in European history, a whole nation’s people would be
mobilized.27 Additionally, this was now a war of ideas, the radical republicanism of the
French versus the absolute and constitutional monarchism of the Allies. The French
would be fighting for their ideals of “liberte, egalite, fraternite,” while the Allies rallied
23
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around monarchy, aristocracy and true Christian religion. When the new French
Revolutionary Armies, buoyed in battle by a fervor not seen since the wars of religion of
well more than a century before, bested the professional troops of the Prussians and
Austrians, hurling them back into the Habsburg Netherlands and the Bavarian border,
they did not stop there but marched into Holland and overthrew the existing United
Provinces, replacing it with the Batavian Republic, a puppet government controlled from
Paris.28 During the course of the war, French Revolutionary arms overran northern Italy
and sought to capture Egypt from the Ottomans.29 It seemed like all the world was turned
upside down and the old orders trembled at the potential of utter social upheaval.
William Pitt, now Prime Minister, for some ten years, despite early rhetoric
decrying Jacobin France as posing a threat to the Kingdom’s very existence,30 determined
to fight this new war, much as his father had the Seven Years War some forty years
before. He and his colleague, the Scot, Henry Dundas, saw the key to hitting France as
destroying the income from her remaining colonies, the lucrative sugar islands of the
Caribbean. They hoped that by wresting these islands away from the French Republic,
they could bankrupt it, or perhaps simply add to Britain’s share of the sugar, and coffee
trade by absorbing them into her Empire.31 St. Domingue, the western two fifths of
Hispaniola, was the most productive sugar producer in the islands, perhaps producing
more than all the British islands combined, including Jamaica, and controlling a foreign
28
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trade as great as that of the United States in the late 1780s.32 Britain dispatched Admiral
Sir John Jervis with a military taskforce to capture as many of the French Lesser Antilles
as possible. They bowled over opposition in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the other
islands, like ten pins.33 The invasion of St. Domingue even showed promise. The British
overran the port cities of Jeremie, Mole St. Nicholas, Leogane, and Port au Prince (then
called Port Republicain). The British Army was able to advance inland and lay hold of
perhaps a third of the French section of the island.34
However, the British were soon to discover that this was not William Pitt the
Elder’s war. First of all, St. Domingue was in turmoil before the British even got there.
The lofty ideals of the Revolution in1791 had touched off a maelstrom amongst the free
Mulatto and black slave populations which vastly outnumbered the white planters and
tiny petits blancs. The slaves had revolted and refused to be returned to slavery. Led by
former slave Toussaint L’Ouverture, they fought both, the planters and the advancing
British, slowly gaining the upper hand. A Republican French expedition sent out from
France and led by Victor Hugues regained Guadeloupe from the British, causing a panic
in the British Lesser Antilles and the recall of British forces from St. Domingue to protect
the remaining islands. This weakened His Majesty’s troops in Hispaniola. But it was not
force of arms that ultimately gave the advantage; it was disease. Yellow fever savaged
the British troops as it had so many times before when the British had attempted
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invasions against French and Spanish possessions in the West Indies and Spanish Main.35
Cartagena in present day Colombia some fifty years earlier had been a graveyard for the
British in the War of Jenkins Ear, when disease had decimated a large amphibious force
led by Admiral Vernon against the city, leading to his disgrace.36 So it was to be again.
British fever deaths mounted into the thousands.37 Michael Duffy estimated that by 1801
there were 64,250 to 69,250 British dead from all causes in the West Indies.38
If that were not all, Pitt had totally misread how the French viewed the conflict.
They were not after colonial gains or trade advantages as they had been so many times
before. They did not dream of the return of British North America, or expanding their
sugar island holdings. They were in a life and death struggle on the Continent of Europe,
and they were winning. They had already expanded the borders of France to an extent, of
which Louis XIV had only dreamed. By 1797, the now ruling Directory had ordered their
most promising young general, Napoleon Bonaparte, to prepare for an invasion of
England itself. His army, now styled the Armee d’Angleterre was massing on the English
Channel, awaiting an opportune time to cross and export the Revolution to the “Nation of
Shopkeepers.”39 During the winter of 1796-97, another French Army led by General
Hoche had been preparing to invade Ireland and aid Wolfe Tone’s rebel Society of
United Irishmen.40
To add to Pitt’s difficulties, all was not well within Britain’s primary defense force
against invasion. The Royal Navy, which had stood stalwart for a century against French
35
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invasion threats41 now mutinied at its primary anchorage at Spithead and at the Nore. On
Easter Sunday 1797 when Admiral Lord Bridport ordered the fleet to sea, with one
signal, three cheers from the crew of the flagship, H.M.S. Queen Charlotte, answering
ship’s companies from Battleships and frigates throughout the fleet, refused to make sail.
They struck their sails in defiance of their officers. No one was intentionally harmed. In
time, “bumptious” officers were put ashore. Sympathetic ones remained aboard. For there
was sympathy amongst much of the officer corps for the ratings’ primary demand: an
increase in wages. Royal Navy tars had not received a pay increase since the days of
Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector in the 1650s.42 Inflation had sapped their earnings
which even then were in practice mainly tendered when a ship was “paid off,” meaning
decommissioned. In wartime this would not happen unless a vessel’s refitting was so
extensive that the ship required docking for a lengthy period. Hence, payment could be
infrequent.43 Demands for a pay increase had been addressed to the outgoing fleet
commander, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, known affectionately in the fleet as “Black
Dick.” He had forwarded them on to the Admiralty Office where the Lords
Commissioners had ignored them until they realized demands had also been sent on to
41
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influential members of Parliament. By the time the First Lord of the Admiralty, George,
Earl Spencer realized something was up in the fleet at Spithead and warned incoming
commander, Admiral Bridport, it was too late. The sailors’ plan already was in motion.
The Admiralty ordering the fleet to sea to head off trouble was the signal to mutiny.44
Now there was only one thing for it. That was to negotiate a settlement before the
French fleet might learn of the strike and come out with Napoleon’s army in tow. The
strikers, by now savvy to governmental procedures and useless promises, demanded that
Parliament be involved. They would not withdraw the strike until Parliament had enacted
their demanded raise, and, the King had given the Royal Assent. When delays sewed
deserved suspicion amongst the ratings that they had been betrayed, the mutiny resumed.
The Admiralty brought back “Black Dick,” himself, to help with the negotiations. An
accord was struck granting an agreed pay raise, the promise that the most disagreeable
officers would be re-assigned, and the hated purser’s pound abolished.45 Parliament
eventually enacted the measures, and the Crown gave the Royal Assent. The strike over,
the fleet put to sea from Spithead. The Great Mutiny had been remarkably free of
violence. The fear of disloyalty had also been misplaced for the tars had declared that at
any sign of the French coming out, they would have made sail and fought.46
However, the mutiny at the Nore was another matter. Whereas the mutiny at
Spithead had proceeded under the well ordered management of a committee of delegates
44
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from each of the capital ships, that at the Nore had broken out afterward in May without
organization, or well conceived demands. In many ways the more radical Nore mutiny—
the mutineers had actually attacked the Articles of War, the very organizational structure
of the Navy—had been the most dangerous and frightening for the nation. It was joined
by units of the North Sea Fleet which had been standing in readiness to face the Dutch,
now French puppets, believed to be preparing their fleet at the Texel to come out to fight,
in all likelihood to cover Napoleon’s proposed invasion. The mutineers also at one point
effected a blockade of the Thames and Medway Estuaries, which had the potential to
starve and freeze London. The capital city relied heavily upon the river for both its food
and coal shipments.47 In contrast to the amicable resolution at Spithead, the mutiny at the
Nore was suppressed. Its chief, Richard Parker, was hanged from the yard arm of H.M.S.
Sandwich. With the mutiny crushed, the North Seas Fleet then put to sea and mauled the
Dutch at the Battle of Camperdown that autumn.48
If invasion threats and mutinies in the fleet were not enough, Britain faced severe
economic woes. The Pitt government had been bankrolling the Allies on the Continent
for some time as well as mounting the very costly operations in the Caribbean, mostly on
tick. Consequently, with the huge gold payments going out to maintain Allied armies,
there was little enough specie left in the country for domestic needs. News of General
Hoche’s invasion force headed for Ireland to aid Tone’s rebel United Irishmen and then
subsequent word of another led by Colonel William Tate and his Legion Noire, largely an
army of conscripted criminals, landing on the remote northwest coast of Wales, touched
off a run on the Bank of England. Fears of invasion and a massive loan request from the
47
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Irish government in consequence of Hoche’s appearance at Bantry Bay had deeply
threatened the Bank’s specie holdings. Britons throughout the kingdom had begun to
withdraw gold from their banks in the shires. The 25 February edition of the
Extraordinary Gazette reported the news that had reached the Admiralty the day before
that Tate’s troops had landed in Wales. Crowds descended on the Bank to demand their
holdings in coin. By 26 February, the Privy Council had issued orders in council for the
movement of the Bank to a paper note standard for its gold holdings.49 Never mind that
Tate’s invasion was a complete bust because the Welsh had failed to rally to his colors—
British troops rounded up his men within three days of their landing50—or that Hoche’s
force never had set foot upon Irish soil because the weather had been so foul that an
amphibious landing was impossible, or that his ships had limped back to France driven
by dirty weather,51 the damage was done. The nation was on tenterhooks. And so it would
remain for the British people during the annus horribilis that was 1797.
For American mariners the new war meant one thing, the chance for huge profits.
The French, whose West Indies possessions had to some extent been open for American
trading vessels before the conflict, had now flung open the gates. American merchants
sent cargos of food, lumber, and other staples to immediately take advantage of the new
opportunities. The French were eager to have neutral bottoms carry their supplies. They
did not have enough ships themselves and were under blockade in Europe. Besides, the
neutrals selling their own produce and manufactures of these kinds were believed to be
immune to seizure under international law. These items were not contraband of war, not
49
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weaponry, munitions, or products associated with the paraphernalia of war.
Unfortunately, the British read contraband of war differently to conclude, anything which
might be used to support enemy combatants, including corn and other foodstuffs.52
Hence, American merchantmen laden with such cargoes were subject to capture by
British men of war and privateers as good prizes. This was the position His Majesty’s
Privy Councilors had taken in their Order-in-Council issued 6 November 1793. Sadly,
American merchants and their skippers had not seen this Order-in-Council which only
became public in December 1793.53 By then unsuspecting American vessels heavily
laden with foodstuffs intended to provision the French sugar islands were already on
station in the Caribbean as were British privateers and men of war already armed with
this knowledge. The Jonathans sailed unwittingly into a trap. The British privateers and
men of war found rich, slow, unarmed, unsuspecting prizes by the score. By 1 March
1794, British flagged corsairs and men of war had seized more than 250 Yankee vessels
and had escorted them into port. There the ships and cargoes had rotted while their crews
had languished pending adjudication. Local Admiralty courts in the islands condemned
150 of them.54 The Americans were utterly guileless at the time, trading with non-forged
manifests and destination papers. This would not be so later.
These seizures set off an uproar when news of them reached the United States.
There were stories of mistreatment of American crews and passengers, of Americans
confined in “fever-ridden prison hulks” in steamy island anchorages.55 Americans had
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learned of many cases where vessels had never been heading to French ports in the first
place, and were laden only with American owned cargoes, but never the less, suffered
capture. As these spoliations continued, the public mood only soured toward England.56
Even those who were Anglophiles, such as Alexander Hamilton, were outraged. The
British Minister, Hammond, saw his hard work towards keeping the young Republic
neutral despite French sympathy and support being undone.57 Something had to be done
as the popular mind drifted toward the hitherto unthinkable alternative of war.
This seaborne commerce was not the only arena where resentment of the British
was growing. Westerners, meaning settlers to the new Ohio territory, were concerned
with the failure of the British to withdraw their frontier forts and trading posts. The
settlers, with some cause, believed these posts, and the British who manned them, were
the source of much of the Indian unrest in what would be now termed the Old Northwest.
Two American armies sent to pacify belligerent tribes in the territory had suffered utter
routs at the hands of the Indians. The British in the area were believed to be feeding the
resentment by encouraging tribal confederations to hold to a settlement line creating an
Indian buffer territory between the U.S, and the new British colony of Upper Canada.58
American Commissioners sent to treat with the Indians had had to suffer a safe conduct
from the new governor of Upper Canada, Simcoe, and rely upon British officers to
transport and guard them in the wilderness. These official “minders” were there, as far as
Simcoe was concerned to “guide’ the negotiations along paths favorable to British North
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American interests59—keeping the Americans boxed in behind the Appalachian
Mountains and so posing no threat to British North America by any realistic notions of
expansion to the Pacific. They intended to nip American dreams of manifest destiny in
the bud.60 Simcoe viewed with suspicion a new American army now readying in Ohio.
Unlike the two earlier ones, this one was put together with some forethought.61 Its
commander, General “Mad” Anthony Wayne, a hero of the Revolutionary War, had
taken the time to see that his army received ample equipment, and was well trained and
disciplined before setting out to meet an enemy. Wayne was also known to be a very able
field commander. To Simcoe, an army such as Wayne’s posed a threat not just to the
Indians in the Ohio Territory, but to British Canada itself. He had convinced himself that
Wayne’s actual objective was the British fort at Detroit. The intent to simply treat or war
only with the Indians was a smokescreen. Simcoe then refortified the old stronghold on
the Miami River and moved there much of the Detroit garrison. This in itself was a
provocative move towards the Americans, effectively re-establishing a military base well
inside American territory as defined by the Treaty of Paris, especially when put in the
context of having refused to abandon its border posts on the American side of the frontier
for the last eleven years.62 Taken together, the British seizures of American merchantmen
in the West Indies and the border troubles in the Old Northwest made for a tense
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diplomatic situation between the two nations. They were drifting towards war in the
spring of 1794.
However, the United States and Great Britain did manage to avoid an untimely war
in 1794. President George Washington determined to try and resolve the problem with
diplomacy. He dispatched the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John
Jay, as a special minister plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James’s with the brief of
concluding a treaty with England that would resolve a critical list of disputes including
vacating the border posts, opening trade with Britain’s West Indian possessions, and
gaining compensation for seizures of the American merchant marine carrying food,
lumber and other supplies to the French as neutrals.63 Jay arrived in London and talks got
under way with Lord Grenville, Britain’s foreign minister and one of His Majesty’s
Secretaries of State. Historians have opined as to how Grenville flattered Jay and got the
best of him in the eventual bargain.64 But the truth was that no one wanted war, that it
was absolutely imperative that the United States compel Britain to evacuate its sovereign
territory in the Northwest, that American merchants receive compensation for the
captures, and that American bottoms gain some certain access to Britain’s West Indies
trading system. All three objectives were obtained from the document now termed Jay’s
Treaty signed 19 November 1794, but not fully ratified and effective until 1796.65
Additionally, a commission was set up to resolve the ambiguous St. Croix boundary issue
left by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and commissions to resolve the claims of British
63

Elkins and McKitrick, 397-98.
Samuel Flagg Bemis was one of these historians. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, 205-06. Stanley Elkins and Eric
McKitrick and Joseph Ellis in their respective works have argued that the treaty, largely the brainchild of
Hamilton, reflected a far reaching vision that the United States’ economic future be tied to Britain’s
economic star and not that of France. Elkins and McKitrick, 396-400; Ellis, 136-37.
65
Elkins and McKitrick, 410-12.
64

33

creditors against American citizens predating the War of Independence. The treaty was
silent as to future seizures of American merchantmen under the British interpretation of
contraband goods, effectively leaving the rule of 1756 in place, and also to the Royal
Navy’s forced conscription of American seamen into its fleets. As Jay had to realize,
these were truly non-negotiable for Britain at that time considering that its main weapon
against France was the Royal Navy with its blockade strategy, and its overriding hunger
for seamen which in wartime it had no realistic chance to sate without the naval press. He
took what he could get, and returned to America.
However, upon returning home with the treaty, Jay was an instant villain. To many,
he had sold out the honor of the young republic and toadied up to their former oppressor.
He was pilloried in the popular press and burned in effigy from one end of the nation to
the other when word of the treaty’s provisions became known. Washington himself had
presented it in secret to the Senate for that body’s approval, arguably hoping to head off
the resulting tumult—that would be the interpretation given to it by the Republican press.
Approval in the Senate was no guaranteed proposition either. But pass it did by the
narrowest of margins and Washington signed it. And despite a rearguard action fought by
James Madison in the House of Representatives trying to withhold funds for the treaty’s
execution, it became the law of the land.66
But ordinary Americans were not the only ones unhappy with Jay’s Treaty. When
word had reached Paris through the medium of the London newspapers, the new French
Republican Government, the Directory, felt distinctly betrayed. Since the beginning of
the war with England, the government of Revolutionary France had been disappointed
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with the response of the United States to its sister republic’s predicament. The United
States had declared a strict policy of neutrality despite its obligation to guarantee
protection to France’s West Indies possessions under the 1778 Franco-American treaty of
alliance.67 Recognizing that the Americans had no naval armament to do so, the new
French minister sent to the American republic in 1793, Citizen Edmond Genet, never the
less had expected to be able to establish French privateer bases in American ports. As
soon as he had landed in Charleston, he had set about issuing French privateer charters to
Americans wishing to fit out privateers to harass British shipping. He also expected to
empower French consuls resident in American ports to exercise French Admiralty
jurisdiction over prizes brought into those ports by French corsairs.
Before the U.S. Federal Government was aware of his intentions, some of Genet’s
privateers already had put to sea and even returned with British prizes in tow. Upon
learning what Citizen Genet was up to, the Washington Administration had objected
strenuously and directed Genet to halt issuing privateer charters to any Americans
intending to outfit privateers from an American flagged seaport. Genet had bitterly
resented the American cabinet’s position which he believed violated the spirit, if not the
letter, of the 1778 treaty between the then Kingdom of France and the United States. He
refused to stop and attempted to appeal directly to the American people as against their
elected officials. An ugly situation had resulted when federal marshals had arrested
American sailors who had enlisted upon a Genet corsair. Then there was the case of the
British ship, Little Sarah, captured as a prize by the French national frigate Embuscade
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and interned by French officials at Philadelphia pending rearming as a French privateer in
defiance of Washington’s directive forbidding such actions. Confronted by Pennsylvania
State officials acting under Governor Mifflin’s orders, Genet had threatened to sail
regardless. The French Minister upbraided first the Pennsylvania Secretary of State, and
the next day, U.S. Secretary of State Jefferson for standing in the way. Mifflin, Treasury
Secretary Hamilton, and Secretary of War Knox, then proposed setting up canon on Mud
Island to bar the vessel, now renamed Little Democrat, from clearing the harbor. In the
end, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, despite being a Francophile, at Washington’s
behest, sent word to France requesting that Paris recall the minister. The Jacobin
Committee for Public Safety, led by Robespierre, was only too happy to oblige,
requesting the Americans to arrest the Girondin Genet, and send him back to France in
chains. Instead, the minister’s credentials simply were withdrawn, and he requested and
received asylum in America, having no doubts as to what would have awaited him upon
his return to a Montagnard dominated Paris.68
With Genet gone, Philadelphia’s immediate relations with the French Government
did improve superficially as the new minister, Fauchet sought to avoid the errors of his
predecessor, even to the point of cultivating key Anglophile Federalists to the dismay of
the French Republic’s Democratic-Republican friends in Congress.69 He also avoided
meddling in domestic politics as Genet had, declining to join in early 1794 the battle
raging in Congress led by James Madison himself, leader of the Democratic-Republicans
in the House of Representatives, to establish a system of protective tariffs –an American
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Navigation Act—and thereby wrench the United States from the economic orbit of
France’s deadliest enemy, Great Britain. Whether his aid would have assisted Madison’s
goal, is uncertain, but without it, the measure failed in the Senate by the tie-breaking vote
of Vice-President Adams.70 Fauchet also failed to get to first base in negotiating a new
Franco-American commercial treaty per his instructions from the new Jacobin Committee
of Public Safety. And the chief negotiator for the Washington Administration was the
new Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph—Jefferson having retired to Monticello—the
only member of the cabinet left reasonably sympathetic to France.71 Put in perspective,
these failures had occurred at what would have seemed an auspicious juncture to be
pleading the French Republic’s case. The United States was even then verging upon war
with Great Britain over the border problems in the Ohio Territory and British seizures of
American shipping in the West Indies. Finally, he was especially concerned when
President Washington appointed the Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, as a
special envoy to London to resolve the disputes with England—he suspected Jay’s
instructions included negotiating a commercial treaty—but he failed or purposely did not
warn his colleague, Leblanc, then heading back to France, of his suspicions.72 Could a
better managed diplomatic campaign have tipped the scales for France, by ensuring antiBritish protectionism, or by whipping up the Ohio Frontier standoff into a hot war, or
perhaps by heading off or foiling Jay’s mission? Perhaps it could have. But astute
observers might not have bet against Jay’s mission to avert war with England in 1794
whoever France had stationed in America.
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For there were deeper issues complicating the Franco-American relationship
suggested Frenchmen who had been resident in the United States. The ex-Bishop of
Autun, the now out of favor diplomat, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, had
remarked during his exile in the United States that America was “English.” Talleyrand
had lived in the home of Aaron Burr in New York and worked as a financial trader and
speculator. While there he had made some shrewd observations about which he had later
written. What struck him very much was how “English” the United States was in spite of
itself. Its citizens might express pro-Gallic sentiments, but these were really surface
veneer.73 Reading from a paper he presented at the National Institute in Paris in 1797 he
told his audience: “In every part of America through which I travelled, I have not found a
single Englishman who did not feel himself an American, not a single Frenchman who
did not find himself a stranger.”74 The truth was that America was virtually tuned to
Britain in everything that really mattered and shaped American thought and being. The
American language was English. Works of fiction read in America were most often
English novels. The American theatre was dominated by the English stage, including
travelling thespians out from England performing revivals of earlier Drury Lane hits.75
Tastes for English goods dominated; French goods simply did not sell as well. American
consumers preferred to purchase products they were familiar with and trusted. Similarly,
merchants preferred to do business with those with whom they were familiar, especially
if the credit there was longer as well. And British merchants were in a position to extend
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much longer credit than the French.76 And the leader of the Federalist Party, that which
held most of the portfolios in Washington’s cabinet and controlled the Senate, knew this.
Alexander Hamilton, who had been repelled by the late excesses of the French
Revolution like so many of his English “cousins” across the Pond, had believed
America’s future lay tied up with British commerce and his economic scheme now also
dictated the young republic’s foreign policy goals. Maintaining peace with England was
paramount for Hamilton’s Federalists. Their government’s only real source of revenue
derived from tariffs on the brisk trade with the former mother country. And without a
reliable revenue stream, without the resulting sound credit, there would return the
economic chaos and social instability of the Confederation Government, which had
threatened to spin the several states apart into disunion where they would be ripe for the
plucking by any interested power, perhaps even England and France themselves. The
issue for Hamilton was independence.77
Rumors of a new treaty between Britain and America, signed in November 1794,
had reached Paris in December 1794, but no one, let alone the American Minister to the
Convention, knew its actual provisions. The text of the treaty had only arrived at the
American seat of government 7 March 1795. By orders of Washington, only Secretary of
State Randolph and he had access to its text until it would be given to the Senate to be
convened 8 June to consider approval.78 Therefore, the new French Minister to
Philadelphia, Pierre-Auguste Adet—Fauchet had just been recalled—had received no
instructions from his government on how to deal with it before leaving Paris. He had only
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suspicions echoed by Fauchet who had not yet left Philadelphia that the treaty bode ill for
French interests. Never the less, Adet undertook efforts to defeat the unpopular treaty’s
ratification in the U.S. Senate which proved unsuccessful.79 Senators who were already
friends of France, or who simply disliked what they viewed as the servile tone of the
treaty, or who might be persuaded by the lobbying of the French diplomat, could simply
not muster the one third plus one minority needed to deny ratification. Instead, voting had
proceeded entirely upon party lines: twenty Federalists for, ten Democratic-Republicans
against. After Adet had purchased a copy of the treaty from Virginia Senator Stevens T.
Mason and given it to Aurora editor Benjamin Franklin Bache, who had printed and
distributed it, the minister attempted to bring public pressure upon Washington not to
complete ratification by withholding his signature. By this time, as mentioned previously,
the country was aflame against the treaty as large segments of the public urged the
President not to sign. Elkins and Mckitrick in the Age of Federalism argue that
Washington finally had recognized the “sinister”, invisible hand of the French
Government behind opposition to the treaty, trying to drive a wedge between Britain and
America for its own purposes, even to provoke war. Hence, in the end, he had decided to
buck public sentiment and delay ratification no more.80
As a result there were unpleasant rumblings issuing from the Directory during the
winter and spring of 1796 following the treaty’s proclamation. Lord Grenville in London
detected them through his intelligence sources on the Continent and relayed these
apprehensions to the new British Minister in Philadelphia, Robert Liston, in a dispatch
79
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dated 18 March 1796. The warning sent to Liston indicated that a new French Minister,
Monsieur Fontaine, would present a note to the American Government that the new treaty
made between Great Britain and the U.S.A. abrogated the latter’s 1778 treaty with France
and demanding within fifteen days an answer to French complaints based upon the treaty.
To add gravity to the demands, the message would be coordinated with the appearance of
a French naval squadron off the American coast. Lord Grenville directed Mr. Liston that
if the French openly acted upon these threats, to inform the Washington Administration
that His Majesty’s Government would be “ready to enter into such engagements with the
United States as may appear best calculated to repel an aggression of this nature and
make common Cause against an Attack which can be dictated by no other motive than by
a desire, to prevent the Establishment of a good understanding between Great Britain and
the United States….”81 In the event, the Directory did not send Monsieur Fontaine to
America and never sent such a message to Philadelphia. The new U.S. Minister to Paris,
James Monroe, had urged the French against such a drastic move and, instead, privately
intimated that they await the presidential election of 1796 to remove Washington and
repair the rift.82 The French had taken Monroe’s advice and attempted through Monsieur
Adet’s offices—he had not left the United States after all—to influence the outcome of
the election. When in September 1796 Washington had decided not to run, the French
had thrown their influence behind the Democratic-Republican candidate, Thomas
Jefferson. When the people instead elected another Federalist, albeit, one like
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Washington not believing in party faction, the Directory again altered their approach.83
They now elected to openly commence a guerre de course, a war upon seagoing
commerce, with the United States.
In reality, the French had already begun a limited war upon America’s neutral
commerce back when the conflict had begun against America’s chief trading partner,
England. The French Revolutionary Government had issued decrees in 1793
countenancing the seizure of foodstuffs and enemy owned goods—read British—en route
to enemy ports.84 This had affected American provision ships selling to the British and
recently British-conquered French possessions in the West Indies, though on a much
smaller scale than the British depredations upon French-bound cargoes of the same time.
Just as the British had modified their positions against neutral shipping, the French had
relaxed theirs, or excepted American merchantmen carrying non-contraband goods
wherever bound. 85But, as the Jay Treaty had become a reality, promising American
rapprochement with Great Britain, the rumblings from Paris had produced evidence of
what was to come. In July 1796 the Directory had issued an ambiguous decree directing
that hence forth French naval and privateer vessels would treat neutral shipping as the
neutrals would suffer Britain to treat them. What this mysterious arête actually meant no
one really knew. It would, of course, be impossible for French warships and privateers,
let alone, French colonial prize courts to know what British Admiralty courts were then
doing to neutral shipping. As some commentators have opined, what it really did was
give carte blanche to those commanders and courts who so desired to exercise wide
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jurisdiction to seize neutral, especially American shipping, in the West Indies.86 Some
like Victor Hugues, the infamous Jacobin governor of Guadeloupe, sometimes known as
“the Colonial Robespierre,”87 issued their own decrees against American commerce. On
1 August 1796, Hugues had directed that all neutral vessels transporting contraband were
subject to seizure wherever they were sailing. On 1 February 1797, he had followed up
with a decree subjecting neutral vessels sailing to any of the former French West Indies
colonies now held by the British.88 In London, Rufus King, the U.S. Minister to the Court
of St. James’s, had written to Alexander Hamilton, observing of French conduct:
France will harass and waste our commerce, regardless of justice. She makes our
treaty with England the pretence. Had we no treaty her conduct would have been
the same. She has recently required of Hamburg and Bremen to suspend and
prohibit all commerce with England . . . .The demand has likewise been repeated at
Copenhagen . . . .89
As the March 1797 inauguration of the president-elect, John Adams, approached,
the French position toward American commerce became even more strident. On 2 March
the Directory issued a decree declaring that any American ship not having on board a
document called the role d’equipage, a list of the crew and their specific nationalities in
the proper form prescribed by Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778—the model
document was alleged to be attached to the treaty—was to be considered a good prize. No
American ship carried such a list. In nearly twenty years of commerce under the treaty,
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the French had never required one. With no advance notice, all American merchantmen
were liable to seizure under this arête. It also provided that American tars captured
serving aboard an enemy man of war or privateer were to be regarded and punished as
pirates, whether serving voluntarily or pressed.90 The Government of Metropolitan
France now appeared to have adopted the more radical position of its West Indies
colonies.
Thus, when John Adams became president on 4 March 1797, he inherited a foreign
relations mess regarding the French Republic. Washington, his august predecessor, left
office successfully having steered the young republic between the Scylla and Charybdis
of warring Britain and France for nearly his entire second term. Now it would be
Adams’s turn at the helm. Adams later described in a letter to his wife Abigail how
Washington’s countenance fairly beamed as he stood on the dais watching Adams taking
the oath of office. He wrote: “Me thought I heard him think, ‘Ay! I am fairly out and you
are fairly in! See which of us will be the happiest!”91 Adams naturally subscribed to
Washington’s credo of avoiding war with either of the belligerent powers. The United
States, after all, had treaties with both and traded with both. But at each turn the French
appeared to be escalating the crisis. The French had recalled their minister, M. Adet,
during the autumn of 1796 and had sent no replacement.92 Adams would soon learn of the
French Directory’s arête issued two days before he assumed office, vastly widening the
scope of seizures of American merchant shipping. A reconvened Congress would soon

90

1st French Republic, “Decree of the Executive Directory, 12th Ventose, 5th year,” 2 March 1797, in
American State Papers: Foreign Relations 2:30-32, available from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage;
Internet; most recently accessed 12 March 2012; Elkins and McKitrick, 552; Michael A. Palmer, 5.
91
John Adams to Abigail Adams, 5 March 1797, quoted in McCullough, 469.
92
Elkins and McKitrick, 538.

44

request a report from the State Department as to the status of French depredations
committed against American seafarers. Timothy Pickering, Adams’s holdover Secretary
of State from the Washington Administration, would in June deliver a catalogue of woe
carried out by French corsairs against unarmed U.S. trading vessels since 1 October 1796.
Additionally there would be listed embargoes of American vessels in Metropolitan
French seaports, shipments of supplies delivered to French planters and merchants in the
West Indies but left unpaid for, accounts of tortures perpetrated against Yankee skippers
to force false admissions of destination so as to seize a vessel, and other outrages.93
Additionally, word would arrive from France in mid-March that the Directory had denied
recognition to the new U.S. Minister to Paris, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney by officially
ignoring him for weeks, and finally sending a minor functionary to direct him and his
family to leave the country. Requesting this directive in writing the family waited weeks
before it arrived and they left for Amsterdam. The functionary had specifically told
Pinckney that the French Republic would not accept an American minister until the
American Republic resolved its disputes with France. This treatment was completely
outside the norm of diplomatic custom and a tremendous insult to the United States.94
Before learning of these latest outrages, even before his inauguration Adams had
weighed his options. He could ask Congress to enact an embargo or for a declaration of
war. He might even have the request for war prevail—his Federalist Party had its war
hawks—but a substantial portion of the nation would not be with him at this juncture,
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would yet be sympathetic to France. Going to war as divided as the nation would be
might be courting disaster, as the United States would later discover in 1812.The other
option he considered was the obvious precedent that Washington set when presented with
a roughly analogous situation in 1794 with England. Washington had elected to send a
special peace mission to England. It had been a last ditch step to stave off dreaded war.
Despite the many insults to the American Flag, Adams was determined to give diplomacy
one more try by dispatching his own peace delegation to France to hopefully work out a
Gallic Jay’s Treaty.95
There were very sound reasons to do so. Rufus King had detailed some of these in a
letter to Secretary Pickering dated 19 April. King recounted how the war was going very
badly for France’s opponents. Russia with its new Tsar Paul was indifferent to the war as
was Prussia, unless it concerned the Partition of Poland. England, bankroller of the
alliance, King noted, was financially stretched to the limit, her Royal Navy now hobbled
by mutiny, and her people war weary and despairing. Austria, he described as exhausted
and suing for terms.96 It was not an auspicious time to go to war against France. Even
Hamilton, who detested everything the French Revolution now stood for, had agreed.
Writing to King, he had advocated a peace mission to France, but also believed it prudent
for the United States to arm while negotiating.97 Perhaps this last reason was dispositive
for Federalists in the government and Democratic-Republicans in opposition. The U.S.
really had no armed forces. Its regular army was miniscule by the standards of Europe’s
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smallest states and it had no navy whatsoever. To seriously arm, it would take time.
Negotiations whether they failed or not, would buy time.
In the end, President Adams decided on three peace commissioners: Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry. Pinckney, an eminent but
moderate Federalist, was still in Europe after his original rejection by the French as the
American Minister to the Republic. John Marshall, the youngest of the three, was a
reliable Federalist of ability. In January 1801 Adams would appoint him Chief Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court. He would effectively lay the foundation of Constitutional
jurisprudence for the thirty some years he held the post. Elbridge Gerry rounded out the
commission. He was of Democratic- Republican sympathies, but also a Massachusetts
man, and an old friend of John Adams.98 Marshall sailed from Philadelphia 20 July 1797
and Gerry from Boston on 23 July. Marshall landed in Holland where he joined
Pinckney, and travelled together to Paris. Gerry arrived in the French Capital a few days
later.99
On 8 October the three American diplomats briefly met unofficially at his home
with the Directory’s new foreign minister, none other than Charles Maurice de
Talleyrand-Perigord. Talleyrand was a laicized, former Catholic Bishop and moderate
revolutionary who had escaped the Reign of Terror in exile, first in England and then
America.100 However, there would never be an official acknowledgement of the envoys’
arrival or acceptance of their credentials. The diplomatic farce that followed would enter
history as the “XYZ Affair.” Talleyrand kept the Americans waiting for weeks for their
98
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official reception. Instead they were to be visited by four men and later a woman, the men
sometimes in tandem, claiming to be “agents” of Talleyrand, and subsequently known as
W, X, Y, and Z in the official dispatches presented to the U.S. Congress. These “agents”
made it clear that the price of negotiating with M. Talleyrand was a doceur of 1.2 million
livres (approximately $250,000), plus the offer of a $6 million loan from the United
States to the French Republic. Without the payment and loan, there could be no official
diplomacy between the Americans and the French Government. The agents also indicated
that the Directory wanted the U.S. commissioners to disavow a 19 May 1797 speech
President Adams had given to Congress which the Directors deemed bellicose. The
attitude of the Americans was predictable: outrage. It was not because of payment; the
United States was already paying the Dey of Algiers for peace as part of a signed treaty.
It was the idea that Americans had to pay a price to be officially received by the French at
all. They judged this just another insult piled upon those previously heaped upon
American shipping, and the rude earlier treatment of Pinckney.101 When pressed by one
of these agents for an answer to the demand for money, Pinckney is said to have
exclaimed: “It is no, no, not a sixpence.”102 Then the envoys were threatened with war if
no money was forthcoming.
This series of contacts, and some informally by Gerry with Talleyrand himself,
dragged on through the autumn and into winter. It did not help the mood of the
commissioners that while these ‘meetings” were ongoing with the agents they received
word that on 17 October Napoleon had forced the Austrians to capitulate at Campo
Formio in Italy. The military threats of the agents seemed all the more real. Marshall, for
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one, presumed an invasion of Britain was now imminent.103 In January 1798 the
delegates presented a document to the Directory outlining the depredations committed
upon American shipping and citizens along with a defense of the 1794 treaty reached
with Britain. This proved to no avail, because in the interval, the Directory had issued a
decree that settled the issue for the commissioners. On 18 January it had declared that
American ships carrying any British produced articles, no matter their owner or where
bound, even to French ports, were deemed to be a good prize, including the entire cargo,
and the vessel itself.104 This arête went beyond the bounds of any international law of the
time as the British foreign Minister, Lord Grenville, recognized when he heard of the
Directory’s message to the French legislative bodies preceding the decree. He said as
much in a letter to his minister in Philadelphia, Liston, predicting that any resulting action
would directly lead to hostilities between the United States and France. Grenville then
directed Liston to be prepared to offer assistance to the American Government.105 The
arête was, for all intents and purposes, a declaration of war at sea.
Even before the actual decree had issued from the Directory ordering seizure and
condemnation of any neutral shipping containing any goods of English origin aboard,
Lord Grenville himself had offered Rufus King, the American Minister in London, any
assistance he could render, including holding up the regular transatlantic packet ship for
any urgent dispatches King might want to send on to his government in America.106 His
Majesty’s Government had been following the deterioration of the French-American
relationship with interest. Lord Grenville had first offered the possibility of aid to the
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United States back in 1796 when intelligence sources had warned him the French were
about to issue an ultimatum backed by the appearance of a menacing French naval
squadron off the American coast. That threat had not of course materialized at that time.
Never the less, the offer had made an impression upon Americans, at least those living in
or trading with Britain, that former enemies might become fast friends in the face of
French aggression. When French depredations had worsened during 1796 and 1797,
American traders in Britain had sought permission to join the regular British convoys
travelling down the English Channel and past the Western Approaches toward the
Americas. King had at that time told Grenville that the decision to request aid from
another government was for him, the United States Minister, to make—not private
citizens. It was a matter of foreign policy to be decided by the American Government in
Philadelphia.107 The proud republic was trying to avoid the appearance of being a
dependent or of assuming an obligation to a foreign power which later might prove a
liability. But King had not ruled out the idea should the situation later change to warrant
it. King simply had not then felt it was the time.108 Now, in light of the Directory’s new
policy of general seizure of neutral—read American—shipping, the time had arrived. He
now promptly wrote to Pickering apprising him of the huge change in the situation, and
that circumstances dictated that he must act without prior instructions, and so would be
requesting that the Spring American shipping leaving Britain would be held up until
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escorted with the regular British spring convoys departing England.109 He also promptly
wrote Grenville to accept the offer.110
Meanwhile, no official word had arrived from America’s peace mission to the
French until a packet of dispatches, most being in cipher, including Pinckney’s, arrived in
Philadelphia from Paris on 4 March 1798. Only the message not written in code could be
read immediately. Dated 8 January, it conveyed the commissioners’ opinion that they
believed the mission was hopeless as there was no prospect of being officially received
by the French Government.111 The president on 5 March passed on to congress the
envoys’ message that the peace delegation had failed to resolve the disputes with France
because the Directory denied them official recognition. Adams simply informed the
legislators that now they would need to take action to protect the nation’s merchant
marine.112 Deciding upon a specific course of action would need to await the decoding of
the remaining dispatches.
It took days to decode the XYZ dispatches which related the whole prolonged and
tortured process of humiliation the American peace delegates had endured in Paris.113
Also arriving12 March 1798 was a letter from Mr. King in London with an enclosed
encrypted letter from Pinckney dated 27 December 1797 that very simply related how the
French through their foreign minister, M. Talleyrand, had refused repeatedly to formally
receive the American envoys unless “tribute under the disguise of a loan or other
disguise” plus a “private douceur of fifty thousand pounds Sterling” be paid. Pinckney
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further advised that Marshall had drafted a statement factually outlining the American
grievances which the American ministers intended to present directly to the French. With
the unlikely prospect of a settlement, he related that it was their intention to request their
passports back.114 After the Adams Government had deciphered the dispatches, the
president had wrestled with which course to take. Should he ask Congress for a
declaration of war as was his first impulse? He vacillated between that alternative and
some course perhaps short of war, aware that American sentiment had favored peace
despite the huge French spoliation of American shipping.115 In the end, the president took
the latter path, addressing Congress on 19 March with a message declaring that a state of
limited hostilities now existed between France and the United States. He called for
defense measures including the protection of merchant shipping and harbors and the
manufacture of munitions. Adams also revoked the executive order through which
President Washington had forbidden the arming of merchantmen, so as to maintain
neutrality.116
Instantly, the Democratic-Republican opposition in the House of Representatives
was incredulous as to the actual content of the envoys’ dispatches. The opposition press
led by Benjamin Bache’s Aurora was wildly critical of Adams’s message to Congress,
declaring that the president was scheming to join Britain in the conflict against France
without a congressional declaration of war. Republicans clamored for the release of the
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XYZ Dispatches, certain that they would reveal that France was still open to negotiation
and Adams’s Federalists wanted this fact suppressed to facilitate war.117 In the words of
the Aurora, Adams was “afraid to tell.”118 House Republicans on 2 April called for the
President to release the actual dispatches without any redacting. House Federalists had
originally moved their release to Congress but allowing the executive branch a national
security “blue pencil” clause. However, some Federalists gleefully joined the
Republicans in calling for the release of the entire text of the dispatches, equally
confident that the documents would be damning for the pro-French cause.119 The vote to
release the dispatches easily carried in the House. The next day, the Administration
dutifully complied; House members listened shocked at how shabbily the Directory had
treated their envoys. The Republicans were “struck dumb,” as Abigail Adams observed,
realizing they had been outfoxed.120 The content indicated the French had harbored no
serious intentions of receiving or treating with the American delegation. It became
apparent that Revolutionary France was “shaking down” its former ally like it might with
any other small European country in its way, or which could be bullied. The fates of
Holland, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden came to mind.
When the Senate agreed with the House that the texts of the XYZ dispatches be
published for Congressional use, it was not long before the public had access to them.121
The result was a maelstrom of anger toward anything French. People tore down French
Tricolors or cockades wherever they might find one. Patriotic songs with new verses rang
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out in meeting places up and down the country. On the sinister side, an anti-French mob
broke up the private home of Benjamin Bache because of the anti-government and proFrench sympathies exhibited in his newspaper, Aurora.122 In this atmosphere, the
President’s proposals to enlarge the army, and, most importantly, to establish a navy
succeeded where before the publication of the XYZ dispatches the Republicans in
Congress largely had been able to forestall such efforts.123 Only a bill to push along the
construction of the first three of the six frigates provided for in the Naval Act of 1794 had
managed to become law.124 Now all six frigates would be rushed to completion. Congress
would pass an act establishing an independent Department of the Navy and authorize the
purchase or construction of vessels and the recruitment of officers and sailors to man
them.125 In May one of these warships, an ex-East Indiaman, the U.S.S. Ganges, would
be on patrol off the coast of the United States seeking French corsairs.126 In England,
Rufus King would soon receive approval from His Majesty’s Government to purchase
naval stores, arms, and munitions in that country to aid in establishment of that infant
U.S. Navy.127 The Quasi-War had begun.
With hostilities against France finally reached, albeit limited ones, the United
States had come full circle between the two powers who, as history would show, were
enduring the last conflict of their Second Hundred Years War. It had been an eventful
fifteen years. When the American War of Independence had concluded in 1783 with the
Treaty of Paris, autocratic France had been America’s sole ally in the world. The young
122

Ibid., 74-79; McCullough, 498-501.
Elkins and McKitrick, 589-90.
124
Michael A. Palmer, 5.
125
Elkins and Mckitrick, 589-90.
126
Michael A. Palmer, 19-20.
127
William, Lord Grenville to Robert Liston, 8 June 1798, in Instructions, 155-56.
123

54

Republic was diplomatically mortgaged up to its eyeballs to the French Crown in
perpetuity. As the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Alliance provided, the U.S. bore the
obligation to guarantee the security of France’s American possessions, meaning her sugar
islands in the West Indies. Britain, the ex-enemy, the mother country, had largely
forsaken her ungrateful American progeny, leaving it without a trade agreement and even
without a formal diplomatic mission. But economic ties and habits are hard to break. And
so it was with the merchants and customers on both sides of the Atlantic; the hugely
profitable trade between the United States and Great Britain simply resumed, however, at
a distinct disadvantage to the Americans who were largely closed out of the British
Caribbean trade. Never the less, by 1791 fear of American protectionism had convinced
Britain’s Foreign Office belatedly to send a minister to her late colonies and open
dialogue.
The war which began in 1793 between Revolutionary France and England threw
ordinary diplomacy into chaos. It thrust the United States between its historical ally and
its chief trading partner then locked in mortal combat with each other. This conflict of
sympathies sharply divided the young nation into the partisans of England and those of
France, with only rancor between them. Each side had demonized the other. The
Francophiles, largely the Democratic-Republicans of Jefferson and Madison, saw
Republican France as Europe’s savior, ready to spread the joys of liberty, equality, and
fraternity throughout a continent ruled by despots: never mind that she had executed
some 40,000 of her citizens, many without trial or via kangaroo courts, and was
bludgeoning small nations, whether governed as republics or constitutional monarchies,
to do her bidding. The Anglophiles, the Federalists, saw France as the atheistic anti55

Christ, ready to enslave Continental Europe, then Britain, and then America, and ready to
demolish justice and the rule of law. In the minds of High Federalists such as Secretary of
State Pickering, or Massachusetts Senator George Cabot, only Great Britain stood before
this juggernaut, shielding the United States. Each side saw the other as betrayers of the
American Revolution and hated them virulently for it. Yet at the same time, both sides,
for the most part, wished to keep faith with Washington’s parting words of wisdom to
avoid European entanglements. Whoever their favorites were in the death match across
the sea, they did not wish to join them in the ring.
So how did it come to limited hostilities with France and, as we shall see in the
next chapter, an informal naval alliance with England? After all, Britain started with
more handicaps in the game. She had no alliance with the U.S. She had an ongoing
border dispute feeding a vicious Indian War in the Ohio Territory on Upper Canada’s
American border. And to boot, she had privateers and Royal Navy men of war rampantly
seizing American merchantmen in the West Indies. The most telling answer to the
question is that on the whole, the British diplomats involved exhibited far greater skill in
analyzing the situation and demonstrating a willingness to work out practical solutions
than their French counterparts. Of course, luck always played into it as well: Adams
winning the 1796 election over Jefferson was a prime example of this—but the French
had bungled that one too by clumsily trying to influence the result.
When Washington sent his emissary, John Jay, to London in 1794, he was well
received by Lord Grenville, Britain’s Foreign Minister. Both Jay and Grenville knew it
was in their interests to come to some solution of the disputes and avoid war. Grenville
intuitively understood that on a foundational level the U.S had to have the British border
56

posts off its territory. It was a matter of pride to the young republic, and also a practical
necessity—the presence of the posts kept the local Native American Tribes hopeful and
determined to continue their armed resistance to American settlement. He also
understood that the border posts standing on American sovereign territory posed a
distinct threat to the integrity of Upper Canada. As long as the United States had an
excuse to continue sending well trained, equipped, and led armies such as Wayne’s
Legion of the United States into the region, Canadian security would be at risk. This fear
had distinctly guided the mind of Lieutenant Governor Simcoe when he had moved his
garrison out of Detroit and into the fort on the Maumee. The United States already
possessed perhaps the largest and wealthiest population in North America. It was likely to
grow and remain the power to be reckoned with on the continent. It was best for His
Majesty’s Government to recognize this fact and attempt to reach an accommodation.
The other disputes arising out of debts and claims from the American War could be
solved by arbitration. Opening the British Caribbean to the American provision trade
only stood to benefit Britain’s food poor sugar islands and not siphon off shipping badly
needed for the war effort. At the same time Jay gave way on the bitter dispute over
impressment of American seamen into the Royal Navy. In a critical struggle with France,
Grenville could never in any way impede the Navy’s recruitment, forced or otherwise, of
its most precious resource: able seamen. Jay had understood also that Britain would never
give in on the re-export trade in American bottoms whether concerning British
manufactured goods from Britain or West Indies produce from America. Both sides had
taken a practical, non-ideological view towards the negotiations. While decried in
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America, the treaty laid the groundwork for further trade and friendship and in the short
run, and most importantly, averted war.
In contrast, the French reaction to Jay’s Treaty had been irrational and petulant.
Refusing to see the treaty with England as a necessary settlement by the American
Republic to evade the plague of war, it mistakenly took the treaty to be an alliance when
it was clearly not. Whether it was official French Government action which drove the
French depredations upon U.S. commerce, or whether the Directory’s official
pronouncements simply echoed conditions already rampant in the West Indies due to the
greed of local privateers, colonial admiralty courts, and island governors, as some
scholars have argued,128 is moot. The Directory and the privateer interests in the French
Legislative Councils acted as if these policies emanated from Paris. French diplomats and
government officials apparently little understood the American situation, or over
estimated the sympathies of their proponents in America and their abilities to influence
domestic American events. By attacking American commerce they won few friends. But
they did elicit an American response: the same one the British had received in 1794, an
offer to fairly treat and resolve the conflict. Instead, even a diplomat of Talleyrand’s
128
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experience, who had himself lived and worked for two years in their country when in
exile there, utterly failed to comprehend how to deal with the Americans, or grasp the
strategic significance of their country. Even in 1797 America was not like Holland, or
one of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, which would directly fear French military power. It
sat behind the wide moat of the Atlantic Ocean, now patrolled by the British battle fleet.
Furthermore, it was very strategically placed. As Talleyrand himself, once recognized of
Americans: “[T]he nation that hangs onto their friendship will be the last to retain
colonies in the New World.”129 Americans would never respond to being rudely snubbed
and bullied. And they did not. The peace commissioners sent by Adams to Paris returned
home to America—to a hero’s welcome, in the case of Marshall.130 The Quasi-War was a
direct result of a massive French diplomatic failure. And it had long term unintended
consequences. It spawned the United States Navy. As we shall discuss in the next
chapter, it also fostered an informal naval understanding, or even alliance, between two
nations formerly certain enemies. Additionally, it perhaps reinforced the subtle decision
taken with Jay’s Treaty, to bet on Britain and not France to be the world’s next economic
hegemon and eventually become America’s closest ally.
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CHAPTER III
TO FOUND A FLEET
In April 1798 Congress voted to increase the size of the United States Navy by
authorizing up to twelve vessels of a maximum of twenty-two guns each to be bought or
built. The navy already had six frigates, originally ordered under the Navy Act of 1794,
in various states of completion. Shipyards in Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore had
launched and were hurriedly finishing three of them. Yards in New York, Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, and Norfolk, Virginia would soon begin, and rush to conclusion work
upon the other three.1 The need was urgent. The young republic was then facing its first
major international military crisis as an independent nation. Its only “ally,” the Republic
of France, had just issued an arête or decree effectively declaring war on America’s
world-wide commerce. The American President, John Adams, had asked Congress for
the means to protect that commerce and the territorial integrity of the United States,
meaning the effective creation of a navy and a huge expansion to the tiny standing army.
Since the wind up of the Continental Navy following the end of the War of
Independence—Congress had sold off the last warship, the frigate Alliance, in 1785—
there had been no national fleet whatsoever,2 besides the Treasury Department’s pocket-
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sized flotilla of revenue cutters, built to enforce in coastal waters the tariff duties fueling
Alexander Hamilton’s vision of national credit.3
The task was daunting. The young United States already had a coastline longer
than any one of old Europe’s kingdoms. And daily the ships of America’s merchant
marine left the maritime havens of Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, but
also the tiny harbors scattered all along the Atlantic Seaboard, for ports around the globe.
Additionally, a booming coastal trade spread commerce domestically from Georgia to
Massachusetts’s Maine District. America’s population still lived hard by the sea, despite
pretensions of internal expansion. Scholars have estimated that already America’s
merchant navy was second only to Great Britain’s4 and perhaps the more aggressive in
searching out new markets, the Stars and Stripes having become nearly omnipresent on
the world’s sea lanes.
Of course, up until 1775 this growth had occurred under the protection of the
British Royal Navy. After that, until 1798, American seaborne commerce had moved
entirely at the sufferance of the world’s maritime powers, including the Barbary Pirates,
who had menaced American shipping in 1785 and 1794. But the crisis facing American
merchantmen in April 1798 was on a wholly different scale. There had been some 5000
American merchantmen sailing the world in 1797 and French cruisers had taken in excess
of 300, some 6 percent of the total fleet. The effect upon commerce was especially
evident in the rising insurance rates for merchant voyages. In 1796 these had ranged
around 6 percent of the cargo value. In 1797 this rate rose to anything between 15 and 25
3
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percent. Export values dropped from $61 Million to $51 Million and imports fell from
$81 Million to $75 Million—the latter meaning a significant loss of income to the Federal
Government which lived on the tariffs levied upon imports.5 The French guerre de course
was a disaster for both the merchant and the Federal Treasury. Something had to be done
swiftly. To Federalists in Congress and to President Adams, the obvious solution, beyond
allowing merchantmen to arm themselves, was that America must again acquire a navy
and get it to sea immediately, a truly herculean task.
Initially, this intimidating administrative feat came under the brief of the
Secretary of War. While the new constitution provided the Federal Government the
power to raise armies and navies, it did not specify the administration of those armed
services. That was Congress’s job to sort out. And originally, Congress placed the new
United States Navy under the leadership of the Secretary of War, James McHenry. Sadly
McHenry had all he could handle administering the United States Army.6 Consequently,
he neglected the “second child,” the navy. The three frigates being built in Boston,
Philadelphia and Baltimore had suffered significant delays, frustrating the captains placed
in charge of building the ships they would subsequently command and also Congress
itself. It enacted a bill establishing a separate Department of the Navy which President
Adams signed into law on 30 April 1798.7 A Maryland-born Federalist with mercantile
ties to Georgetown, Benjamin Stoddert, became the first Secretary of the United States
Navy. He was not President Adams’s first choice—that had been former Massachusetts
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Senator George Cabot who turned down the appointment8—but it would prove an
inspired one. It would be Stoddert’s duty to form and shape this infant United States
Navy. His tenure would lay the foundation for the institution much as Washington had
done for the Presidency. He would establish the precedents of professional administration
that would guide the navy well into the nineteenth century.
But the United States would not establish this naval fighting force on its own and
in a vacuum. America’s mother country, Great Britain, its recent foe in the war for
independence, had been watching the deterioration in relations between the two allies,
France and the United States, since the Anglo-American treaty of 1794 (Jay’s Treaty) had
begun a sort of rapprochement between the American and British Governments. The
preceding chapter of this work has described and analyzed this three partner minuet
between France, England, and the United States which resulted in undeclared hostilities
between the allies of the American War, the U.S. and France, and something like a
mutual appreciation of shared interests between the U.S. and Great Britain. This chapter
begins the story of how this nascent rapprochement solidified into an informal naval
understanding or even alliance between the two countries who, for some three years,
shared a common enemy. It would originate in the form of concrete British assistance in
establishing the new American fleet, especially the copper and ordnance which a modern
eighteenth century navy required. But Britain also indirectly acted as midwife to the birth
of an American naval culture largely modeled on her own. This chapter will make the
case that this naval relationship merits more than the scant attention which scholars have
paid it. It was surely the most concrete embodiment of the warming of relations between
8
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the two countries following Jay’s Treaty as outlined by Bradford Perkins in his work, The
First Rapprochement.9 Nothing like it would exist between these two maritime powers
for well over a century.
The problem which confronted the new Secretary of the Navy was one of classic
naval administration: how to assemble a navy? Again, it was to be from scratch because
the United States possessed not one man of war of any size. Also there was no actual
naval establishment: no dry docks, no navy yards, scarcely a cannon foundry, and no
tradition of naval administration. This was in sharp contrast with the long tenure of the
Navy Board in England, which dated from 1546. The competing navies of Europe’s
kingdoms would have nothing like this venerable body for hundreds of years, if ever.10
No other country had so formalized its naval governance and it showed in the Board’s
ability to construct and service a fleet of hundreds of ships of all varieties with all the
bases to maintain them and also supply the fundamental creature necessities of its sailors,
including bakeries, breweries, packing plants for salted meats and the first naval
hospitals.11 Some of these sites predated the Navy Board itself. The Portsmouth
Dockyard had held a working dry dock before the sixteenth century.12 It was Stoddert’s
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job to leapfrog this lack of naval facilities and tradition so as to supply the ships, men and
money required to bring the new American Navy into being.
Modern scholars who have studied the history of naval administration during the
Classic Age of Fighting Sail have analyzed its basic issues as being functional in nature.
It was the mid twentieth century historians John Ehrman and Daniel Baugh, who had
pioneered an analytical scheme for examining how navies worked and what they did in
their studies of the Royal Navy during the Nine Year’s War and the Wars of Jenkins’ Ear
and the Austrian Succession.13 Comprehending Ehrman and Baugh’s method of
dissecting naval institutions is fundamental to understanding the task which confronted
the United States Navy Department in May 1798. In The Navy in the War of William III,
and British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, Ehrman and Baugh,
respectively, would study the Service by systematically examining its separated parts, in
short, a dissection. Without explicitly stating it, they had effectively simplified the
essential issues of naval administrative analysis to three: ships, men and money. Their
analysis reduced to these three points because its primary concern was how did the
organization operate? How did the separate components of the King’s Navy work
independently and together? They asked: how did the R.N. build and maintain its ships?
This question necessarily included researching the dock facilities, dockworkers, the
procurement of supplies and naval stores, to say nothing of timber for hulls and masts.
The issue of men mandated consideration of manning the fleet, which involved how the
navy recruited, provided wages, victuals, medical care, and clothing, among others. The
issue of money was the catchall but meant the finance and taxation which made it all
13
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possible. When the money was missing, the rest of the organism ground to a halt. Of
course, this analytical method would prove applicable to any fleet during the Classic Age
of Fighting Sail.
Even before Benjamin Stoddert could take up his new position as Navy Secretary,
the Navy Department faced the first of these fundamental administrative issues: finding
ships right quick. Of course three large frigates were then being readied for sea, already
having been launched pursuant to legislation the previous year which had accelerated
their construction. Additionally, in July 1798 Congress would finally authorize the
construction of the three remaining large frigates originally ordered under the Navy Act
of 1794 to combat the Algerine pirates.14 But as to the measures enacted in April 1798
which had authorized the procurement of an additional twelve vessels of at least twenty
guns, three options lay immediately open to the Navy: purchase of warships, a crash
building program, or both. The purchase option was problematic as large, ready-made
men of war were not then generally available on any cognizable market.15 Men-of-war
were expensive specialty ships, speedy but heavily built floating gun platforms. They did
not have the broad beam necessary for efficiently carrying cargo.16 Warships came in six
ratings based upon the amount of guns mounted aboard them, starting with first rates with
100 or more guns, down to sixth rates with twenty.17
But the real difference in these specialty men of war was whether the ships were
cruisers or line of battle ships. The latter, also called ships of the line were the warship
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that had created the Classic Age of Sail navy. The ship of the line was very simply a ship
powerful enough to stand in the battle line during combat at sea. Only the largest ships,
built to take the battering of cannon throwing thirty-two pound cast iron balls at under
200 yards, and dish out the same to the enemy, could sail there. These were the first,
second and third rates, again ranked by the number of guns carried and arrayed to fire
“broadside” through gun ports pierced through the hull above the waterline.18
Considering the cost and the complicated, time-consuming assembly required—it
often took years—there would be no way that the United States could construct
battleships in anything like the time needed here. Building and fitting out such warships
took patience somewhat akin to laying down fine vintages in a respectable wine cellar.
When in 1799, Stoddert finally convinced Congress that the United States should even
build its own battleships, the best that he could do was lay the necessary foundations. The
secretary had begun gathering and seasoning the massive timbers the navy would need,
including the purchase of two of Georgia’s wooded Sea Islands to supply the critical live
oak. He also acquired land for the service’s first navy yards in which to assemble them.19
But the war would end before construction of even one 74 could begin. In the event, the
U.S. Navy would not again take up the commission to build ships of the line until the
War of 1812. Even then, when the wood was already available thanks to Stoddert’s
foresight, no American liner would be ready for battle until after the Treaty of Ghent
ended the hostilities.20
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Thankfully for the United States, the Royal Navy was already inadvertently on the
job protecting the United States coastline from the French Republic’s powerful battle
fleet. The Royal Navy’s blockade of the major French naval bases at Brest, Rochefort and
Toulon provided an invaluable, if unintended, service to the American Republic by
keeping the eighty-three French ships of the line trapped in port.21 Hence it was unlikely,
though not impossible, that a squadron of French battleships might elude the blockade in
a fog or storm and cross the Atlantic to menace the New World. After all, French
warships had escaped to convoy a huge food shipment from the United States headed to a
Metropolitan France fearing famine in 179422 and again when a small French relief
expedition under Victor Hugues had retaken Guadeloupe.23 This was why some
Federalists would harbor real fears of a French breakout until Nelson’s crushing victory
at the Nile in early August 1798 had relieved their concerns—that is, once it had become
known in November.24
If no French battleships were likely to menace the American coast, the question
became: what manner of warship should the U.S. Navy prepare to meet? It was known
that frigates could more easily run the British blockade of the French coast than ships of
the line, and from time to time did. They were known to call and sometimes remain based
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at Guadeloupe for extended periods.25 French frigates in the New World required at the
very least that the American Navy be able to meet such a threat, another reason that the
naval measures taken in 1797 had hurried three of the famous six frigates to completion.
United States, Constellation, and Constitution would put to sea during the summer of
1798.26 The other three, President, Congress, and Chesapeake, would not be ready for
nearly another two years, despite the rush.27 Certainly, more frigates would help the
cause. Merchants of the seaport cities saw the situation that way. In Boston, New York,
Salem, Philadelphia, and Charleston, merchants banded together to take out subscriptions
to build frigates which they then offered to the navy. Formal committees from these
towns received pledges from the various trading houses, raising thousands of dollars in
very short order. They then designed and ordered the ships assembled in the shipyards of
their various cities. Recognizing this spontaneous service, Congress enacted legislation to
both accept these ships for the navy and to pay back the committees in shares subscribed
at an interest rate of six percent. As a result, in the first two years of the Quasi-War these
various committees would build the frigates Boston, New York, Essex, Philadelphia, and
John Adams.28 The Navy itself also constructed the frigates, General Greene and Adams.
All of these would be commissioned and serve at sea before the war ended.29
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While these frigates ensured that the United States Navy would be able to
maintain a theatre preponderance of naval might, the greatest menace facing American
shipping came not in the form of French navy ships, but of privateers. In the New World
the primary base of these private warships was Guadeloupe in the West Indies. French
merchants in Guadeloupe could no longer carry on trade in the usual fashion and so
instead turned to the time honored “profession” of legalized piracy against enemy
shipping under the aegis of a government-issued privateer commission.30 Arming their
vessels with as few as one canon, or as many as twenty, for large vessels with wealthy
owners, these skippers put to sea to raid British and now American shipping. Some
privateers were just under the size of a small frigate or sloop of war.31 Others might only
be barges sporting a single gun but manned with a large crew armed to the teeth with
muskets, pistols, and swords. These shallow draft vessels were often rowed using sweeps
or oars, allowing them to dart out from hidden anchorages in creeks or small rivers when
merchantmen appeared and were especially effective in light winds or dead calms.32 Any
vessel captured by corsairs as a good prize would have a prize crew placed aboard to sail
her into a French or Spanish port to be “libeled” for adjudication and sale on behalf of the
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captors.33 The French or Spanish authorities might jail the unfortunate crews of these
vessels as prisoners of an undeclared war, or simply leave them to fend for themselves
destitute in an unfriendly port.34 Either could have tragic results for these seamen, who
during the “sickly season” might succumb and die in these West Indies havens so rife
with mosquito borne disease.
To combat these privateers the United States needed to put armed naval vessels to
sea which could outgun the Gallic privateers. Small vessels of meager draft, carrying
twenty guns, or even less, could be very effective against such tiny seagoing corsairs and
barges.35 And from the administrative side, these vessels were relatively cheap and quick
to build; they could even be converted from purchased merchantmen.36 In the first few
months of the Quasi-War the U.S. Navy would readily turn to this latter alternative.
Within days of the approval to do so, and before Stoddert would even assume his position
as Secretary, merchant firms would sell the nation merchantmen for navy use which
would be hurriedly pierced for guns and armed with available cannon. The East
Indiaman, Ganges, fitted for twenty-four guns would be one of these, and was the first
commissioned U.S. warship to serve at sea in May 1798. Her captain would be Richard
Dale, a hero of the Revolutionary War. Other vessels rushed to sea would include the
purchased Montezuma and Delaware.37 The U.S. would also employ some of the tiny
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revenue cutters of the United States Treasury Department. These would be seconded to
the navy, some for the duration of the war.38
But whether building frigates, sloops of war, or converting small merchantmen
and schooners into warships, the project required significant resources and access to
naval stores. While the United States was yet heavily wooded and had a long tradition of
ship building since early colonial times, building warships could present technical
problems not so easily solved in 1790’s America. One resource necessary for serious
warship construction was not available in the country. That was the copper plating and
bolts and spikes needed to sheath the wooden bottoms of men of war. The world’s
leading naval power, Great Britain, had for some years sheathed its ships in copper, and it
had become standard practice in the navies of all the powers.39 The primary reason in
northern waters was speed and maneuverability. Coppering prevented or minimized the
growth of barnacles on the hulls of seagoing vessels, diminishing drag and yielding as
much as a decisive one knot improvement in speed over fouled warships in battle.40 And
the longer opposing ships had been at sea, the more pronounced this advantage became
for the copper-sheathed ones.41
But in tropical waters, a coppered hull was not merely a matter of an advantage in
battle, but of a ship’s very survival. Shipworm, teredo navalis, a wood devouring mollusk
native to the warm seas, in a matter of months could render unsheathed hulls veritable
38
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honeycombs, utterly unseaworthy.42 The R.N. had found no other effective remedy to the
worm; sheathing with treated wood had proved ineffective and had always required
frequent docking to replace or repair the sheathing.43 At significant cost in ships and
treasure, the Royal Navy had also learned that only copper spikes and fasteners could fix
the copper plates to a ship’s hull without threatening that vessel’s structural integrity;
cheaper, easy-to-produce, iron fasteners simply corroded in the presence of seawater and
copper.44 Great Britain, with its technologically advanced industrial base, then proceeded
to so sheathe its massive fleet, rendering all others obsolete.45 The copper-bottomed
Royal Navy had become the gold standard in naval architecture that all other sea services
would need to copy.
This British lesson was certainly not lost upon American naval architects and
planners. Because the new American navy would be tiny in European terms, it could not
afford the luxury of laying up numbers of its vessels in port for any careening that copper
plating could eliminate. In the event, copper sheathing would prove even more critical to
the success or failure of any American naval deployments in the Quasi-War since the
fleet’s primary theatre of operations would be the West Indies, the very place so
bedeviled by the shipworms. And the U.S. had no dock facilities on station. To be
effective it was clear that the United States Navy would need to utilize copper sheathing
for all of its warships. But coppering its fleet would pose a distinct challenge to the

42

Maurer, “Royal Navy,” 57; Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in
the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 213-15;
43
Crewe, 213-15.
44
Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 294-98. Ships coppered using iron spikes and fasteners were believed to have
been lost because of this corrosion; they simply fell apart. The case of the Royal George was the worst; she
sank at her Spithead mooring. Rodger, Command, 375.
45
Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 298.

73

young republic. America’s nascent metallurgical industries did not yet possess the
technical ability to produce the requisite copper sheets and bolts. Besides the mining and
smelting of the essential ore, manufacture of these copper fasteners and plates demanded
mastery of the rolling and drawing technology necessary to fabricate them. Producing
even the copper fasteners, for example, would prove beyond the technical ability of every
firm but that of Paul Revere, the famed patriot and coppersmith of Boston. Following the
original order of the six frigates he had set about developing the techniques required to
draw copper into spikes and bolts suitable for coppering warships. Consequently, he had
supplied some of the copper bolts and spikes used during the mid 1790s to plate the
Boston-built frigate, Constitution and some which would later be used to sheath the
Congress, constructed in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. But even the Revere works would
not be able to provide the rolled copper sheets used to plate these or any other men of war
until after the Quasi-War. Consequently, in the years leading up to the Quasi-War, the
Secretary of War had ordered that all the plates required, and a sizable supply of spikes
and bolts, be imported from England.46 Now in 1798 the question again became how
would the U.S. Navy obtain these vital components for its warships? Could the
Americans once again turn to Britain to supply sufficient copper to meet their needs when
this time they would be seeking to plate not merely three, or even six frigates, but a small
fleet?
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In 1798 Great Britain was still the world’s largest producer of the requisite copper
plates and bolts, having pioneered the technology in the first place.47 But England was
known to jealously guard resources so necessary to its precious Royal Navy. Ministers in
Whitehall knew that the realm’s very survival hung on the ability of its Senior Service to
keep the sea.48 The 1797-98 invasion threats to both Great Britain and Ireland had
certainly driven home this reality. The Navy Board was constantly worrying over its
critical supplies of naval stores. Britain’s very pre-occupation with the Baltic region
stemmed not from an appreciation of Swedish, Norwegian, Russian and Lithuanian
culture, but from the simple fact that these countries helped to meet the Royal Navy’s
vast requirements for masts, spars, tar, and hemp.49 Copper plates, spikes, and bolts were
at least as vital as these. Would His Majesty’s Government allow its own suppliers to
divert any of their vital inventories to the upstart American navy at this critical juncture
and in the needed quantities? Surprisingly the answer in the summer of 1798 was yes.
Of course, even as early as 1797, Lord Grenville had been eyeing the deepening
fissure in Franco-American relations. He had alerted Rufus King when his intelligence
sources had indicated that the French might dispatch a naval squadron to awe the
Americans back into line with Paris’s vision of American interests. He had suggested that
Britain would be very interested in lending the Americans critical military and especially
naval support to ward off this threat. Now in late spring of 1798, Grenville explicitly
suggested that Britain and the United States cement their community of interest against
Jacobin France with tangible naval assistance. On 8 June, he wrote his minister in
47
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Philadelphia, Robert Liston, that Liston should advise the Adams Administration that
King’s requests on behalf of his government to purchase “Naval and warlike Stores” in
England “[would] not be refused him.”50 Chief among these requests would be the
necessary copper plates and bolts to continue the American naval buildup.51 Shipments
would continue through early 1799.52 In fact, all the ships built for the United States
Navy before or during the war, including the ships built by the merchants’ committees,
would use British copper plate despite the Navy Department’s financial support for an
infant naval copper industry.53 The merchants’ frigate, U.S.S. Boston, launched in the city
whose name she bore, was the first to have all of its copper sheathe fastening components
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made in America.54 Paul Revere’s firm had managed to fabricate enough of them to
complete the Boston by March 1799. But again, the manufacture of the plates themselves
was yet beyond the capabilities of Revere’s works. Only after having received
government subsidies to help import the very expensive rolling equipment from England
would Revere produce plates of sufficient quality to service the American fleet as it went
to war with the Barbary States in 1801.55 This was indeed vindication for the policy of
developing American suppliers of naval stores. And also very timely, because by 1799
British exports of copper plates and bolts had ceased due to an eventual perceived
shortage in the Royal Navy’s own supply of copper sheathing materials. 56As Grenville
had originally intimated, and the Americans understood, the U.S. Navy would only
receive shipments of the vital copper plates and fasteners if the needs of the Royal Navy
allowed.57 Fortunately, by that time the U.S. Navy had stockpiled enough imported
copper plate to get it through the rest of the war.58 But as to copper to supplement its
dwindling supplies of British imported bolts and spikes, the Navy scrounged whatever it
could find, even at times resorting to using clippings from the U.S. Mint.59
It is no exaggeration to state that the British willingness to liberally supply
copper in the first year of the war had made the American naval build up possible.
Without it, America would have been unable to go to sea with any ships other than the
three original frigates as supplemented by the three finished much later in the war. The
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effective operations that the nascent American navy was able to carry out against the
French corsairs in the enemy’s home waters throughout the West Indies—begun even as
early as the first summer of the war—would have been entirely impossible.
But in 1798 the infant U.S. Navy experienced another critical shortage: naval
armament. The United States had an insufficient supply of cannon to arm both naval
vessels and shore installations.60 Additionally, the President had rescinded the executive
order which had forbidden the arming of merchantmen except those sailing to the East
Indies. East Indiamen had been reasonably expected to encounter pirates on such voyages
and so had been allowed to arm against that eventuality.61 Now many merchant owners
and skippers heading to Europe or the West Indies were mounting cannon to help resist
enemy privateers.62 Worse, American foundries were not up to meeting this vastly
increased demand. The government had placed orders with domestic iron works in 1794
in hopes of augmenting its meager supplies. The results had been dismal. Half of the
cannon cast had proved defective. None, of the ordered naval carronades, the new light,
short-barreled guns designed to fire heavy balls short distances had seen delivery. These
carronades, or “smashers,” named for Carron, Scotland where the British had developed
them, represented the latest innovation in naval ordnance. At least one American foundry
had imported the technology from Britain to cast and bore the new weapons, but,
obviously, as of 1798 actual production left much to be desired.63
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Part of the problem of quickly arming naval vessels lay with the tremendous size
of the batteries carried aboard men of war. It has been said that a single 74 gun, third rate
ship of the line carried more powerful artillery aboard her than did Napoleon’s entire
army at Austerlitz.64 Even small brigs and sloops of war might carry 14 to 18 long guns
or carronades,65 while Frigates might be rated for as few as 28 guns with 9 pounders in
their primary battery66 or range as large as the new American 44s, the United States and
Constitution, boasting 24-pounders on their gun decks. By the summer of 1798, Congress
had already authorized raising eighteen ships of twenty guns or more, including three
more of the original big frigates originally planned in 1794 to combat the Algerines. And
of course, none of these calculations accounted for naval armament of the merchants’
frigates mentioned above.
In short, the United States needed huge supplies of great guns and lacked the
domestic capacity to produce them, at least in a hurry. The need was so urgent that
Captains John Barry and Thomas Truxton, commanders of the frigates United States 44,
and Constellation 36, respectively, had found that to arm their ships they would have to
scrounge 24-pounders and 12-pounders from state-owned harbor fortifications, or
wherever else they could lay hold of them.67 Secretary of State Pickering in Philadelphia
directed Rufus King in London to advise Yankee merchant captains to procure cannon
for their vessels in England, if they could, because of the acute shortage in America.68
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The burning question remained: where could the United States Government turn to meet
such a desperate need of ordnance? Again the obvious answer was to obtain the weapons
in England, then the greatest industrial power on earth and, thankfully, also the arch
enemy of France.
During the summer of 1798 Mr. King in London had received instructions from
his government to place an order on behalf of Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott
for both naval and military ordnance. King wrote to Grenville 16 August requesting
permission to procure 24, 18, 12, 9, 6, and 4 pounders, as much as £6,000 would buy. He
also placed a £4,000 order for artillery for the United States Army and harbor defenses.
King informed the British foreign minister that he had taken the liberty to communicate
his needs to the Birmingham ironmongers and had received assurances that they could
meet the increased demand.69 Grenville was not slow to respond, telling King that same
day that he would take all necessary steps to facilitate the American order.70 As a
practical matter, Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott had deposited the required funds with
the international banking firm of Barings so either the manufacturers directly, or His
Majesty’s Ordinance Office from the Tower of London, could supply the great guns.71
Along with the cannon order had come one for small arms as well. The U.S.
government had also directed that Mr. King requisition 25,000 muskets in England.72
Muskets were essential for the arming of the new American Provisional Army under the
titular command of George Washington, but also were required to equip the marines to be
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stationed upon every U.S. Navy vessel. However, American authorities would discover
that it would prove much more problematic for suppliers to fill musket orders than those
for cannon. King wrote to Secretary Wolcott on 17 September 1798 informing him that
Barings would keep him abreast of the cannon order King had placed, but that he had as
of yet received no answer from the British Government as to the small arms sought. In
fact, King apprised Wolcott that he was looking elsewhere for guns; he had the U.S.
Consul stationed in Hamburg, Mr. Pitcairn, trying to locate them there. Apparently,
Pitcairn was able to scrounge 4,000 of the prized British muskets in the former Hansa
city, and also 18,000 German made guns, if wanted. They would be sent by merchantman
with the regular Royal Navy convoy leaving Hamburg for England and then one leaving
England for America.73
On 6 October 1798, King wrote Wolcott informing him that it was unlikely that
the U.S. would be able to meet its small arms needs in England. King indicated he had
spoken to General Ross then in charge of ordinance at the Tower of London in the
absence of Lord Cornwallis. Ross, King discovered, was not unsympathetic to American
needs. He had intimated that the British would certainly share what they had with the
American Government should it come to declared war with France. In the meantime,
Ross had also offered to assist America with the proving of any German arms purchased
on the Continent, presumably at the Tower or the Woolwich Arsenal, if the guns would
be shipped through London. Ross had also indicated that although it now seemed to him
that a Franco-American rupture was unlikely, upon his return from business in Scotland

73

King to Wolcott, 17 September 1798, in King 2:416.

81

in some three weeks, he would arrange to supply 5000 muskets from the Tower.74 This
was no mean offer in light of the existing British obligations already undertaken to supply
guns to both the Ottomans and Portuguese, both of whom were now directly threatened
by French or Spanish forces. This was to say nothing of the British Army’s needs,
especially in light of the invasion threat to Great Britain herself. When Ross did return
from Scotland he explained these pre-existing commitments to King, adding that under
the circumstances, the most that the arsenal could presently spare were 2000 or 3000
muskets, but that he would arrange the sale of a further 500 every month from the Tower
at the same price that His Majesty’s Ordnance had purchased them.75
When during the summer of 1798 Rufus King had approached the British
Government about importing saltpeter, the critical oxidizing component in gunpowder,
from the East India Company in Calcutta to the U.S., he again had found a sympathetic
ear. The United States at the time had no significant domestic sources of saltpeter and had
relied on relatively cheap imports from the Subcontinent in order to manufacture the
explosive.76 King had received a directive from President Adams himself to render all
assistance to any American merchant seeking to import to the United States any “military
stores.” In this case, a Mr. Derby of Salem, Massachusetts intended to send a small vessel
to purchase 130 tons of saltpeter in Calcutta for direct export to the United States.77 King
perceived the sensitivity of the request. The material was absolutely fundamental to
maintaining any war effort and could not be allowed to fall into the hands of enemies
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such as the French or Spanish to be used against Great Britain. The de facto rulers of
Bengal holding the monopoly on saltpeter production just happened to be the English
East India Company (EEIC). And the Honourable Company itself jealously guarded its
saltpeter supply from perceived European rivals. Hence, it would take the good offices of
His Majesty’s Government to assure the EEIC that sales to Americans, hitherto de jure
allies of the French Republic, would not amount to aiding the enemy.
The same day King had written to Grenville concerning the order for cannon and
muskets, he had taken the logical step of writing to the influential M.P., Henry Dundas, to
secure His Majesty’s support for the purchase of the essential gunpowder ingredient.78
Besides being a good friend and ally of Prime Minister William Pitt, Dundas sat in the
British Cabinet as both War Secretary and head of the Board of Control. Thus, he was the
Crown’s minister who, along with Pitt, was chiefly responsible for British war policy
during the Wars of the French Revolution.79 Additionally, Dundas, as President of the
Board of Control, occupied a unique position from which to exert influence over the
EEIC. He was the government officer charged with supervision of the semi-independent
joint stock company, and in effect, of British Indian policy.80 In writing to Dundas, King
stressed the importance of procuring the saltpeter in light of the actual hostilities America
was now embroiled in against Britain’s chief foe, France.
Furthermore, King reminded Dundas of the assistance the minister had earlier
rendered in a previous case that summer when Boston merchant Adam Babcock had
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sought to import 500 tons of saltpeter to the United States from Bengal.81 In the instance
of Mr. Babcock, while King had pursued the blessing of His Majesty’s Government in
London for the sale, Secretary of State Pickering had written to the British Minister in
Philadelphia, Robert Liston, for his assistance on that end, namely a letter to the
Governor General in Calcutta, enlisting the Governor’s permission to consummate the
sale, and the request for Babcock’s ship, the Martha to join a British convoy, at least as
far as the Cape of Good Hope, so as to safeguard the critical shipment.82 Again, as he had
done previously for Babcock, Dundas was happy to be of assistance with the EEIC in the
case of Derby’s petition to export saltpeter to America. In his 18 August reply to King,
Dundas wrote:
…I can have no hesitation in contributing to afford every possible facility to the
Government of the United States, which my influence with the East India Company
can tend to Procure, and I shall instantly forward your application to the Court of
Directors, who I flatter myself will feel no hesitation in complying with your
wish.83
With Dundas’s support, the EEIC Court of Directors was quick to grant Derby’s
request. And what is more revealing is that the exportation of that most essential
compound necessary for the manufacture of eighteenth century munitions had the
blessing of those at the very highest level of British war policy. Again, access to saltpeter
was absolutely critical for modern war making because at that time gunpowder was the
only known explosive and the necessary propellant for firearms and artillery. In allowing
the U.S. access to its Indian supplies of saltpeter, Britain was again providing essential
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military support to the young republic as the latter prepared to battle their mutual enemy
on the high seas.
By the summer of 1798 the British Government was supplying essentials without
which the American naval build up would have been a pipe dream: canon, muskets,
saltpeter to make the gunpowder to fire them, and the essential copper needed to shield
warship bottoms from the worm and barnacle. But it was true that Britain was doing well
out of the bargain. Her merchants were selling their naval stores and military wares to
willing buyers for a profit. But there was at least one instance during that summer of
feverish arms deals when neither His Majesty’s manufacturers nor Government pursued
gain in providing military aid against the French threat. This was the matter of the
Halifax cannon. During that summer, ambitious and impatient captains were “liberating”
great guns from wherever they could find them because of the dire shortage of naval
ordnance to arm their new men of war. More often than not, these weapons came from
the nation’s forts and harbor defenses as described earlier in this chapter. This practice
was leaving these important defense establishments with a compromised or non-existent
capacity to protect the nation’s coastline.
The residents of Charleston, South Carolina were acutely cognizant of this
situation. The set of French 24’s which had once graced their defenses were gone. The
British had seized them as the spoils of war when Charleston fell to them in the War of
Independence, later removing the guns to Halifax, Nova Scotia when they eventually
evacuated the city. There was a certain irony to this scenario. The guns had been prizes of
war long before the War of Independence .The British, in the Seven Years’ War, had
removed the guns from the captured French battleship, Foudroyant, and given them to
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South Carolina for the defense of Charleston.84 The Secretary of State, Pickering, had
learned that the guns were not in use in Halifax because they fired a French 24 pound
ball, which in English measure made them roughly 27 pounders.85 Hence, as a nonstandard British caliber, they could not use ammunition supplied from His Majesty’s
Ordnance, rendering the guns next to useless for the British Army just as they originally
had been for the Royal Navy when removed from Foudroyant.86 To the Americans
desperate for cannon, non-British caliber was no impediment to their use. If nothing else,
if returned to Charleston, the military authorities would either use them while the original
cannonballs lasted, or eventually have the correct caliber projectiles cast somewhere in
the U.S.
In light of the above information, Secretary of State Pickering wrote to the British
Minister, Robert Liston, in Philadelphia and also Rufus King in London to directly deal
with His Majesty’s Government regarding use of the guns.87 Liston caught the urgency of
Pickering’s proposal when he wrote Grenville that in the “present perilous state of the
coasts of the U.S...[the American Government wished]…to beg or borrow or buy these
guns, for to be once more transported to Charleston.”88 In the meantime, while Liston’s
dispatch made its way across the Atlantic to London, the minister, as he had promised
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Pickering, took the liberty of writing to the Governor of Nova Scotia, Sir John
Wentworth, and His Royal Highness, Prince Edward, commanding the Halifax garrison,
seeking approval of a loan of the cannon to the United States. Prince Edward responded
that while he could not present the guns as a gift—he lacked authority to do so—he
would be willing to loan them, on condition that American forces remove and transport
them to Charleston and that upon the request of His Majesty, the United States saw to
their immediate and safe return.89 Pickering then conveyed Prince Edward’s offer to the
President. Secretary of War McHenry, on behalf of the Administration, issued an
acceptance of the terms to Secretary Pickering who made arrangements with the Navy
Department to collect the French guns.90 Secretary of the Navy Stoddert then dispatched
Captain James Sever of the U.S.S. Herald to Halifax to see that the guns were safely
shipped to Charleston.91 The loan was in essence a fait accompli by the time the British
Cabinet’s approval arrived from London. The Home Secretary, His Grace, the Duke of
Portland, himself, had signed off on the loan of the French 24s per Rufus King’s request
through Lord Grenville.92
But there was one more twist in the saga of the ex-Foudroyant, French 24s.
Following the ceremonial transfer of the guns to the American officers sent to Halifax
and the weapons’ transport to Charleston, Secretary of State Pickering soon wondered if
the loan of the cannon might be made permanent.93 This inquiry made its way to London
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where His Majesty’s Ministers must have seen a diplomatic coup to be made from guns
of no value to their own armed forces, but of great value to the desperately arming United
States. Lord Grenville in January 1799 directed Liston in Philadelphia to return to the
Americans the written engagement they had entered to give back the 24s upon the request
of the British Government, transforming the loan into an outright gift.94 In April 1799
Liston returned the loan document to Pickering along with a note in which he described
the act as “a testimony of friendship towards the United States.”95 And indeed, the gift
had its desired effect upon the Americans. In his reply to Mr. Liston, Secretary Pickering
noted the pleasure and thanks President Adams had expressed upon learning of the
gesture. The President regarded “the present of the cannon… ‘as a testimony of the
friendship of His Britannic Majesty to the United States” and specially desired Liston to
transmit to London the President’s thanks on behalf of the American Government.96 In
the end, the French 24s never fired a shot in anger during the duration of the war.97 But
the loan/gift of those guns certainly had made a positive impression upon official
Philadelphia. As Pickering had noted to President Adams in September 1798, Britain’s
providing access to the guns was significant “not so much for their intrinsic value (though
that…[was]…not inconsiderable) as that they…[were]…ready for immediate service; &
that we want[ed] them.”98
In retrospect, the ordnance that the Pitt Government provided the United States,
whether by sale or grant, was absolutely critical to the American war effort against
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France. Professor Michael A. Palmer, in his study of the American naval campaign in
that conflict, Stoddert’s War, has noted:
Probably between 300 and 400 cannon and carronades were imported for the
United States Navy from Great Britain between 1797 and 1801. Considering that
the navy at its peak strength in 1800 carried 900 guns, at least one third, and
perhaps as many as one-half of the naval guns in use were British.99
Upon this fact alone the case can be made that the British were an indispensible partner in
the Adams Administration’s crash program to build or buy a fleet in 1798.The case
becomes stronger when one credits the British Government’s role in the American
acquisition of the critical copper sheathing materials so necessary for a late eighteenth
century naval vessel to function effectively. And the argument becomes even more
cogent upon recognition of the part the British in those days had played in the U.S.
importation of saltpeter, the essential ingredient in gunpowder then also difficult to find
in America. Considering the naval administrative triumvirate of ships, men, and money,
without key British assistance, the United States would have found the challenge nearly
insurmountable with respect to the first issue: ships. Thanks to Alexander Hamilton’s
system of tariffs and credit, the new Federal Government had the requisite money. As to
sailors, the American merchant marine was truly a “nursery of seamen,” such that finding
crews for the American fleet would not pose the kind of vexing problem continually
faced by the Royal Navy.100 While wages would remain significantly higher in their
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merchant navy while the war lasted,101 the Americans would never have to resort to the
hated institution of the naval press to fill out their warships’ compliments.102 They paid
better than their British counterparts,103 and utilized only one year enlistments,104 instead
of the policy of indefinite length of service—usually for the duration of the war—
employed in Whitehall. But to have a navy, a nation needed all three legs of the naval
administrative stool: ships, men and money. Without British aid with the first of these,
possessing the other two legs would not have been relevant considering the time frame
with which the Adams Administration had to contend.
And so with British help the United States Navy had become a reality. American
warships were soon on patrol off the American coast, including in late June the frigate
U.S.S. Constellation.105 This vessel and her captain, Thomas Truxtun, would become
icons of the young republic’s new sea service during the Quasi-War. Although Truxtun,
who had been a privateer skipper in the War of Independence, had never served in the
Continental Navy as had men such as John Barry of the United States, and Samuel
Nicholson of the Constitution, it was to be his influence more than that of the other
captains that would establish the traditions of the new service.106 It was Truxtun who had
established a book of naval signals for the service and written a critical book on
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navigation. Truxtun had mastered the exquisitely complicated technique of taking lunars
to find longitude, an essential skill as the Americans could not yet afford the luxury of
sea-going chronometers.107 And it was Truxtun more than any other who created the
fighting tradition of the new service with his famous victories against the French Navy
frigates L’Insurgente and La Vengeance.108 In consequence, by the end of the war,
Stoddert had virtually made Truxtun a de-facto admiral and commander in chief of the
new service.109 To Stoddert, he represented the acme of professionalism.
Ironic, however, was the influence that his old Revolutionary War enemy, the
Royal Navy, would exercise over so much of what Captain Truxtun established for the
young U.S. Fleet. And for him and the American naval officer corps which emulated him,
the R.N. remained their guiding light. It was as if the British Senior Service were acting
as an unofficial mentor to this very junior one. This chapter has already discussed how
the British greatly assisted in the founding of the American fleet itself, making the ships
possible, but there was also a distinct but indirect British hand in the development of one
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of the other legs of the naval administrative stool: the men. This was not in providing
them. The British desperately needed tars for their own fleet and had routinely illegally
impressed Americans into it. In June 1798 they had even actually proposed that America
supply them sailors in exchange for the R.N. supplying the U.S. Navy with ships and
officers, an offer ignored by Philadelphia.110 Instead, the Royal Navy’s contribution
would be to supply, perhaps inadvertently, the model the American navy would emulate.
The United States Navy at its inception was in so many ways fashioned as a mirror image
of the Royal Navy. Its basic rank structure followed that employed in that institution. The
Americans had also adopted the British Service’s conception of: naval discipline, a
marine corps, warship armament, basic fighting style, and even fundamental
administrative organization.
This was not surprising. The Royal Navy for a century had been simply the best in
the world. While people might debate the sailing qualities of its warships, there was no
question that the seamanship of its officers and men, their gunnery, their organization,
and aggressive tactics were without parallel. Its dockyards were the best, the largest
industrial plants of their day.111 From top to bottom the Royal Navy stood for
professionalism in a world of amateurs. No one bought commissions in the King’s Navy
as they did in the British Army.112 Officers earned their commissions in Britain’s Senior
Service. To command a warship in the British Navy, one had to be an “able” seaman
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first, that is to be sufficiently skilled to reef, furl and steer like the best tar in the fleet. But
the captain also needed to have the competence to perform complex navigational
calculations like a mathematician, and be able to manage the complicated structure of a
sailing vessel as a capitalist would his factory. In essence, R.N. captains were a unique
breed in the eighteenth century world, professionals expected to act the gentleman. They
were professionals first—survival in the extremely dangerous environment at sea
demanded that—but then secondarily, in order to assume command in that traditional
eighteenth-century world, they needed qualities that would have been familiar to a landed
squire, the easy sure-footedness to rule their “wooden world” at sea with a firm hand, but
in the case of the best of them, a Nelson or a Collingwood, yet remain a father figure to
their men. Naturally, their rank would require that they be prepared to stand to arms as
fearless warrior chiefs on their quarterdecks, largely alone, strikingly obvious in their
gold-epauleted, blue coats and white breeches, and quite unprotected from enemy sharp
shooters.113 Consequently, when this professional Royal Navy went into battle against the
French, its officers and men knew they would win before the battle began; they were the
best. A century of victories in the Second Hundred Years’ war had proved it.114 And
those who knew how a navy worked also recognized the excellence of the administrative
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structure behind the fighting sailors, both on land and at sea, busy feeding, equipping, and
arming them. It was this standard that Truxtun, and the U.S. Navy sought to replicate.
This emulation of the Royal Navy, of course, had begun well before Captain
Truxtun and his fellow American captains had ever assumed command of their vessels.
Even during the time the navy was under the direction of the War Department, Britain’s
fleet had been the model to follow. As 1797 moved forward with no apparent lessening of
the tensions with France, it had become very apparent that the frigates being launched
would soon need to go into commission. In short order each lieutenant would need to
open a rendezvous to recruit his ship’s crew. Captains would then be able to assume
command of their vessels and the ships put to sea. Shipboard organization would need to
become a reality. The new service would need uniforms. It would need regulations to
rationalize the daily routines of the hundreds of souls sharing the same small space afloat
and so maintain good order. Good order on board a ship at sea was not just a matter of
decorum; it was a matter of survival. A ship’s company either pulled together or perished.
Hence the symbols of good order, were the trappings of uniforms, of the boatswain
piping a captain on board, of the ship’s bell signaling the watch changes, the steady
presence of the captain on the quarterdeck, plus a myriad of other small ceremonies and
procedures which promoted if nothing else the semblance of good order. And, of course,
there was the ceremony of punishment for violation of those rules and traditions executed
publicly before the assembled ship’s company. Where did an overworked secretary of
war turn to provide an instant naval culture? The answer was simple: model as much as
was possible after the British. Copy the best, the finest form of flattery.
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And that was what Secretary of War McHenry had done in 1797. In regulations
issued 24 August 1797, he had specified that the uniforms worn by the officers of this
infant sea service would closely resemble those of the Royal Navy. A U.S. Navy captain
would appear in a familiar blue coat with a standing collar, light lapels and gold or
yellow buttons, light vest, breeches and socks and a gold epaulette upon each shoulder.
Lieutenants would be similarly attired but only wear one epaulette, with this placed upon
the right shoulder. The sailing master would wear a simple blue coat with blue facings,
light vest, but blue breeches.115 In comparison with the U.S. Navy uniform prescribed by
McHenry, the Royal Navy dress uniform adopted before 1795 would be very similar
except that the light lapels, breeches and vests would be white instead of the American
buff. As to epaulets, just adopted in 1795 by the British themselves, senior captains in the
R.N. would wear a gold one on each shoulder. Captains of less than three years service in
that fleet would only wear one on the right shoulder while lieutenants would not wear
any. With the 1795 Royal Navy uniform changes, coat lapels had also become blue.116
Thus the American naval uniform adopted in 1797 was very much a combination of the
pre 1795 and post 1795 Royal Navy uniforms.117
McHenry also turned to the Royal Navy for the American navy’s basic law, the
Articles of War. These were the fundamental regulations established to govern all life
aboard the new, soon to be commissioned warships. Congress swiftly passed the articles,
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which the War Secretary had borrowed from the regulations adopted by the Continental
Congress in 1775 for the new Continental Navy.118 These were the work of John Adams,
then Secretary of the Committee of Marine for Congress, and had borrowed heavily from
the Royal Navy’s venerable Articles of War, last amended in 1749.119 The American
articles, founded upon the British ones, would be the regulations used to govern conduct
and establish good order on United States ships into 1799.120 When Truxtun had put to
sea in Constellation on her shake-down cruise in June 1798, he had employed the same
basic disciplinary system utilized in the King’s fleet.
It would not be long before Captain Truxtun would need to enforce the newly
enacted U.S. Navy Articles of War aboard Constellation. While cruising off the U.S.
coast Truxtun received intelligence from the Navy Department that there were crew
members planning mutiny. Apparently Truxtun’s officers had been watching the likely
plotters and they were put off the ship at Norfolk in irons. But Truxtun did read the
Articles of War to the crew, explaining that mutiny was an extremely serious crime,
especially when it involved taking a ship at sea. In his address to Constellation’s crew
concerning the Articles of War on 2 July 1798, the captain had alluded to the recent
mutinous tarnish upon the Royal Navy’s luster.121 The Spithead and Nore mutinies were
already notorious. Of course the Spithead affair had been of the traditional sort: at anchor
over a venerable sailors’ grievance, pay, with little bloodshed and so forgivable by a
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nation indebted to its “jolly” tars. But the vicious Hermione mutiny of the previous
year—an R.N. crew driven to the breaking point by a sadistic frigate captain had taken
their ship on the high seas in the Caribbean’s Mona Passage—stood out as something
beyond the pale. Somehow, the Royal Navy’s system of on-board order, successful for so
many years—mutinies at sea were virtually unknown in the British Sea Service—had
gone quite wrong. Hermione’s crew had butchered nearly all her officers with tomahawks
and thrown them overboard. The hated Captain Pigot they had hurled through the stern
gallery windows and then sailed to the Spanish Main to offer His Majesty’s ship to the
enemy.122 While the Hermione mutineers had a legitimate grievance worthy of sympathy
—Pigot was perhaps the cruelest commander in Royal Navy annals123—their stooping to
murder and treason certainly was not. Even the Bounty’s mutineers had put Captain Bligh
and loyal crew members off their ship in a boat with provisions.124 Obviously, the
Hermione affair had proven a shock to a man like Truxtun who had held the Royal Navy,
its professionalism, and governance institutions in such high esteem. That these same
institutions, normally celebrated as synonymous with good order at sea, could so publicly
and tragically fail must have sent a tremor of fear through the young American navy
which saw itself as a Royal Navy protégé. Truxtun could only have felt these emotions all
the more when he learned that one of the mutineers he had put off the ship at Norfolk had
been one of the Hermione’s murderous crewmen, seeking to suborn his own crew.125
Whatever doubts the recent British mutinies might have seeded in American naval
minds, it was this British system of shipboard order that Truxtun and his fellow U.S.N.
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commanders now sought to impose upon American jack tars used to the laxness of their
merchant fleet. If any American sailor had thought that life in a Yankee man of war
would be easier than aboard one of His Majesty’s warships, he soon learned better. The
American navy drank deeply from the cup of Britain’s naval traditions. Corporal
punishment for violations of the ship’s regulations was standard. The flogging of
violators by petty officers before the assembled ship’s company was just as American as
it was British. Twelve or more lashes upon the offending tar’s bare back was not
infrequent for drunkenness, inattentiveness to duty, brawling, and especially theft,
despised perhaps above all by men living cheek by jowl at sea.126 N. A. M. Rodger, that
great scholar of Royal Navy history, has noted that the British practice of “starting”
sailors—hitting them with a rope end or small cane—when they did not attend lively
enough, was still a part of life in the American service, long after Britain’s Senior Service
had barred it.127 It is interesting to recall that Secretary of the Navy Stoddert in 1799 had
given five of his most illustrious captains, of course including Truxtun, the chance to
revise the 1797 Articles of War, again rooted in the 1749 British Articles. And Congress
quickly enacted their work product for the new navy. What did these venerable men of
the sea come up with? Not surprisingly, it was basically the same document, only ordered
somewhat differently.128 The Royal Navy’s sea regulations lived on in the Yankee fleet.
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So much of life aboard an American warship in those years would have been
indistinguishable from life aboard a British one. The United States Navy did not try to reinvent the wheel as to food, and other accommodations for officers and crew. The diet
was basically the same,129 as were the officers’ uniforms—mentioned earlier—the slops
or clothing issued to the ratings,130 and even the grog.131 The British had made a fine
science of naval success at sea and the Americans so familiar with it sought largely to
duplicate it. The Royal Navy routinely became the standard by which the nation’s naval
commanders judged their progress. Not much later in the war, when the theatre of
operations changed from the coast of the United States to the Caribbean, Captains such as
Truxtun and Alexander Murray would look up to the British Captains and Admirals they
frequently met with something approaching reverence.132 If American vessels sortied
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with their British counterparts, Yankee commanders took pains for their ships to look
sharp and their crews to respond smartly to orders; nothing was to appear lubberly within
sight of the Royal Navy Ensign.133 And when sailing in consort with a British frigate, the
American captain nearly always strove to demonstrate the superior speed and sailing
qualities of his Yankee-built man of war.134 While Secretary Stoddert himself might
sometimes exhibit frustration with what he took to be British indifference to American
naval interests,135 he never the less continued to use the Royal Navy as his gauge as to
whether his captains were lollygagging in getting their vessels to sea. When one of his
skippers, Captain Moses Tryon of the Connecticut, had complained that his ship was yet
undermanned, Stoddert had told him to get to sea when he was within thirty of his stated
complement. The navy secretary irritably told Tryon that a British man of war of his
ship’s size might expect to put to sea with perhaps two thirds of the complainant’s full
crew.136 Stoddert also on at least one occasion asked one of his captains, Richard
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Valentine Morris, to inquire of Royal Navy officers their opinions on the proper guns for
the U.S. Navy.137
The Americans borrowed even their fighting style from the Royal Navy. Despite
having received the critical aid of famous French Admirals such as De Grasse in their
War of Independence,138 American naval commanders did not choose to copy French
naval tactics. In combat, captains such as Truxtun, instead chose the methods of their
former enemy. Emulating the British Admiralty, the American naval establishment,
despite possessing a fleet of perhaps thirty vessels at its peak, encouraged U.S. Navy
captains to aggressively seek battle instead of preserving their precious ships. Stoddert
had only disgust for skippers who sailed too often together instead of singly. The
Secretary expected them to give battle to any vessel of similar or lesser size without
compunction. He expected valor, if not success, from his commanders.139 There would be
no Admiral Byngs140 in his fleet. And on the whole that is what he got. Truxtun perhaps
best personified this relentless pugnacity in his battles against the French national frigates
L’Insurgente and La Vengeance. In both cases it was the American who ruthlessly
pursued his French quarry. Chasing Insurgente in February 1799, Truxtun crowded on all
often cruize (sic) with fewer men than you now have—“ Stoddert to George Little, U.S.N., 13 July 1799, in
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canvas even in the face of a sudden squall at the risk of losing a mast, reminiscent of
Hawke’s reckless pursuit of the French fleet into an anchorage during a gale at Quiberon
Bay. Instead it was Insurgente which lost her topmast.141 Against La Vengeance Truxtun
forced battle with a much heavier 50 gun frigate which desperately sought to elude the
more lightly armed Constellation 36. In each battle it was superior American gunnery
which won the day, executed in the British manner by firing into the enemy hull instead
of at the opponent’s rigging, the French tactic.142 While Constellation certainly carried
heavier guns than Insurgente— at that time 24 pounders to the Frenchman’s 12
pounders—against La Vengeance, the French ship with 50 guns wielded the greater
weight of metal.143 But just as in so many British sea battles, it was not the individual
weight of guns which made the difference, but rate of fire. Later analysis would show
that Constellation was able to fire at least two if not more broadsides for each one fired
by La Vengeance.144 And the result to the French ship was devastating. She was hulled so
badly that after skulking away from Constellation in the night she barely limped her way
to Curaçao on the point of foundering; she grounded outside the harbor rather than risk
sinking upon her approach.145 Many years later during the War of 1812 the similarity of
tactics used against each other in expert fashion by the British and Americans would
produce deadly results:146 the most famous being the fairly evenly matched single ship
action between H.M.S. Shannon and U.S.S. Chesapeake which produced so many
141
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casualties on both sides, including both captains.147 In so many ways the Royal Navy
truly was the mentor of the infant American service, whether intended or not.
As noted earlier, historian Bradford Perkins in The First Rapprochement has
described a softening of relations in the 1790s between the United States and Great
Britain which had begun in earnest following the conclusion of Jay’s Treaty in 1794. It
had been the Gallic over-reaction to said treaty, namely a non-declared guerre de course
against the United States, which had driven the two commercial partners much closer
together. The facts credit Perkin’s observation that it was the informal naval alliance
between them, itself a direct result of this French war on American trade, which had
clearly represented the high tide of this new cordiality between these “cousins” The
British had offered material military aid to their former rebellious colonies, especially in
helping the young nation build and organize its new navy. With British help, the young
republic had established a small, but entirely modern and effective naval fleet. The
British had provided essential copper plate and fasteners for warship bottoms so that the
Americans could have the best technology to increase the sailing performance and seakeeping qualities of their men of war, both of which were so necessary to maintaining a
credible naval presence in the critical Caribbean sector of operations. John Bull had
supplied perhaps as much as half of the naval ordnance utilized in the American fleet in
its struggle against France as well as small arms. The Americans had also received access
to saltpeter from British India. It is abundantly clear that without this British
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administrative aid, the effective U.S. Navy which served during the Quasi-War would
have been a pipe dream. Most of this assistance had to do with obtaining, maintaining, or
basing ships, the first leg of the naval administrative stool needed to found or keep a navy
in the age of sail.
Perhaps just as importantly, the Royal Navy had served as the very model upon
which the impressionable Yanks had chosen to mold their new sea service. The U.S.
Navy had borrowed its naval culture from His Majesty’s Navy, including the seamen’s
diet, the uniforms, the regulations, and even the style of combat. All of this Philadelphia
had copied whole scale from Britain’s Senior Service, whether by design, as this author
suggests—the Royal Navy was what they knew and clearly the most successful model
they could follow—or done subconsciously because it was all they knew.148 Never the
less, the Royal Navy’s societal norms were so instrumental in laying down the
institutional structure aboard ship throughout the small American fleet that an officer
such as Captain Alexander Murray, U.S.N., during a cross-Atlantic tour which took him
to Britain’s great Mediterranean sentinel fortress, Gibraltar, could observe in a letter to
Stoddert :
I may have trespass'd upon you, in this detail, but it appears
me to be sound policy to cultivate & draw the cords of Friendship, as
close as possible, & have little doubt but your sentiments will accord
with mine, in this instance, for certainly no nation in the World
hath it so much in their power, to assist & foster us in our Naval infancy.149
Murray could have added that they already had.
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CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS
In 1798 the British had provided vital material aid to the Americans in
establishing their new fleet. With their government’s blessing, British firms had sold the
young republic the copper to plate the bottoms of its warships’ and much of the ordnance
used to arm them. Indeed, the Royal Navy’s perhaps inadvertent influence upon the naval
culture of the American sea service was also evident. The stamp of the R.N. was visible
in the uniforms the U.S. Navy chiefs chose for their officers, the food that the men ate,
the regulations enforced aboard ship, and the aggressive tactical style they intended to
employ in battle. And soon this brand new naval force would put to sea to combat the
French. Almost from the beginning of its time at sea, the U.S. Navy would recognize that
it was not alone in its fight against the French guerre de course. When Navy Secretary
Stoddert began dispatching his small force to the West Indies to catch the French corsairs
as they left their island bases, the Americans would routinely fall in with Royal Navy
warships patrolling the same waters.
This chapter is about the informal operational relationship which grew between
the two navies during the period of the Quasi-War, as they both fought their separate
wars against their common foe. There would be no diplomatic treaty, not even a written
understanding between the Admiralty in London and the Navy Department in
Philadelphia. But never the less, practical men sharing a common burden found ways to
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unofficially cooperate to aid each other. The new American navy secretary discovered
that the British island governors in the West Indies were happy to allow his squadrons to
base themselves there. British companies in the islands were very pleased to help supply
food, and naval stores to the American warships. British jails were only too glad to accept
the prisoners of war the Americans boarded there. While there was no treaty or other
obligation to do so, the Admiralty in London sanctioned American merchantmen joining
the Royal Navy’s regular convoys to and from the New World or the West Indies. The
Americans followed suit, accepting British trading vessels into their more informal
convoys.
There would also be operational cooperation between serving units of the two
navies in the Caribbean Theatre. The skippers of the various frigates and sloops of war of
the U.S. Navy exchanged signals, intelligence, sailed in concert, and even pursued enemy
ships together with His Majesty’s warships. But none of this would be at the direction of
Philadelphia/Washington or London, nor even the local British station admirals or
American commodores. It was entirely a creature of the line officers of both services
serving at sea who found ways to cooperate to their mutual benefit. It was they who
would forge their own British-American naval “quasi-alliance.”
As soon as ships of the new United States Navy became ready for commission,
the nation’s navy chiefs ordered them to sea. Again, by the end of May 1798, even before
the new Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, had assumed his post, U.S.S. Ganges,
the ex-East Indiaman, had made her way from Philadelphia down the Delaware to sea.
She had begun patrolling the American coastline from Cape Henry to Long Island in
search of French armed ships “hovering” off the coast with predatory intent.
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Constellation was the next warship American warship deployed. She sailed from
Baltimore down the Chesapeake Bay and entered the Atlantic 23 June 1798 to guard the
coastline from Cape Henry south to the St. Marys. By 6 July, a third man of war, the
converted packet, Delaware, 20, under the command of Stephen Decatur, Sr., had also
put to sea from Philadelphia, to join Ganges on patrol. Within a day, Delaware pounced
upon the first Frenchman, La Croyable, caught lurking off the U.S. coastline.1 Decatur
brought this prize into the Delaware River, heading for the capital, when she passed the
new U.S.S. United States, 44, dropping down river toward the open Ocean. But before
either vessel could reach its intended destination, a pilot boat intercepted each with new
orders from the Secretary of the Navy. Both ships were to proceed to sea forthwith, but
remain off the Delaware Capes awaiting further orders pending anticipated Congressional
legislation. When they finally did receive their orders issued 11 July, the heavy frigate
and the sloop of war together were to make for the Caribbean and show the flag in
tropical waters.2
On 9 July 1798, President John Adams had signed an act of Congress which
significantly altered the very limited rules of engagement under which Ganges,
Constellation and Delaware had patrolled. No longer would American armed ships be
handcuffed by the requirement that French vessels had to be caught in the act of attacking
American shipping within American territorial waters, or lurking with intent to do so
1
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before they could take action. Now Congress authorized American warships to attack
French armed vessels on the high seas whenever and wherever they found them.3 With
that authorization it now made sense for Secretary Stoddert to experiment with another
strategy rather than simply directing his ships to cruise the American coastline, which in
a month had provided very few encounters with the enemy. Knowing he did not have the
ships to convoy the huge number of American merchant vessels heading out to trade
world-wide, the navy secretary had concluded that it might make sense to send American
men of war to the West Indies where many of the French privateers were based and catch
them as they sortied out. Stoddert only planned a short, two month expedition to test the
waters, so to speak. His instructions to Commodore John Barry, commanding United
States –one of the genuine naval heroes of the Continental Navy in the Revolutionary
War—involved sailing in company with the Delaware to Nantucket to rendezvous with
another merchantman the navy had converted to a sloop of war, U.S.S. Herald, 18,
proceed to Boston, and there connect with a revenue cutter seconded to the navy from the
treasury department. This squadron, under Barry’s command would then make sail for
the West Indies.4 In the event, Herald and the cutter, Pickering, were unable to join the
squadron and so Commodore Barry decided to set out with just the original two ships.5 In
his instructions to Barry, Stoddert directed the ships to cruise between Barbados and the
Lesser Antilles where the Secretary assumed the bulk of the French corsairs would be
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lurking. Barry was to make a pass on the south side of Puerto Rico and then attempt to
free an American merchantman taken as a prize by the French and brought to San Juan
for adjudication. He was also to drop a diplomatic note from Secretary of State Pickering
with the Spanish governor on the island. Hopefully, the voyage would produce prizes and
show the French that the new American navy could project power to the very home
sailing grounds of their corsairs. The navy secretary anticipated the ships would be back
in the United States in late August or early September.6
Stoddert would later express his disappointment in the achievements of this first
foray into the West Indies. The United States, one of the world’s mightiest frigates, had
brought back just two prizes and failed to call at San Juan or cruise around Porto Rico.
Barry had elected to patrol west of the Windward and Leeward Islands instead of
windward of them as Stoddert had specified. The Secretary also believed Barry had
shown poor judgment in the deployment of his cruising consort, Delaware. All of this
very much frustrated the Secretary. For the rest of the war, Stoddert would regard
Commodore Barry as an under-achieving squadron commander. However, despite
Stoddert’s disappointment, Barry would continue to hold flag rank due to his standing as
the navy’s senior captain.7 The secretary, unable to withhold squadron command from the
fleet’s greatest surviving naval hero of the Revolutionary War, would simply have to
stomach Barry’s weaknesses for the time being. Eventually, he would find assignments
for the “old man,” such as providing a naval escort to France for the diplomats President
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Adams would send to negotiate an end to the Quasi-War, effectively removing him from
squadron command.8
Still, this lackluster first mission to the Caribbean did provide some important
operational lessons to the young navy. The first was the reminder that the republic’s sea
service was not the only force patrolling American and Caribbean waters. The Royal
Navy was also on duty with much the same mission as the American navy, namely to
protect British and friendly commerce from French corsairs and national warships.
Quickly the two forces learned that they would need to co-exist and perhaps cooperate
against their common foe in the same theatres of operations. The first of these lessons in
necessary practical operational cooperation came during Commodore Barry’s outward
journey southeast toward Bermuda in the mid-Atlantic. This was before the squadron
would pick up the west bound trades that would carry it to the West Indies. The lookout
on the U.S.S. United States spied a large sail in the distance. Barry then ordered sails set
to chase the strange ship, which also made no attempt to elude the American vessels. The
big American frigate’s skipper next utilized a frequently employed ruse de guerre in the
age of sail: flying false national colors. Barry directed his crew to run up the French
Tricolor. The chase also showed a French flag. As the ships grew closer it became
obvious that both were large frigates trying to maneuver to gain advantage over the other.
United States now stood at the ready for battle, her guns manned. The opposing frigate
similarly appeared ready. Once the distance closed, Barry then ran up the Stars and
Stripes. Suddenly the French ensign also came down on the other man of war, replaced
8
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instantly with the ensign of His Majesty’s Royal Navy. The two vessels then “spoke”
each other. The approaching frigate was H.M.S. Thetis commanded by Captain
Alexander Cochrane. The two ships from friendly naval services had nearly exchanged
deadly broadsides. Captain Cochrane sent a boat for Commodore Barry. Barry, on board
Thetis explained his mission to his British counterpart, and Cochrane foreseeing similar
near exchanges of friendly fire in the “crowded” waters of the West Indies provided the
American with a copy of the British private signals used by R.N. men of war in that
theatre.9
As Barry was outward bound for the Caribbean, it would be some time before
word of the near tragedy between H.M.S. Thetis and U.S.S. United States would reach
official circles. But unbeknownst to Barry and Cochrane, who had solved their near
disaster by an informal exchange of signals, British and American naval administrators
on shore had already anticipated the problem and had been working on a mutual solution
through official diplomatic channels. Navy Secretary Stoddert and Secretary of State
Pickering, working with the British Minister to Philadelphia, Liston, and Admiral
Vandeput, the Royal Navy Commander of the North American Station based at Halifax,
had begun exchanging proposed sets of recognition signals for use by their respective
fleets during operations upon the high seas. In the end, it would be Admiral Vandeput’s
signals which the two shore administrations chose to use for their ships at sea.10 This
marked the first specific instance of official operational cooperation between the two
navies in the Quasi-War or otherwise. From that time on, each American naval
9
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commander would have a copy of those signals aboard before setting out on patrol off the
United States or in the Caribbean.11In theatre, the various American captains also
provided them to Royal Navy commanders they encountered who were not yet privy to
them.12 As the war progressed, the signaling intercourse between the two navies became
common enough that the various captains sometimes came to know the private
identifying signals for the other service’s warships in a particular patrolling sector.13
The significance of the exchange of signals was considerable. Being able to
identify a ship at distance did not just save vessels from friendly fire; it also saved them
from wasting immense amounts of time. The job of patrolling for enemy raiders largely
involved sailing in the merchant sea lanes until sighting a strange sail and then giving
chase. Pursuing a “chase”, as the quarry was called in those days, might take hours, even
days. It could pull a naval vessel well off station only to find upon closing that the chase
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was a friendly warship on a similar hunting mission.14 Armed with the British/American
naval recognition signals navy skippers could break off a chase at a distance, or decide to
close and “speak” the ship. As it turned out, speaking the ships of one’s counterparts on
station could serve a number of uses. First, it built a sense of shared identity with what
came to be seen as a brother service. Captains, who normally dined alone in their cabins
in both services, greatly appreciated the fellowship of men inhabiting the same lonely
world of command.15 Hospitality as a basis to build understanding and operational
cooperation could not be overrated. After United States and Thetis had nearly come to
blows, the captains had exchanged courtesies with Commodore Barry joining Captain
Cochrane aboard his ship, while later that evening, Barry had entertained Cochrane and
his officers aboard the American frigate.16
The second lesson learned from Barry’s first cruise in the West Indies was
logistical. Stoddert originally had directed that Barry’s squadron be back in an American
port after approximately two months’ cruising time. Of course, the Secretary had given
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the commodore latitude to remain longer should circumstances require it.17 When Barry
returned home on time, in Stoddert’s eyes having accomplished so little, the navy
secretary was astonished that the Commodore had not determined to remain longer and
so achieve more of his mission. But Barry had not believed he really had possessed that
option. A significant portion of his provisions were inedible due to spoilage, leaving him
little choice but to return. The United States had no bases in the West Indies and had
made no provision to obtain comestibles in theatre.18 The distance to the West Indies
from the mid-Atlantic states of the U.S. is deceivingly great. In the days before steam or
diesel power freed mariners from the oceans’ currents and wind patterns, the sea lanes
were very well defined. From the northern United States it was several thousand miles
and much farther to the Antilles in sailing time than from England. Hence one could not
merely pop back to the American coast to re-provision and swiftly re-appear on station. If
a skipper could not obtain necessary food supplies in theatre, the only option was the
hastiest return possible, ending the mission.
Barry’s voyage brought home to Secretary Stoddert the point that he would have
to solve this issue of re-supply if he hoped to have his cruisers remain in their patrolling
“grounds” for longer periods, a condition precedent to making his strategy of taking the
war to the corsairs’ backyard practical. Otherwise, too much time would be spent coming
and going from the Caribbean.19 Even the largest of the U.S. Navy’s frigates such as
Constitution or United States could just fit six months supplies in their hulls packed with
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men, and the instruments of war.20 Constellation , because of her lesser size and narrower
profile, could only stow a four months’ stock of food and other necessaries.21 For the
sloops of war and even smaller cutters Stoddert intended to use in the Antilles, addressing
the issue would be even more critical; they could pack much less in their holds.22
So Stoddert found himself again facing an administrative puzzle, but this time
connected with two of the three classic issues simultaneously: ships and men. He needed
logistical bases for ships to rendezvous, undergo minor repairs and replenish needed
naval stores. He also needed a system of either bases or supply ships to keep his men fed
and watered. The question was how to do it. The United States owned no real estate
outside the sixteen states and the territories between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. It
could try to persuade neutral powers in the Caribbean region to allow use of their islands.
Sweden and Denmark, possessing colonies at St. Bartholomew’s, and St Thomas,
respectively, would qualify. But while they would certainly welcome American warships
as visitors, as neutral powers they might be loathe to proffer too much succor to
combatants, even unofficial ones, especially if the foe was the powerful French Republic.
Spain, with extensive holdings in the Greater Antilles, and the Netherlands, with its
islands in the Lesser Antilles, were each allied with France against Britain, but both were
technically at peace with the United States. Never the less, using Spanish or Dutch ports
might prove ticklish, as the French often worked from Spanish island strongholds and
Holland was a virtual satellite of the French. Then, of course, there were the British
possessions in the Caribbean, which included an extensive list of islands in the Lesser
20
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Antilles, plus Jamaica. Although relations between the U.S. and Great Britain were
cordial, Stoddert initially believed Britain would not welcome American warships into its
West Indian ports.23
In the end, Stoddert would solve this puzzle with the tacit assistance of the British
Colonial Governors in Basse Terre, St. Kitts and Martinique. The Navy Secretary made
arrangements to store supplies with local island firms recommended to him by his
merchant contacts in Philadelphia upon whom he relied for so much of his island
intelligence. At Basse Terre he chose the firm of Denniston & McLauchlan, and at
Martinique, Frazer Urquhart & Co.24 In addition, he obtained from the State Department
authority to use American Consuls in a pinch as navy agents. This was necessary to
finesse the tricky situation in Spanish Havana. To allow America to utilize Havana to reprovision her navy ships so as to attack the vessels of Spain’s ally might have seemed
problematical for any Spanish governor. But the governor also knew that Cuban planters
desperately needed American foodstuffs to feed their large slave populations.
Accordingly, the U.S. Government had made it easier for His Excellency to turn a blind
eye to these extra-diplomatic duties of procuring, and storing food supplies and naval
stores by keeping the navy agent role utterly unofficial. Thereby, both governments could
maintain, for the benefit of the French, the fiction that Daniel Hawley and his successors
at Havana, Joseph Yznardi and John Morton, only ever acted in their capacity as the
American Consul, a diplomatic office solely intended to serve American merchant
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interests. Eventually the navy and state departments would translate this system to the
colonies of other French allies, such as the Dutch, at Curaçao.25
At Basse Terre, St. Kitts, and Prince Rupert’s Bay, Martinique, the Americans
would happily discover such subterfuge was unnecessary. As it turned out, Stoddert’s
apprehension that the British would try to block the use of their islands for the supply of
friendly warships proved utterly misplaced. The British were happy to have the
Americans based in their islands, spending money with local merchants, and if nothing
else, providing extra security for their island bases and the trading vessels coming and
going from them.26 This was a time when there was a reasonable fear that the French
might attempt some further adventurism in the islands as they had four years earlier when
Victor Hugues had evaded the British blockade of the French coast and, with a small
squadron of warships carrying troops, recaptured Guadeloupe from the British.27
Therefore the U.S. Navy was able to formally employ naval agents in these ports and
forswear the need for the Consuls to perform naval supply tasks. At Basse Terre it was
Commodore Truxtun himself who informally appointed a local acquaintance, Clarkson,
as resident navy agent. Secretary Stoddert acquiesced in this appointment even though it
had been made outside proper channels.28 Later, when the war progressed and the United
States, Great Britain and the black rebel general Toussaint L’Ouverture—he then held
25
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most of the former French colony of St. Domingue—formed an agreement opening to
British and American commerce two of the island’s ports controlled by Toussaint, the
U.S. Navy began using one of these, Cap Francois, as the base for its Windward Passage
station, along with the additional excellent watering harbor of St. Nicholas Mole. In fact
this station came to be known as the Cap Francois or St. Domingue Station and its ships
would later be tasked to protect merchants going to and from the two main trading ports
controlled by Toussaint, namely Cap Francois and Port Republicain (Port au Prince) and
interdicting those attempting to trade with Toussaint’s rival general, Andre Rigaud, who
still professed allegiance to the Directory in Paris. At le Cap, Toussaint encouraged an
official U.S. Navy presence and so Secretary Stoddert, as early as March 1799, had
appointed his friend, Nathan Levy, to assume the role of navy agent, freeing new Consul
General Dr. Edward Stevens from those tasks.29
During the winter of 1798-99, while he had pondered solutions to these supply
conundrums, the Navy Secretary had decided to commit nearly the entire American Navy
to the Caribbean region. Stoddert believed that he now had the intelligence he needed to
effectively deploy his ships into several squadrons.30 The smallest of these he sent to
cover the Havana trade consisting of the cutters General Greene 10 and Governor Jay 14,
and the sloop of war, Delaware 20, all under the flag command of Stephen Decatur, Sr. in
the latter vessel.31 Adjacent to this command, he placed U.S.S. Ganges 24, the exIndiaman, now under the command of Captain Thomas Tingey, to patrol the heavily used
Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola. Stoddert had intended two other
29
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vessels to accompany Ganges but other difficulties interfered with their actually arriving
on station. When they finally did get there in the spring, Tingey had returned to the
United States.32
To the Lesser Antilles, the Secretary sent the strongest squadrons. He decided to
divide this command in two with a northern and southern division. The northern
command or Leeward Islands and Porto Rico command, based at the British island of St.
Christopher’s—commonly known as St. Kitts—would be under Commodore Truxtun in
Constellation 36, and also employ the sloops of war Richmond 18, and Baltimore 20, and
the cutter Virginia 14.33To the south in the Windward Islands, based at Martinique, a
formerly French colony now held by the British, would be the most powerful squadron
formed around the two 44s, United States and Constitution with Commodore Barry flying
his flag in the former. Under Barry’s flag command besides the other big frigate would be
the sloops of war George Washington, 24, a large but dull sailing converted
merchantman, Portsmouth 24, Merrimack 24, and Herald 18, also a very slow ship, and
the cutters Pickering 14, Scammell 14, Eagle 14, and Diligence 12. Their patrolling area
would include everything from St. Kitts south to the Spanish Main. Overall command for
the entire navy based in the West Indies would devolve upon the most senior officer,
Commodore Barry.34
One final grouping of ships, acting as a sort of free agent, but coming under
Truxtun’s St. Kitts command, had been intended to include the three men of war under
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Commodore Alexander Murray.35 Flying his flag in the converted merchantman,
Montezuma 20, Murray had set out at the end of October 1798 in command of the sloop
of war, Norfolk 18, and the schooner, Retaliation 14.36 However, during November, he
had lost Retaliation in action to two large, French frigates, l’Insurgente, 36, and le
Volontaire 40.37 Now a lone wolf, Murray was free to cruise the Lesser Antilles wherever
he thought provided the best hunting.38 This was the station grouping for much of the
winter 1798-99 cruising season. In many respects it would remain the organizational
structure for squadrons and their bases throughout the rest of the Quasi-War.
During the course of the war, necessity dictated increased American use of British
facilities. As the U.S. Navy continued to capture French privateers and some French
Navy ships, it took into custody scores of prisoners of war, which implied the duty to care
for them until they could be exchanged. Vessels of war with space and provisions aboard
sufficient only for their own crews, could not act as floating jails. One expedient station
commanders sought was to board these prisoners in British jails on the base islands.
Again, the British were only too happy to so employ their local lock ups; it brought in
ready cash.39 At one point, the use of British jails for these prisoners had become so
great, that Stoddert had seriously remonstrated against the practice to his favorite captain,
Truxtun, announcing that four months of boarding prisoners at St. Kitts alone—where
food was very dear—had overrun by several times Congress’s entire budget dedicated to
35
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prisoner care for that same period.40 Since President Adams himself objected to prisoners
being returned to Guadeloupe without formal exchange because he believed it just put
privateer tars back into employment raiding British and American shipping,41 the
administration was in a tough spot. Clearly, it did not want the navy to continue using
jails on St Kitts, Martinique or Antigua, unless there was no alternative. In the event,
Secretary Stoddert’s solution to the difficulty was simple; he directed that all navy ships
travelling back to the United States were now obliged to transport home with them any
un-exchanged prisoners.42 American jails, in a land of bountiful food supplies were much
cheaper. Never the less, in a pinch, the theatre availability of British jails had proved
extremely valuable to the young republic’s sea service.
There were also times when U.S. Navy skippers sought to use the Royal Navy’s
dockyard facilities in the Antilles. As mentioned earlier, the navy’s men of war routinely
carried small supplies of lumber, naval stores, spars and cordage, for the ship’s carpenter,
sailing master, and crew to perform repairs of rigging, planking, and any number of
minor wear and tear defects to a vessel caused by enemy action or by Mother Nature.
However, when a warship had suffered severe damage, such as a dismasting, or a holing
below the water line, the ship required a dockyard. Again, the United States had no such
facilities on station, but the British did at English Harbour, Antigua, and Port Royal,
Jamaica. While not true dockyards in the sense that none possessed graving docks or
floating docks to remove a ship from the water, Antigua had a careening pier allowing
40
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bottom repairs, and both had naval stores and artificers to repair or replace masts, spars
and rigging.43 Captain Alexander Murray, then commanding U.S.S. Insurgente, sought to
use the dockyard at English Harbour to replace a rotten, unsound mast. He wrote to the
Royal Navy’s new Leeward Island Station commander, Admiral Lord Hugh Seymour,
asking permission to use His Majesty’s dockyard at Antigua. The text of the letter
illustrates the reverence with which American naval officers held Royal Navy flag
officers.44 While waiting for the Admiral’s response—he was elsewhere on duty—
Murray hobnobbed with his R.N. counterparts, again cementing the personal
relationships that made informal naval co-operation flourish. Once the Admiral had
approved aiding the stricken Yankee frigate, the Americans were able to procure and
install a mast from the stores available there. Glowing with praise for the dockyard and
His Majesty’s officers present at English Harbour, Murray departed in Insurgente .45
Within the first twelve hours at sea, the American Captain suffered from a severe case of
buyer’s remorse with respect to his brand new mast. The mast had already failed.
Inspection revealed that it had massive structural defects including a number of large
knotholes that someone had puttied over. The U.S. Navy had paid full price for a mast in
the islands and been given a “lemon” by English dockyard personnel.46 The whole
exchange revealed that perhaps there were limits to any kind of naval co-operation
between informal allies fighting the same foe. Naval stores, especially masts and spars,
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were very dear in the islands, having been imported.47 They were urgently needed to
service the eighty to ninety Royal Navy warships stationed there. While a sea service
Admiral sympathetic to the Americans like Lord Hugh Seymour might accede to
expending precious mast timber upon the Yankee navy, dockyard personnel in the British
West Indies might not agree with him. They answered to the Navy Board in London, the
body charged with the care of His Majesty’s warships. Whether these personnel were
registering resentment at being asked to provide the Yanks with a mast, or merely making
them the target of a practical joke, is unclear. But Captain Murray received the message
loud and clear: American warships would not be able to count on the British Caribbean
dockyards for anything more than moral support.
Truxtun himself would soon learn the same lesson when after his engagement
with La Vengeance 50, he had limped into Port Royal similarly seeking spare masts or
spars to help repair the severe damage. Constellation’s mast situation had been so bad
after the action that Truxtun had not dared to beat back to Antigua for repairs, instead
sailing to windward to Jamaica.48 When he finally made Port Royal, accompanied,
ironically by the injured Insurgente following its Antigua experience, Truxtun would
learn that apparently there were no masts to be had for his vessel. The dockyard did not
even pretend to have the necessary spars, etc. to furnish an American frigate, even one
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having performed such famous service against the enemy’s frigates.49 At any rate,
Constellation eventually made the American coastline with an utter jury rig.50
Another, and arguably far more important, sign of this mutual Anglo-American
naval assistance during the years of the Quasi-War was the tacit agreement for their
respective navies to convoy each other’s merchant vessels. On the British side this had
begun informally before the U.S. Navy had put even one ship in blue water. As
previously described, the Royal Navy regularly operated convoys from the major English
ports or anchorages per an organized sailing schedule. In early 1798 Rufus King had
asked and been given permission for American merchantmen in England to join the
spring convoy to America. This was especially critical going to or leaving England
because the English Channel was a prime hunting ground for French corsairs operating
from St. Malo, or Dunkirk, among other ports. Ships were not generally safe until well
out at sea beyond the Western Approaches—sometimes even as far south as the latitude
of Gibraltar—on an outbound leg and acquired the danger again upon entering them on
an inbound leg.51 Hence, the British Admiralty allowed American ships to gather at the
designated assembly points and provided them with the regular written convoy
instructions.52 The Yankee merchant captains then had to suppress their natural
independence and desire to be the first into home port—this usually meant the best prices
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for goods—and instead conform to naval convoy discipline, travelling in formation no
faster than the flotilla’s slowest vessel.53
On the North American Station, even before receiving any instruction from the
Admiralty or any other Whitehall office, Admiral Vandeput had put into effect orders
directing R.N. warships on convoy duty to specifically accept American merchantman to
England, and then the West Indies.54 And the American merchant marine did utilize this
vital trans-Atlantic and trans-Caribbean service. American merchantmen use of British
convoys sailing from England to the New World also appears to have been common. The
correspondence of Rufus King contains references to various American trading ships
sailing in various R.N. organized convoys. The letters of Elias VanderHorst, the
American Consul resident in Bristol, to King suggest that only armed, fast ships, “flyers,”
risked the journey un-escorted.55 After 1798, convoys were mandatory for British
merchantmen trading abroad unless specifically exempted as were the speedy flyers and
packets. Consequently, marine insurers typically issued their policies with the specific
understanding that the ship was to travel in a formal convoy. Failure to do so voided the
coverage. The underwriters based out of New Lloyd’s Coffee House in London, who
insured the bulk of the voyages from the American ports to Britain, or vice versa, most
often sold their insurance with this proviso.56
Of course, the American navy was in no position to provide a regularly scheduled
convoy service, be it to England, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or the West or East
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Indies. At peak, the Americans only had roughly thirty men of war in the fleet.57 They
just did not have the ships to guard America’s world-wide commerce. Secretary Stoddert
had early in the war expressed to the president his firm conviction that the best way to
protect that wide roving American merchant shipping was to hunt the privateers in their
home waters before they could lose themselves in the sea lanes and wreak havoc.58
Hence, Stoddert’s priority was to have American warships on station in the Caribbean
preying upon the predators. As mentioned previously, the navy secretary preferred his
men of war to cruise alone, if possible, in order to cast as fine a net as was possible to
snare French privateers. But he did acknowledge the perspective of the powerful
merchant lobby in Congress, which believed the convoy of their own vessels should take
precedence. Therefore, he encouraged U.S. Navy commanders to provide escorts for
American merchantman whenever consistent with their general cruising duties.59
And they did so conscientiously. In general, whenever an American Navy vessel
was homeward bound, station commanders or the individual captains, looked to shepherd
groups of merchantmen back to the American coastline. In the case of the St. Kitts-based
squadron, during his tenure, Commodore Truxtun directed his captains to call at the
various prominent ports of the Leeward Isles, and sometimes even farther afield, to
provide notice that a convoy would be available from a particular assembly point such as
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Basse Terre Roads, or Prince Rupert’s Bay. Trading vessels would often accompany the
navy ship bringing news of the impending convoy back to its proposed, general point of
departure. The navy warship would gather a group of ships heading through one of the
island passages and escort them until reaching some latitude deemed safe for the flotilla
to continue on to the American coast or wherever else bound. The navy ship would then
return to its squadron’s rendezvous to await the commodore’s further orders.60
It was in no way unusual to find several English commercial bottoms among a
group of Yankee traders with a U.S. Navy escort heading between or out of the islands.61
On one of these American convoy gathering excursions Captain Truxtun recorded in his
journal instances of encountering his British counterparts assembling their annual spring
convoy to England, with some 300 ships, minded not by just one or two small men of
war, but by two ships of the line, H.M.S. Prince of Wales 98, and H.M.S. Vengeance 74,
plus a bevy of frigates. The pennant of Vice-Admiral Harvey, commander of the Leeward
Islands Station, flew from Prince of Wales’s mast head, indicating the Admiral himself
was escorting this immensely valuable agglomeration of merchant ships.62 Not since the
loss of the Smyrna Convoy in the Nine Years War had the Royal Navy allowed such a
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huge, rich flota to continue unguarded to its destination.63 And among those 300 traders
bound to England could be found the ubiquitous Yankee bottoms.64 Each nation knew the
critical import of its seaborne commerce to itself and its essential trading partners. Hence,
although there was no formal treaty of alliance between England and America, there was
the recognition that some kind of naval cooperation between them would be necessary to
counter the French guerre de course. Each power extending access to its convoys to the
other was certain evidence of this.
Then there was the general cruising each navy undertook to patrol for the French
seagoing marauders. The Royal Navy and U.S. Navy each organized their own ongoing
high seas interdiction missions. As Professor Palmer notes in Stoddert’s War, despite the
nearly identical object of their efforts there would never be any official joint operations or
strategic planning, with perhaps one exception. The two naval administrations, the Navy
Department in Philadelphia—later Washington—and the Admiralty in London, never had
a formal agreement to share intelligence or deploy assets in concert with each other.65 But
informally it did happen in theatre, as often occurs when practical military men share a
common goal. And the individual captains of the respective navies were practical men,
who valued economy of effort. Use of the system of private signals became
commonplace between the two services from their introduction in 1798 through to the
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American cessation of hostilities with the French in early February 1801.66 With this
came, the common practice of speaking each other’s ships and sharing the local
intelligence between brother officers serving in the same sector. For example, when
Commodore Truxtun had first arrived to effectively establish the St. Kitts station in the
winter of 1799, he quickly made contact with a Royal Navy frigate which Constellation
had been set to chase until private British signals identified her as friendly. She was
H.M.S. Concorde, Captain Barton, commanding. Truxtun had signaled his desire to
speak the frigate and the British ship then had sent a lieutenant in a boat with Captain
Barton’s compliments to ask the American commodore his wishes. Truxtun had
explained to the British officer that he was new on station, and that he desired to know
the sector’s news, namely how the enemy was operating in that area. His Royal Navy
counterpart was happy to relate through the lieutenant what he knew about local French
warship strength. After exchanging each other’s respective night signals, the two ships
went their separate ways.67 This kind of encounter would occur throughout the war.68
There would also be numerous accounts during the Quasi-War of U.S. Navy and
Royal Navy men of war sailing in concert, or even conducting joint chases of suspected
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French armed vessels.69 Of course none of these joint cruises were directed from the
British Admiralty, or the U.S. Navy Department. Neither did the British station Admirals
or station commanding American commodores formally direct such action. It was just the
natural outgrowth of commanders frequently speaking each other’s ships and exchanging
intelligence as described above. The encounters between Captain Nicholson’s
Constitution and the Royal Navy frigate, Santa Margaretta during early March 1799 are
illustrative. On 2 March, at 6:30 P.M. Constitution’s lookout had spied a “strange sail”
and had given chase. This other vessel had responded by “standing towards” the
American. Nicholson had ordered his ship cleared for action. There had been no
exchange of signals. Fortunately, the two frigates had chanced to speak each other before
opening fire.70 The American warship sent a boat across to the British frigate requesting
the “night Private Signals” to avoid further instances of friendly fire. The two men of war
had remained in proximity through the night such that Santa Margaretta’s captain was
able to send a boat to “pay his respects to Captain Nicholson.” When the two frigates
finally left each other, they had been sailing in concert for some sixteen hours. The
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journal kept by James Pity of the Constitution indicates that Santa Margaretta had spent
those sixteen hours trying every way possible to “out sail us, being sensible of Inability
tak’d (sic) to the Northward and Shortened Sail.”71 One week later, Constitution similarly
gave chase to a distant sail, but upon answering the vessel’s private signal discovered she
was none other than the Santa Margaretta.72 The two frigates would then sail together
until at least the next day. Mr. Pity’s journal and that of the American sloop of war
Merrimack, reveals that the two frigates were still sailing in company when Merrimack
signaled and then spoke them early the next afternoon.73
In May 1800, Constitution, by then under the command of Captain Silas Talbot,
similarly would keep encountering the frigate H.M.S. Alarm while on patrol on the St.
Domingue station. The first of these contacts had nearly foiled Talbot’s plan to cut out
the French privateer, Sandwich, then taking on cargo in the harbor of Puerto Plata, east of
Cap-Français. Around midnight on 11 May, Alarm had intercepted and fired upon
Constitution’s tender, Sally, on her way to enter the Spanish anchorage where Sandwich
remained moored. Sending a boat to the Sally, the British lieutenant boarding her was
chagrined to find that she was not the expected French prize, but a “Trojan Horse” loaded
with American naval tars, officers and marines hidden below deck waiting to board and
subdue the unsuspecting corsair in Puerto Plata. First Lieutenant Hull, commanding the
raid, had left the Royal Navy lieutenant even more crestfallen to learn that the Americans
were after the same prize, the Sandwich, sought by Captain Rolles of the Alarm. But
Rolles’s officer had the good grace to wish the Americans good luck and not further
71
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impede their mission, which should it succeed would certainly not have enriched Alarm’s
ship’s company, but never the less would have furthered the common cause of defeating
the French.74 Constitution herself encountered Alarm during the night of 11 May, and
again at daybreak 12 May.75 On 23 May, Alarm appeared again, this time chasing
Constitution’s tender, Amphitheatre. The big American warship then identified the
British frigate and came up to sail in company with her and Amphitheatre.76 Three days
later, with Constitution, now sailing alone—Captain Talbot had ordered the tender to
work separately again for a while—her lookouts had spotted inshore a ship they
supposed, but never confirmed, as Alarm.77 The British ship’s rig and her patrolling
habits had become that familiar to the Constitutions. Her presence had become a regular
feature on station, an informal cruising partner just as Santa Margaretta had been the
previous year.
Even though there was no formal integrated command between their respective
naval hierarchies, the two forces deployed in a manner which complemented the other’s
strategic efforts. In early 1798 the Royal Navy had concentrated its ships in the Leeward
Islands Station based at English Harbor, Antigua under Admiral Harvey. At that time
Harvey had under his command some fifty-nine to seventy-one warships.78 As the year
progressed the Royal Navy began to shift its strength west to the Jamaica Station, under

74

Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 175-79; extract from Talbot to Stoddert, 12 May 1800 in U.S.N., Quasi-War
5:503-04; “Account of the Expedition of U.S. Frigate Constitution, in Harbour of Porto Plata,” in ibid.
5:504-05; extract from “Journal of Constitution,” 12 May 1800, in ibid. 5:09.
75
Isaac Hull, “Journal of Lt. Isaac Hull, U.S.N., of U.S. Frigate Constitution, 12 May 1800, in ibid. 5:50809.
76
Isaac Hull, extract from “Journal of Lt. Isaac Hull, U.S.N., of U.S. Frigate Constitution, 23 May 1800, in
ibid. 5:553-54.
77
Hull, extract from “Journal,” 26 May 1800, in ibid. 5:566.
78
Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 240.

132

Admiral Hyde Parker at Port Royal.79 This was largely due to the deteriorating situation
on St. Domingue, where both the rebels and mosquito borne sickness had decimated the
British Army. There, British acting general, Maitland, negotiating with General Toussaint
L’Ouverture, had finally concluded a strategic withdrawal from the colony. This British
evacuation from St. Domingue eventually included even abandoning the Royal Navy’s
highly prized deep water harbor at Mole St. Nicholas, which commanded the Windward
Passage.80 The British had greatly feared that the slaves revolting on St. Domingue might
export similar unrest to Jamaica. They suspected that Toussaint planned on invading
Britain’s richest colony in the Sugar Islands where Jamaica’s Governor, Lord Balcarres,
recently had had his hands full dealing with the rebellious Maroons, escaped former
slaves, in the upland interior of the island. But St. Domingue terrified a number of
societies in the Americas, chief among them the planters of America’s southern coast
who similarly recoiled at the prospect of the St. Domingue uprising infecting their own
slave population.81
So, while the British fell back upon Jamaica, so to speak, the United States Navy
began to establish a presence in the Lesser Antilles which, as it grew, in many ways
helped to offset the British withdrawal. America’s squadrons had the practical effect of
reinforcing Royal Navy units remaining on the eastern station. By early 1799, the
Americans had sixteen warships patrolling against the Guadeloupe based raiders and also
conducting limited convoys protecting both British and American merchant shipping
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from French depredations.82 Both Admiral Harvey and his successor, Admiral Lord Hugh
Seymour, welcomed the American presence in their sector.83 In the early days of
American involvement Harvey had been eager to know the American terms of
engagement with the mutual French enemy and had been gratified to learn that American
men of war would not just aid in catching the raiders, or convoying merchantmen sailing
under either flag, but also in the recapture of British, as well as American bottoms taken
as prizes by the French.84 Though barred from getting directly involved in Britain’s war
with the Gallic Republic, and allowed to only attack armed French vessels, the U.S.
Navy’s policy on recaptures, largely formed by Commodore Truxtun himself, took the
bellicose view that any vessel flying the French Tricolor—this would even include an
English merchant ship just taken as a French prize moments earlier—having so much as
“jack knives on board” would qualify as a French armed ship subject to seizure on the
high seas.85 Very adroitly the U.S. Navy had side-stepped very limiting terms of
engagement by taking a very broad interpretation of the language used.
This same reading of the Congressional Act granting authority to attack any
armed French ship gave American naval commanders the latitude to repel any French
corsair attacking a British ship in an American-led convoy. The raider would present a
clear danger to every ship in the convoy, whether it flew the Stars and Stripes or the
Union flag. After all, any convoyed English merchantman upon capture would instantly
become a French armed vessel posing an immediate threat to the remaining flotilla
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members. Hence, an informal doctrine of mutual aid developed between British and
American forces in the Caribbean rendering them “quasi allies.” It is instructive to note
that even at the end of American hostilities against the French, British Lesser Antilles
Commander-in-Chief, Robert Thomson, facing the threat of invaders believed to be
sailing from Guadeloupe sought Commodore Barry’s help for the defense of St. Kitts and
Antigua.86 That Thomson still thought to invoke the spirit of mutual aid against French
aggression which had dominated British and American relations in the West Indies
throughout the conflict says much about the persistence of the sentiment. Therefore,
although there was no formal coordination of strategic operations between London and
Philadelphia in the Caribbean, the de facto result was much the same as if there had been.
The fighting sailors of both navies on duty in the islands had worked out a practical
informal cooperation which greatly aided each service in its own efforts against the
French.
While the naval understanding between the two powers remained principally
something worked out by the units at sea, the St. Domingue station provided the one case
during the Quasi-War where the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy had a formal basis for
cooperation. This concerned enforcing the tenets of the agreement reached between Great
Britain, the United States and Toussaint l’Ouverture regarding the opening of ports
controlled by Toussaint to American and British merchant bottoms. This would also
encompass the suppression of trade to territory controlled by Toussaint’s rival general,
Rigaud, an agent of the Directory in Paris. Besides containing illegal trade to Rigaud’s
coastal bases, the two naval forces would by necessity need to eliminate Rigaud’s
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shallow water privateer fleet. At the time, this small force was conducting a savage war
upon British and American trade in those waters, besides threatening the limited coastal
commerce allowed under the tripartite agreement, which Toussaint’s supporters
conducted in order to maintain his troops.87 The record would later show that the tiny
American navy did indeed honor its obligations under this compact, but His Majesty’s
navy arguably did not. Instead, the Royal Navy’s history of enforcement was spotty at
best and more accurately exhibited outright hostility to it. The next chapter will discuss
how and why execution of this actual brief directing joint enforcement of the tripartite
agreement, a policy adopted by both Philadelphia and Whitehall, so often fell so far short
of its intended goal.
Thus, while it is true that the United States and Britain never formed a formal
naval alliance during America’s Quasi-War with France, the two nations did indeed
cooperate operationally in their war at sea against their common foe: the French. When
Benjamin Stoddert, America’s navy secretary, ordered his tiny fleet to the Caribbean to
hunt the French privateers near their island lairs, the British had allowed the Yankee men
of war use of their ports as bases to rendezvous, water, and replenish food and naval
stores. In this way the British continued to support the young American sea service with
critical administrative aid serving both its ships and men. Chapter two has described how
the British had previously supplied the critical copper and ordnance to build the
American warships and indirectly provided the Americans with a ready-made naval
culture to adopt. Whereas the earlier administrative aid had been of a foundational rather
than operational nature, this new assistance in the Caribbean would be operational.
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But there would be vital cooperation at sea as well. The British had granted
American merchantmen access to the Royal Navy’s convoy system, a privilege granted to
no other nation not bound to Britain by a formal defense pact during the Great French
Wars.88 And the Americans had reciprocated where possible. Then there was the
collaboration which had developed between the serving units of the Royal Navy and U.S.
Navy in the most critical theater of the war, at least for the Americans: the Caribbean.
The commanders of the individual ships, beginning with utilizing a system of shared
signals, had learned to exchange local intelligence, cruise together, and occasionally even
pursue the enemy in concert. None of this, of course, they did at the direction of their
respective naval establishments in Whitehall and Philadelphia. Even the local British
station admirals and American commodores had not ordered such concerted action. It had
been the product of practical seamen, solving a common problem. To such men, it had
simply made sense and they had acted without recourse to their superiors. While such an
outcome might be more difficult to comprehend for twenty-first century minds used to a
different culture of command and control born of instant communications, in eighteenth
century terms it was entirely logical. The commander of a warship in the classic age of
sail, was on his own once out of sight of the admiral’s or commodore’s flagship. As
stated previously, Admiralty or Navy Department directives, or even those of the local
admirals and commodores, became more in the nature of suggestions subject to
interpretation in the light of the practical realities skippers faced on station. A commandbased study such as Professor Palmer’s fine book, Stoddert’s War, this author would
argue might lose sight of this fact when examining the activities of local naval operations.
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In Stoddert’s War, Dr. Palmer downplayed the importance of the local informal naval
cooperation that did flourish between the U.S. Navy and R.N. units on station precisely
because it never became the formal operational policy of the respective naval
establishments in London and Philadelphia/Washington. However this study has
demonstrated that quite to the contrary, it was this local cooperation which defined much
of how these navies actually fought the war. For the British and American serving units
in theatre, this informal collaboration was a fact of life. It amounted to a naval “quasialliance.”
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CHAPTER V
THE RELATIONSHIP TESTED
During the years of America’s Quasi-War with France, the United States and
Great Britain had forged an informal naval alliance to face the Gallic threat to their
commerce, especially in the Caribbean. Britain had assisted the U.S. in building its fleet,
most importantly by supplying the critical copper plates and fasteners so necessary to
maintain an effective fighting force in late eighteenth-century naval combat, and, of
course, also by providing the lion’s share of American naval ordnance. To this nascent
American fleet they had also added operational aid, namely access to critical British ports
in the Antilles to serve as American bases for minor repairs, provisioning, strategic
rendezvous, and maintaining French prisoners.
Additionally, the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy had informally cooperated on
station by opening each other’s convoys to the other nation’s merchant vessels, trading
intelligence on the enemy and on occasion even patrolling together. The preceding
chapter has discussed all of this in some detail. What it did not discuss was how this
informal naval cooperation between the mother country and its former colony, fashioned
so soon after the two had fought America’s bloody war of independence, was fragile
from the first. Institutional forces which had nearly plunged the two nations into war in
1794, Royal Navy impressment of American sailors and British seizure of Yankee
merchantmen, continued to dog this new naval rapprochement between them.
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This chapter will tell the story of how those institutional stressors affected that
naval relationship, especially as exacerbated by the loose nature of naval command in the
eighteenth century. The personalities of the individual commanders counted for much in
this era before instantaneous communication at sea. As argued in the previous chapter,
the informal operational relationship between the serving units of the American and
British navies had formed in the Caribbean precisely because of the practical
independence the captains enjoyed once at sea. Station Admirals and commodores of the
two services in the West Indies, themselves thousands of miles from their respective
superiors in London and Philadelphia, also effectively wielded command without any
immediate supervision.
As this chapter will demonstrate, the attitudes of a particular admiral, such as Sir
Hyde Parker, were often more significant to the actual policy followed on station than
whatever directives might arrive from Whitehall. Hyde Parker’s unsympathetic position
with respect to the impressment of American tars into his Jamaican squadron, much more
rigid than that exhibited by the Admiralty in London, and the rapacious attitude exhibited
by the cruisers in his squadron in seizing American merchantmen would prove especially
trying to the Anglo-American relationship. But it would be Sir Hyde’s personal animosity
directed at the joint British/American diplomatic initiative towards Toussaint l’Ouverture
and the St. Dominguian Revolution—this was the one situation where their two
governments expected the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy to cooperate—which arguably
would most stress Anglo-American amity. The American squadron on station would
embrace the joint mission, Parker’s would not.
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Additionally, there were always human character flaws to complicate the existing
institutional issues: personal hatreds, individual greed, racism and general bloodymindedness. As the war went on, in letters home, whether to colleagues, or to
government functionaries in the United States, serving naval officers in the Caribbean
came to express real or perceived tensions with their informal British allies. Despite these
negative forces and the American hand wringing they sometimes produced, perceptions
which had the potential to sever the relationship, this chapter will argue that the informal
naval understanding did not in fact fail, but persevered to the end of the Quasi-War.
Contrary to what Professor Palmer has concluded, namely that the Anglo-American
quasi-alliance was on the rocks by the end of America’s conflict with France, this chapter
will show that it was entirely functional. American and British warships continued to
share intelligence and cruise together against the French. American men of war still used
British ports as bases, and cooperated with their hosts as they had earlier.
There had appeared to be a kind of honeymoon existing between the United States
and Great Britain during the summer and early autumn of 1798 as the former struggled to
assemble its navy with the latter’s help to fight their common enemy, the French. As
discussed in previous chapters, the British were busy supplying the Americans with
copper, guns and saltpeter, and offering them even ships and officers. American
Federalist patriots talked of more formal connections between the two countries and
cheered any news of a British or allied gain in the war against the French in Europe.
Meetings between officers and crews of His Majesty’s warships and their few American
counterparts then at sea were full of bon-accord. But the issues which had caused grief to
the Anglo-American relationship ever since Britain joined the Continental war against the
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French had not dissipated. They continued to simmer, submerged beneath the apparent
surface calm of friendship. British privateers and navy warships still seized American
trading vessels as prizes, especially in the West Indies. Secondly, the Royal Navy had not
halted the impressment of Yankee sailors from the many American merchant vessels who
visited British ports, in England, the West Indies, or even on the high seas. What made
these problems so intractable was that each side’s position with respect to the seizures
and impressment were so much entwined within its national institutions or consciousness.
While not even anglophile Federalists ever ignored incidents of British
impressment of Americans, or seizure of American merchantmen, it would be an
infamous episode in late Autumn 1798 that would jolt both sides awake from their
honeymoon slumber and remind them of the deep divisions yet separating the “would be”
allies. On 16 November the American sloop of War, Baltimore, was escorting a convoy
of merchantmen to Havana, Cuba, when a Spanish flagged squadron of heavy warships
plus two frigates approached. This flotilla eventually exchanged Spanish colors for
British and a frigate signaled by cannon shot to leeward that they were not hostile.
Captain Isaac Phillips, commanding the Baltimore responded in kind. The British
battleships were the Carnatic 74, Thunderer 74, and Queen 98, accompanied by two 32
gun frigates, Maidstone and Greyhound, all based at Admiral Sir Hyde Parker’s Jamaica
station. Captain Phillips then stood to speak the Carnatic, which flew a commodore’s
pennant. After coming aboard the battleship at the invitation of Commodore John Loring,
R.N., Phillips was taken aback at his reception. Perhaps expecting the friendly exchange
which had generally accompanied contact between commanding officers of the American
and British navies to date, Phillips found his status in question because he did not have
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aboard his ship’s U.S. Navy commission, nor his captain’s commission—he had needed
to leave port before they could reach him from Philadelphia—only his sailing orders from
Secretary Stoddert and his copy of the British/American private signals. But far more
serious was the “request” he next received from Loring. The Commodore told Phillips
that he would be removing from the Baltimore all sailors he deemed British because his
ship’s complement was low. Sometime after Captain Phillips had returned to his ship, he
found Loring had sent lieutenants to collect all men without “protections.” Fifty-five of
Baltimore’s tars accompanied the British officers back to the Carnatic. This removed
roughly one third of the Baltimore’s crew. Later in the day, Loring relented and released
all but five of these back to the American sloop of war. The Royal Navy squadron then
took its leave.1
Americans were naturally livid once the case became known. Even Anglophile
Federalists in Congress were incensed. Harrison Gray Otis, a staunch Federalist
Congressman from Massachusetts, responded with a resolution requesting the president
provide the House of Representatives with any information he possessed regarding the
impressment of U.S. seamen aboard the Baltimore.2 Captain Phillips himself was
dismissed outright from the American service without a hearing because Secretary
Stoddert and President Adams believed he should not have relinquished even one man
unless he had first struck his colors in the face of overwhelming odds. Instead, they
concluded Phillips had acted in a servile manner to the British, a station they could never
1
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countenance.3 Secretary of State Pickering lodged formal diplomatic complaints both
with Robert Liston in Philadelphia and to the Foreign Office in London through Rufus
King.4
The whole affair seemed to capsulize the issue of British impressment of
Americans. For starters, impressment into the Royal Navy had had a long history of
unpopularity in the United States which antedated independence. American tars, like their
British counterparts, resented the idea that they could be forced to join anyone’s navy,
particularly during a war, when wages were many times higher in the merchant marine.
The naval press was a hated institution in England, and had been all throughout the
Second Hundred Year’s War. Nicholas Rogers has written about eighteenth century
British societal resistance to the press, often involving violence against regulating
officers, their men in the press gangs, and their headquarters, the so-called “rendezvous.”5
But despite this popular anger directed against the press, it was, and had been, for the
better part of a century, a fixture of British naval culture. The Admiralty had found it to
be absolutely essential to the Navy’s continued effectiveness. The reason was simple. The
Royal Navy desperately needed men. It had the ships and usually the money, the two
other legs of the naval administrative stool. Despite the largest population of seamen in
Europe, if not the world, there were simply not enough of them to man simultaneously in
wartime both the globe’s largest navy and merchant marine.6 The Admiralty had tried to
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promote within Parliament a nationwide list of seamen from which it could call up men
for the fleet in wartime in a rational manner, as the French had done, but failed because
the merchant lobby in the national legislature had sufficient power to crush any proposal
which might make it more difficult to recruit scarce men for their trading vessels.7 Hence,
the only tool left to Whitehall to muster crews in wartime when it could not outbid the
merchant marine for volunteers was the medieval power of the crown to impress tars into
His Majesty’s Fleet. Any British man who earned his living “on the water” was liable to
immediate conscription if he could be found.8 But by the mid to late 1790s, the demands
placed upon the Royal Navy had stretched its manpower needs to more than His
Majesty’s Senior Service could find in British ports and ships. The constant naval
blockade of France, the routine convoying of the merchant fleet, and the constant loss of
men to sickness and desertion had taxed the national “reserve” beyond its limit.9
Perhaps the answer to this British conundrum lay with the vastly-increased rival
American merchant fleet. The British came to believe the American merchant navy,
second only to their own, relied heavily upon Albion’s seamen. They could not believe
that the Americans could domestically produce enough jack tars to man this swelling
fleet; the Yanks had to be using sailors justly belonging to His Majesty’s Navy. Lord
Grenville himself expressed this opinion writing from the Foreign Office in London to
Phineas Bond, British Consul at Philadelphia:
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…for altho’ (sic) it is probable that American seamen may have been at different
times impressed into His Majesty’s Service, the number of native American
mariners is so small, and the part of the navigation of the United States carried on
by British Seamen is so considerable, that instances of such impressments of
American Citizens can have but rarely occurred, and certainly cannot be compared
in number with the attempts that are daily made by the owners and masters of
American Vessels to protect natives of this country under the denomination of
Citizens of the United States.10
The British had always believed they had the right to remove British sailors from
foreign ships in their ports, or even on the high seas and had done so. But the American
ships posed a unique challenge as to removing Britons from a foreign vessel. On a
foreign merchantman, the Brits were easy to spot; they spoke English. On Yankee
traders, Englishmen and Americans at this time were very difficult to tell apart. There
was no language barrier and, as argued previously, few cultural differences as well. Then
there was the British conception of citizenship that blurred the boundary even more.
Britain adhered to the theory of indefeasible allegiance which taught that a British subject
always remained His Majesty’s subject even if he became a naturalized citizen of another
country.11 Great Britain originally recognized only natural born Americans. They had
eventually expanded this conception to also include those Britons living in the new
United States upon its formally recognized independence upon the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris in 1783.12 Englishmen, Scots, or Welshmen naturalized in America, after
that, were certainly Americans in British eyes, but subjects of the British Crown first.
Hence, Royal Navy captains believed that they were within their legal rights to press
these “British” Americans from American vessels, be they merchantmen or even men of
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war.13 Technically, statute law in England prohibited impressments of any foreigners, of
course including natural-born Americans and also those Britons so naturalized at 1783.14
The problem for Royal Navy captains urgently needing men at sea was how to
swiftly make that distinction—that is if they cared to follow the law. On the Jamaica
station, want of sailors was dire. Desertion and especially disease had decimated Hyde
Parker’s squadron in those years. As he faced the Baltimore’s Captain Phillips,
Commodore Loring perhaps concluded that he would be safe taking only those tars
travelling without American “protections.” A protection was a document most often
prepared by the local customs agent attesting to the bearer’s status as an American
citizen. They could be had for the fee of one to five dollars in an American port, or even
from an overseas American consul. The trouble with these documents according to
Whitehall, and serving officers in the R.N., was that the customs agents and overseas
American consuls were none too careful as to what documents or testimony they
accepted as proof of American birth or timely naturalization. High ranking Royal Navy
officers commonly believed that the only real proof of citizenship demanded by these
American functionaries was the one to five dollars.15 Admiral John Jervis, then
commanding in the Mediterranean, was certain that such frauds occurred, and called for
vigilance. Admiral George Murray on the North American Station at Halifax also
agreed.16 British tars, they believed, were receiving these fraudulent documents to avoid
the press just by paying the asking price, even in their home ports in Britain. Grenville
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stated as much to Rufus King when he asked that American consuls in England no longer
issue protections.17
While Commodore Loring clearly had not adopted the more radical British
position of denying the validity of American protections to the press as might have his
own superior, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, he had definitely stepped into waters much
hotter indeed. When Loring announced his intention to press any of Captain Phillips’s
crew without American protection documents, Phillips simply replied that Americans
regarded their flag to be the only “protection” necessary for all men aboard an American
navy ship.18 While it angered Americans that Loring had pressed sailors from an
American ship on the high seas approaching a foreign port—Americans, at least in 1798,
allowed that the British could search an American vessel in a British home port to
forcibly induct British nationals into His Majesty’s Senior Service—they found it most
abominable that he had impressed them from the deck of an American warship on the
high seas. As galling as was the former, it had been going on since the early days of the
French Wars. However, the later, pressing from an American national ship, represented a
direct attack upon the American flag. It was surely an insult to American honor, but could
be seen in an even worse light as the start of an attempt to re-assert British sovereignty
over newly won American independence.
The question the Loring Affair presented for the American Government in
Philadelphia was whether Commodore Loring’s actions had the approbation of the
British Government. If so, it might signify the start of a new attempt to turn back the
clock of American independence. The Democratic Republicans certainly would adhere to
17
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this interpretation. But official Philadelphia preferred to conclude that the matter was not
the product of official British policy at all, but the misguided actions of one officer, albeit
one flying a commodore’s pennant.19 The diplomatic rumblings certainly travelled across
the Atlantic and induced the Admiralty to commence a detailed investigation into the
matter.20 Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, had to respond concerning his subordinate’s actions—
just another to add to a long line of unhappy contacts with Americans resulting in
diplomatic overtures.21 In the end, Loring was eventually recalled and put “on the beach”
in England.22 His Majesty’s Government in an official communication to Rufus King
implied that there would be no repeats of the Loring Affair. Americans could be assured
that His Majesty would “see with Displeasure (sic) any act which may . . . [be] . . .
committed by any officer in his (sic) Majesty’s service (sic) in derogation of the attention
and respect due to their flag.”23
There would be an attempt by Captain Edward Hamilton of H.M.S. Surprise to
take tars from the U.S.S. Ganges at sea in the months following the Loring incident while
the diplomatic gears were still turning and perhaps before a message could have reached
that ship at sea. When Hamilton’s lieutenant arriving aboard the Ganges to pay his
respects made the request to examine the crew for potential “British” seamen, Thomas
Tingey, U.S.N., politely responded that he regarded his flag as his men’s only and
sufficient protection and would forcibly resist any attempt to remove even one man from
his ship. Tingey reported that the lieutenant had politely retreated. There were no further
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requests for men but a boat did return from the Surprise, this time begging medicines
urgently needed aboard that ship. This request Tingey honored.24 Tingey became a hero
in the American popular press for standing up to the British, even though he later
explained that there had been no incident whatsoever resulting from the encounter and
the two ships had amicably parted.25 Tingey’s calm and firm response to the Surprise’s
request for men echoed new official U.S. Navy policy. American commanders were not
to give up even one man to a foreign vessel, even one from a “friendly” nation, without
resistance, and only after striking their colors in the face of vastly superior force to avoid
pointless loss of life.26 As it turned out, there would be no further R.N. attempts to press
sailors serving aboard an American man of war for the duration of the Quasi-War. The
two nations had drawn at least one bright line both could respect concerning the
impressment issue. But the honeymoon was certainly over. The issue of impressment of
avowed Americans from Yankee traders on the high seas and refusal to release them
upon proof of citizenship would continue to smolder between the two maritime nations.
But the Loring Affair also raised the ire of Americans on another score. Loring’s
powerful squadron had also seized three of the American merchantmen in the Baltimore’s
convoy en route into Havana. Secretary of State Pickering directed Mr. King in London
to raise the issue of this seizure with Lord Grenville. What galled the Secretary was how
British naval officers—other times it would be corsairs—had to his mind used pretense to
declare as contraband of war what was to him clearly an innocent neutral cargo. In this
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instance it would be six and four penny nails, and osnaburgs, a kind of coarse cloth used
to clothe slaves, which would be styled unwrought iron and sail cloth, respectively, so as
to declare them “contraband of war” in the prize court, thereby justifying their seizure
and libel.27 Worse, an Admiralty court such as Judge Cambauld’s at St. Nicholas Mole,
too many times would sustain such findings.28 In fact, the seizure of American trading
vessels on the basis that they carried “contraband” cargos of osnaburgs and nails would
be recurring themes as the Quasi-War continued.
The issue of British seizures of American shipping also had remained a sore spot
between the United States and Great Britain from the start of the war with France. As
discussed in Chapter One, the United States and Great Britain had a vastly different view
of what constituted legitimate neutral commerce. In 1793 the United States had hoped to
profit from the war by selling to both parties whose shipping was occupied with other
war related commerce, or in the case of France, susceptible to capture by British corsairs.
Instead, between December 1793 and March 1794, the British had seized hundreds of
Yankee ships bound to the French West Indies based upon an aggressive interpretation of
contraband of war to include even foodstuffs. They later retreated from that stance, but
even after Jay’s Treaty continued to adhere to the Rule of 1756 which provided that a
nation could not carry on a trade during wartime that they could not have done in
peacetime. The British also prohibited neutrals to carry enemy goods in their holds under
the guise that it was neutral property.29
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The U.S. had built its trading philosophy on the contrary premise that “free ships
made free goods,” meaning goods shipped in a neutral vessel were to be considered
neutral property. The dream of the new country upon independence had been that new
markets such as the French would now be open to a sovereign country no longer bound to
Great Britain’s system of Navigation Laws. The Great French wars were facilitating that
dream. Many American merchants continued to trade to the French islands—the French
had opened said trade to American vessels before the war—and to run the risk of British
seizure because carrying so-called contraband goods until Congress outlawed that traffic
in June 1798 because of the French guerre de course against American world-wide
commerce. Hence, with legal American shipping halted to the French West Indies, the
British corsairs could only legally prey upon American vessels bound from Spanish
colonies such as Cuba, Puerto Rico and eastern Hispaniola carrying Spanish-owned cargo
and the Yankee smugglers who defied their own government and continued in the very
lucrative trade to French territories. Americans certainly felt hard done by any British
interference with the American/Spanish commerce because British merchant shipping all
the while had kept up an illicit trade to the Spanish colonies which the Royal Navy
conveniently ignored.30 American shipping to the British possessions in the Caribbean
was now legal and technically off limits to aggressive British privateers and the Royal
Navy because British colonial governors in the Antilles had by specific orders
countenanced U.S. trade to their islands; they desperately needed American foodstuffs
and raw materials and there was a continual shortage of British bottoms. Consequently
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the level of seizures by British privateers and men of war did drop off for a time, but
certainly did not cease.
During the Anglo-American honeymoon of the summer of 1798, reports of British
seizures of American neutral shipping continued even in the Federalist press. Although it
sought closer relations with Britain, a nation it saw as a possible shield against French
aggression, the American government yet refused to turn a blind eye to the depredations
of these English privateers and the Royal Navy. Secretary of State Pickering’s letter to
Rufus King in London requesting he take up the matter of the Loring impressment of
Americans from the Baltimore and also the seizure of the convoy ships was an example
of this attitude. While seeking to contend over impressments and the definition of
contraband of war, Pickering’s letter was at pains to state that the Royal Navy convoyed
American merchantmen, R.N. officers were routinely polite to their U.S.N. counterparts,
and that one of His Majesty’s sloops had rescued the crew of an American trading vessel
in peril in American waters.31 But after the Loring Affair had effectively ended the
honeymoon and the fear of an immediate French invasion of the American coast had
vanished with Nelson’s victory at the Nile, Americans again became increasingly aware
that the British corsairs were often none too picky about what American merchantmen
they grabbed on the high seas and brought to British island ports for adjudication. And
the Admiralty courts set up to hear the libel cases, especially ones in the British West
Indies, were quick to condemn American vessels as legitimate prizes for auction. Some
were captured under the theory that their shipping manifests and papers were frauds and
they actually carried enemy goods, others under the pretense that legitimate cargos were
31
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contraband of war. Records of appeals taken from colonial prize courts by American ship
owners to the High Court in London reveal that English judges in the capital overturned
the vast majority of cases appealed and ordered compensation for the owners. West
Indies Admiralty courts were notorious for their rate of rescinded condemnations when
appealed to London. The High Court threw out seven condemnations issued at Nevis in
one afternoon alone.32 And a ruling from Whitehall dissolved an entire court based at St.
Nicholas Mole because General Simcoe commanding in British-held St. Domingue had
established it without authority to do so.33
The truth was that greed drove the prize system. The possibility of rich profits
from the sale of such American prizes encouraged privateers to make dubious captures
based on highly questionable pretexts or bald frauds.34 While the commanding Admiral
on station, and the captain of a successful Royal Navy man of war took the lion’s share of
the prize money earned when a captured ship was condemned and sold at auction, even
the common tars profited substantially, driving the desire for making captures. Admirals
like Sir Hyde Parker, commanding the prize-rich Jamaica station, became immensely
wealthy.35 Also, the desire for continued fees—colonial admiralty judges were paid a fee
for each case heard rather than a salary—encouraged judges in the islands to condemn so
that corsairs, free to employ whatever Admiralty court they desired, would continue to
frequent theirs.36 And the costs and delays in clearing up such messes at the High Court
in London—it could easily take years—were beyond the means of most Yankee shippers.
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Hence, even staunch, pro-English Federalists such as Secretary of State Pickering
responded to the merchants’ pleas for some kind of diplomatic relief. Pickering began
directing Rufus King, the American minister in London, to address the matter with Lord
Grenville. As the undeclared war against France ground on, the Adams Administration
took up diplomatic initiatives to alleviate the worst ills of the British prize system. Rufus
King took up issues such as trying to settle the definition of contraband of war. There had
never been a precise definition, allowing privateer and navy captains wiggle room to cast
a wide net and hope that sympathetic prize courts would see things their way.37
At times exacerbating both the impressment and seizure conundrums was the
loose institution of command and service loyalty prevalent in the Royal Navy at the time.
Command remained largely a creature of a traditional society, based upon personal
loyalty to a commander, and ultimately, the king. The concept of institutional loyalty was
in its infancy. In many respects, a commander’s primary allegiance was to a concept of
personal honor rather than to His Majesty’s Service as such. Allegiance to the former was
a vestige of the ancient warrior tradition of the gentleman, a status any commissioned
King’s officer in either the navy or army clung to. A personal sense of duty to the Service
was in fact a novelty. As traditional Britain transformed into early industrial Britain, the
older concept was beginning to give way to a tighter notion of institutional duty and
loyalty more resembling the discipline found in today’s navies.38 But in the 1790s,
officers yet felt an obligation to pursue the furtherance of their personal honor and reject
positions which might not favor it. At the same time this sense of personal reputation
which they deemed must always be vindicated, was attached to a keen sense of the
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pursuit of material gain. The Senior Service was seen by the younger sons of
impoverished gentry and peers to be an avenue for financial, and hopefully, social
advancement. The prize system played principally into this conception of naval service.
One hoped to serve the king, but also oneself as much as possible. When mixed with the
loose ties to superiors mandated by time and distance in the age before instantaneous
communications, the temptations of disregarding orders that one resented for one reason
or another became very real indeed.39 The Admiralty in London’s primary control over its
commanders, especially those of flag rank, was its control of patronage, the disposition of
plum—read lucrative—appointments. But once on his distant station, an Admiral was a
very independent player. Hence, within wide boundaries, an Admiral’s personal take on
his orders and mission were controlling. His likes, dislikes, and prejudices could and
would, set the tone for what his subordinate captains did with their sea commands once
out of sight of the flagship.
And so it would prove with the British station admirals in the Antilles. Their
personalities would significantly affect the status of the informal alliance with the
American sea service operating in the same waters. Just on the issue of impressment
alone, the contrasting American experience with Sir Hyde Parker at Jamaica and
Admirals Henry Harvey and Lord Hugh Seymour, who commanded in succession on the
Leeward Islands Station is instructive. When Seymour later succeeded Parker at Jamaica,
the contrast became even more marked. Parker would take a very rigid position on the
release of American pressed seamen. He had an inherent distrust of Yankee sailors, and
would choose to ignore virtually any evidence they or their advocates might produce in
39
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favor of their liberation from the service, a policy at odds with that of Admirals Harvey
and Seymour, and certainly his own subordinate, Rear Admiral Richard Bligh. Parker’s
practices were even more inflexible than those in use before the Admiralty in London. As
this chapter will demonstrate, Parker’s hauteur would offend Americans on all levels:
local agents working on behalf of seamen, U.S. Navy station commodores, and even
diplomats in Philadelphia and London.
The informal naval relationship existing in the Caribbean between the American
and British fleets was especially sensitive to the personality quirks of commanders,
whether for good or ill. This was because the issues available to drive a wedge between
them were not going to go away in the short term. Impressment of Yankee seamen and
ship seizures as described above were virtually intractable, as long as the war continued.
Nothing would sate the Royal Navy’s hunger for men but the ceasing of hostilities with
France. The same could be said of the prize system with all its greed driven defects.
Although the lot of the neutrals would improve, for a short time at least, with William
Scott’s Polly decision referred to earlier, the statutory reduction of the number of prize
courts, and the change to a standing wage for admiralty judges, these reforms to
Admiralty jurisdiction would not kick in until after the Quasi-War was over.40 So Yankee
impressment and merchantman seizures would remain to vex Americans and build up
resentment between the officers and men of the U.S. Navy and their R.N. counterparts.
They would simply have to be borne. But the bearing of them could be made better or
much worse by whoever was in charge at Port Royal, Jamaica or English Harbour,
Antigua.
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In late July 1796 Admiral Sir Hyde Parker had been en route to reinforce the
squadron blockading the French fleet taking shelter in Cadiz when an Admiralty order
redirected him, sending his squadron to reinforce the British West Indies against a
perceived imminent French invasion. He would eventually take over command of the
lucrative Jamaica station.41 However, the Admiral was rarely ever to be found at Port
Royal. That was not to say he was usually at sea either. Parker preferred to remain at St.
Nicholas Mole, the deep water port the British Army had captured from the French on St.
Domingue.42 There, sitting astride the Windward Passage, his ships could better control
the route to and from Jamaica, and most importantly, enemy commerce to and from
Spanish Cuba. The significance of the taking of prizes to this command cannot be
overstated. Some sources indicate that Parker’s force during his years in command made
up five percent of the Royal navy’s fleet but accounted for approximately thirty-three
percent of all its prizes taken. This flag appointment made Parker very rich indeed.43
But the Jamaica station had one Achilles heel: tropical disease. As previously
described, it was yellow fever and not the French and Spanish which had decimated
British land and sea forces during the 1790s. Consequently, Parker’s squadrons were
nearly always, significantly under-manned. Sir Hyde was already complaining of his
manning problems as “insurmountable” in a 23 December 1796 letter to Lord Spencer—
he had just captured two French Corvettes, highly valuable small frigates, which he
41
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hoped to take into service but for the dearth of seamen.44 The Admiralty was generally
interested in sending ships and crews back to England once the fear of a French invasion
of the West Indies had abated.45 Historically, local authorities were generally resistive to
attempts to press from the Jamaican merchant vessels; just as in England, the traders
needed sailors to man their ships. And these merchants usually had powerful allies in
Parliament to put pressure on Whitehall to stymie any such forced recruiting from local
vessels. Sir Hyde would simply have to make do. He would have to find his recruits
locally. This meant pressing tars from Yankee merchantmen.
Pressing alleged British sailors from Yankee trading vessels had been a persistent
problem for the Americans long before Sir Hyde Parker’s arrival on the Jamaica station.
In fact, from the American perspective, the problem had become so significant, that the
Washington Administration pursuant to the Act for the Relief and Protection of Seamen46
appointed agents to reside in the British West Indies and Great Britain to act as
ombudsmen for the release of Americans unjustly pressed into His Majesty’s Fleet. The
Administration appointed Captain Silas Talbot, U.S.N. to fulfill this role in the British
Antilles.47 The suggestion of a foreign agent residing in His Majesty’s Caribbean
possessions faced disapprobation from Lord Grenville in London. Britain did not tolerate
such agencies.48 However, before Grenville’s letter to Phineas Bond, the British chargés
d’affaires in Philadelphia, could arrive, Liston had agreed to provide Captain Talbot with
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letters of introduction to British governors and officers of His Majesty’s Navy in the
Islands.49 He believed the potential for harm from Talbot’s office was minimal but the
chance to gain favor with the Americans was significant. At the time, the furor over R.N.
Captain Hugh Pigot’s “starting” of the American merchant master Jessop in the
Caribbean was even souring the minds of England’s Federalist friends.50 In the end,
Liston was not severely taken to task by Lord Grenville for over-stepping his authority.
Secretary of State Pickering’s re-characterization of the post as itinerant, instead of one
based in any specific place, appeared to have temporarily mollified the Foreign Office.51
Talbot made his way to the Caribbean, arriving in Barbados 2 September 1796 but
found no official work for him there. He soon left for Martinique, landing there 28
September.52 At Fort Royal, Talbot met Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, himself having
recently arrived in the Leeward Isles on his way to the Jamaica station, and explained the
nature of his mission. This initial interview would be a precursor of future discourse with
the admiral. Talbot, in his description of the event later sent on to Secretary of State
Pickering, found the Admiral “altogether unaccommodating.” Sir Hyde informed Captain
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Talbot that he would demand “unequivocal proof” of American citizenship before
releasing a tar. He would never accept the testimony of any alleged American sailor.53
Fortunately for Talbot, Parker was not in command in the British Lesser Antilles.
The Admiral sent him on to see Rear Admiral Henry Harvey, whom Talbot found a
breath of fresh air after dealing with Parker. Harvey agreed to cooperate with Talbot,
saying he would issue orders that no Americans be impressed and that he was “willing to
enter into an inquiry, on the most liberal footing,” to ascertain for release any Americans
serving aboard ships under his immediate command. Subsequently, Talbot wrote to
Harvey on 4 October, and again on 11 October, requesting permission to search for
Americans aboard the R.N. ships at Fort Royal. Here, Harvey believed he had to refer
Captain Talbot to the higher-ranking Parker. This, Talbot deemed pointless. Parker had
just refused Talbot’s 11 October request to begin an inquiry for impressed Americans on
what the Admiral termed “such slight grounds.” Sir Hyde indicated that instead of a
general search, that Captain Talbot should specify which sailors he believed to be
Americans and reiterated his requirement that all proofs be “incontestable” before he
would release a man. Of course Sir Hyde made sure to assure Talbot that per his request
“no American seamen should be impressed” and that “due regard should be paid to the
protections of all American seamen.”54
Talbot left Fort Royal to tour other ports of the Windward and Leeward Islands.
He headed west after he became satisfied that Admiral Harvey was indeed keeping his
word about searching for and releasing Americans found on His Majesty’s men of war on
his station. He then made his way to Port Royal, Jamaica, site of the Royal Navy’s
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dockyard in the Greater Antilles. It would be at Port Royal that Captain Talbot would
have his greatest success in obtaining the release of American seamen already impressed
into the British fleet. And it would be on the Jamaica station where Talbot and Sir Hyde
would become each other’s nemesis.
Talbot’s time in Port Royal began very profitably indeed. The Captain found Sir
Hyde was not present at the time but at St. Nicholas Mole. His second in command, Rear
Admiral Richard Bligh, was on station and Talbot found him to be receptive to entreaties
on behalf of impressed American seamen. Bligh’s liberal views on impressments of
Americans—he had told Talbot that he questioned the legal right of the Royal Navy to
press Americans or any neutrals from Yankee ships in the first place55—extended to
allowing searches of R.N. ships then in port that Talbot believed to include impressed
Americans in their ships’ companies.56 Bligh even sent an aide, Captain Rutherford,
along with Talbot to assist him. When Talbot encountered lack of cooperation from
captains of the several ships searched—some refused to give up the requested men, while
others denied their presence aboard their warships—he found Captain Rutherford and the
Admiral helpful in inducing these commanders to change their minds and produce the
men. While not all the men brought before Bligh did win their release, Talbot found the
Admiral open to the evidence he produced.57
However, again Talbot found quite another reception waiting for him when in
January 1797 he travelled to St. Nicholas Mole to plead the cause of other alleged
Americans believed to be serving aboard men of war under Sir Hyde Parker’s
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command.58 Sending the Admiral a list of men put together from his own researches and
that of the State Department along with proofs he believed sufficient, he found Parker
utterly unsympathetic.59 First, he found his communication to the Admiral ignored for a
month. Next Talbot discovered that in the meantime ships whose crews included some of
the men from his list of alleged, impressed Americans were shortly due to sail back to
England.60 The Captain sent a very testy note on to Parker, again requesting the release of
the listed alleged Americans. Talbot had added that if rebuffed, he meant to adopt
“measures that are more or less unfriendly to the British Nation.”61 Sir Hyde returned
with: “in no one instance, have proofs been produced, relative to the names of those you
have been pleased to style citizens of America, sufficient to authorize me to discharge the
individuals from His Majesty’s service.”62 Parker, no doubt responding to the tone of
Talbot’s note, imperiously continued that he would forward the record of all previous
messages between them to Whitehall, “to His Majesty’s Ministers to whom only, I hold
myself accountable for my conduct, whatever may be the consequences.” Parker then
declared all communication between himself and the American agent ended.63
On 5 March, Talbot left for Port Royal, having hit a dead end with Parker. The
Captain wrote to Secretary Pickering before even leaving St. Nicholas Mole that he now
planned to execute a campaign of legal guerilla warfare against the officers of Parker’s
command to force the discharge of American seamen.64 Talbot had determined to use the
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civil court system in Kingston to obtain writs of habeas corpus to compel unsympathetic
British naval commanders to disgorge American seamen from their men of war.65 In
doing so, Talbot had hit upon one of the Achilles heels of the eighteenth century Royal
Navy: the long arm of the British civil law. The strange truth of eighteenth century
British legal jurisdiction was that once in port, the officers and ratings of Royal Navy
warships fell under the purview of the local civil courts. Unhappy officers, or even lowly
tars, could engage attorneys and sue their superiors with impunity. They could win
awards of damages, or other judgments. In Albion itself, writs of habeas corpus were the
frequent weapons of those lawyers engaged by sailors’ families or employers to free them
from the grasp of the impress service. There was a long history in England of public
enmity toward royal military authority such that the Admiralty found itself powerless to
resist such inroads upon its military jurisdiction.
Talbot, upon arriving on 8 March at Kingston, Jamaica, set about putting his plan
in operation. Within days he found there were nine men of war in Port Royal’s harbor,
including some newly arrived. Among these was the frigate H.M.S. Hermione, captained
by Admiral Parker’s favorite, Captain Hugh Pigot. Talbot had already tried to get Pigot
and then Admiral Parker to free five men he had named Americans while Hermione lay
at St. Nicholas Mole. Talbot obtained writs for the sailors in question aboard Hermione
and two other vessels, H.M.S. Renommé , and H.M.S. La Tourterelle , each with one
alleged American aboard. Armed with the writs, Captain Pigot and his brother officers
produced the sailors before the issuing magistrate, who freed the men despite opposition
from His Majesty’s Solicitor. From these freed tars, Talbot learned of four more
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Americans aboard Hermione and similarly applied for another four writs against Captain
Pigot, resulting in the issuing judge releasing those men as well.66 After this, word of
Talbot’s mission reached the “alarmed” commanders of the remaining ships, of whom a
number let Talbot know that he would have their cooperation in releasing the men he
applied for without recourse to the dreaded writs. With the exception of the captains of
Renommé and La Tourterelle, who would not release men without writs, the remaining
captains in port cooperated with Talbot such that he had obtained at Jamaica the release
of forty-seven men either with writs or not as of 22 April 1797. Meanwhile, Talbot’s
assistant agent at Martinique in the Lesser Antilles, Henry Craig, had obtained the
freedom of another forty-nine men from vessels under Admiral Harvey’s command.67
When Talbot wrote Pickering 7 May, he reported he had managed to dislodge another
eight Americans from His Majesty’s squadron at Jamaica.68 At the time it seemed
Talbot’s main difficulties were maintaining patience with the R.N. officers with whom he
dealt—he had told Pickering “many of whom are not the most pleasant nor the most
reasonable beings”—and the American sailors he sought to serve who constantly
bombarded him with “applications.”69 This was soon to change.
Admiral Sir Hyde Parker had gone to sea following his last contact with Captain
Talbot, sailing among the islands. Word finally came to him of what was afoot in Port
Royal. Talbot’s successful resort to writs of habeas corpus to free “American” sailors
incensed and alarmed the Admiral. The captain had found the chink in the Royal Navy’s
armor. The Admiral’s response would resemble the strategy he would employ later with
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respect to Whitehall policies with which he did not agree. He ordered his officers to
simply ignore the civil legal process. In a general order he issued 8 May 1797, Sir Hyde
directed them “never in future to discharge any man from the ship you command, in
consequence of any writ of habeas corpus, till such writ is referred to me (Parker) as
Commander-in-chief …and my orders given in consequence thereof.70 In the order, Sir
Hyde lamely observed that the requirement that the commander-in-chief be served with a
writ was “a rule observed by all the judges in England.”71 Sir Hyde justified overriding
the writs and the legal process they represented simply because they were “attended with
the utmost inconvenience, and disadvantageous to the public service committed to my
(Parker’s) care.”72 This would have been a novel theory in England indeed. Talbot found
that after Parker’s order, even if he could now obtain writs and serve them, no R.N.
captain at Jamaica would honor them, and the marshal would claim he was unable to
serve the writs of attachment Talbot obtained from the court for failure to obey the
originally served writs of habeas corpus.73 Talbot wrote Secretary Pickering that in
consequence of Parker’s order, Royal Navy officers at Jamaica now fancied themselves
above the law and had come into Kingston and impressed Americans in broad daylight.74
The message sent home to the secretary of state was that Admiral Parker had subverted
the venerable English legal system to the detriment of helpless Americans and with the
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apparent approval of the authorities in London who tolerated it.75 Talbot baldly opined to
Pickering “that no more seamen will be discharged during the time that Admiral Sir Hyde
Parker may have the command in these seas.”76 That December he would write Pickering
that “[i]f Sir Hyde should be ordered off from this station, and the command devolve
upon Admiral Bligh, I have reason to expect that in such case perfect justice would be
done to our representations on the subject in question.”77 In contrast to the situation
persisting in Jamaica, in October 1797, Talbot had informed Pickering that Mr. Craig in
Martinique had continued to have success in convincing Admiral Harvey to release
Americans from British warships serving in the Windward and Leeward Isles.78
Talbot, frustrated in his mission to free impressed sailors in Jamaica, finally was
called home to the United States in the summer of 1798 and resumed his naval career as
the French guerre de course was threatening American commerce. In 1799-1800 he
would command the U.S. Navy squadron on the St. Domingue station where his British
opposite number would be Sir Hyde Parker. Talbot’s former post as American agent in
the West Indies was not immediately filled. Nearly a year after Talbot’s return, Secretary
Pickering resolved to try again. On 4 May 1799, he appointed William Savage, a British
subject resident at Jamaica who had also served there as a magistrate.79 Savage went to
work upon receiving the appointment. Writing to Pickering in September, he then
roughly estimated that at least 250 impressed Yankee seamen served in the Jamaica
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squadron.80 However, apparently little had changed since Talbot’s departure. Despite the
agent having himself been a magistrate, Savage observed that “Admiral Parker pays no
kind of attention to my applications.”81 He related that he had written to Sir Hyde Parker,
who yet commanded in the Greater Antilles, to seek the release of eleven men then at the
naval hospital at Jamaica with a negative result, adding that Parker had expressed surprise
that Savage would even write the Admiral again in light of the negative response given
the agent to a previous application made in July.82 Savage did suggest to Pickering
another ploy to perhaps prevent impressments of Americans into Parker’s fleet:
combining the usual protection with an accompanying letter from Robert Liston, the
British Minister to Philadelphia.83
But the attitude taken by Sir Hyde Parker in Jamaica concerning the impressment
of American seamen was beginning to be a specific focus of diplomatic protest in
London. On 7 October 1799, Rufus King under the express orders of President John
Adams, lodged a formal complaint with His Majesty’s Government citing the conduct of
Admiral Parker in categorically denying William Savage’s July application to release
seamen personally known to an American naval officer, Lieutenant John Mullowny,
U.S.N., commanding the U.S. Sloop of War, Montezuma. The Montezuma was then in
the harbor at Port Royal from a cruise. Mullowny had apparently learned that men with
whom he had previously sailed and knew to be American citizens had been impressed
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aboard H.M.S. Surprise and requested the help of newly appointed U.S. Agent Savage.84
Admiral Parker’s summary rejection of Mr. Savage’s request, grounded as it was upon
the personal statement of a serving American naval commander, was odious to the
Americans as an insult by Parker toward the American service and flag. Mr. King,
addressing Lord Grenville, barely containing his fury towards Parker within the allowable
bounds of diplomatic language, wrote:
the correspondence between … [Parker]… and the American agent… establishes
the precision of this representation, and at the same time demonstrates the
haughty injustice of that officer’s proceedings—proceedings the more
unaccountable and extraordinary, as they differ from what in similar cases passes
before the eyes & under the immediate authority of the Lords Commrs. (sic) of
the Admiralty.85
Here King was referring to the direct communication that David Lennox had
established with Sir Evan Nepean, Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty, to request the release of American mariners impressed in Great Britain.
Lennox had been for some time the appointed U.S. Agent in Great Britain under the Act
for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen.86 King was arguing that Admiral
Parker in Jamaica was routinely rejecting the kinds of proofs, and the kind of direct
discourse, accepted by their Lordships themselves in the capital. Lennox had by then
developed a very sound working relationship with Sir Evan, and had proved very
successful in obtaining the release of American jack tars from His Majesty’s Senior
Service.87

84

King to Grenville, 7 October 1799, in King, 3:118-19 (King calls him a captain, perhaps out of courtesy).
This is the July Application to Parker that Savage had referred to in his 17 September 1799 letter to
Pickering.
85
Ibid., 119.
86
Ibid., 117.
87
Ibid.

169

Despite the incisive case Rufus King had made damning Admiral Sir Hyde
Parker’s impressment of American seamen, and how far it diverged from the established
practice in London, or for that matter, at Antigua and Martinique, their Lordships of the
Admiralty continued to allow Parker the latitude to effectively ignore the applications and
proofs supplied by Mr. Savage. The agent was to continue to report his lack of success
with Vice Admiral Parker to Secretary Pickering and then Pickering’s successor at the
State Department, John Marshall.88 But it was not just official Washington receiving this
negative message about Sir Hyde unjustly pressing Yankee tars. Right along, serving
American naval officers with commands in the Caribbean, like Lieutenant Mullowny,
had been learning firsthand of this injustice against their countrymen.
In February 1800 while at Port Royal, Captain Alexander Murray, then
commanding U.S.S. Insurgente, sought to release from H.M.S. Trent one Gamble, an
American pressed sailor personally known to him. Murray applied directly to Captain
Otway, one of Sir Hyde’s captains, as a personal favor to a brother naval officer.89 The
evidence supports the conclusion that Otway spurned Murray’s request.90 Commodore
Truxtun, certainly the most prominent U.S. naval commander in the West Indies, was
also aware of Admiral Parker’s oppressive use of the naval press against American
seamen. While the commodore was in Jamaica attempting to refit Constellation after the
battle with La Vengeance, Mr. Savage kept him apprized of the impressment situation on
88
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Sir Hyde’s command. Truxtun discussed the issue with Parker during their frequent
meetings.91 However, not even the illustrious commodore, fresh from a famous
engagement with the French, could melt Parker’s frosty heart. The admiral did not free
any American tars during Truxtun’s stay at Port Royal.92 Finally, Silas Talbot had
returned to the Caribbean in October 1799 to command the newly expanded St.
Domingue station,93 bringing with him his long memory of personal battles with Sir Hyde
over impressments. He was in a position as commander to influence the thinking of many
on that station concerning Sir Hyde, especially on that issue. As the war continued,
resentment of Sir Hyde’s unbending attitude toward impressment of American seamen
grew in the U.S. Navy’s serving officer corps. This sentiment would prove to be
especially corrosive to an informal naval cooperation built upon positive personal
relationships between brother officers.
However, the impressment of Yankee tars was but one of Admiral Sir Hyde
Parker’s policies rankling Americans at home and in the Caribbean during those years.
The zealous seizure of American merchantmen by the ships of Parker’s Jamaica
command was another which caused much consternation. And Hyde Parker’s rear guard
action against his own government’s policy with regard to St. Domingue was still another
which vexed Americans in both Philadelphia and the Greater Antilles. While frustration
with British cruisers would be a recurring theme for the American maritime community
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during the Quasi-War as mentioned earlier in the chapter, it was Hyde Parker’s squadron
which remained a lightning rod for official American criticism. The information filtering
through American diplomatic channels to Rufus King in London frequently cited the
Admiral by name when it came time to complain to His Majesty’s Government of British
seizures of American commerce in the West Indies. In October 1799, King would inform
Lord Grenville of seizures of American shipping resulting from an alleged
misunderstanding by the Admiral’s officers that the newly opened American commerce
to St. Domingue was legal under the three party political/commercial agreement between
the United States, Great Britain and Toussaint l’Ouverture.94 In November 1799, he
would complain to Grenville that not only British privateers, but Sir Hyde’s men of war
“have together fallen upon our navigation, and a large portion of our ships engaged in the
Trade (sic) between the U.S. & the Spanish colonies (sic) have been seized & the cargoes
condemned…” and that the pretext for taking the vessels as prizes would again be the
that the American merchantmen carried everyday merchandise such as bar iron nails
deemed contraband of war.95 In a 2 December 1799 letter to Secretary Pickering, King
described that in a November audience with Lord Grenville, he had again laid before the
Foreign Minister the “depredations” committed upon American shipping in the West
Indies by R.N. warships.96 But most galling to the American Minister was the
“countenance & encouragement they had received from the Commander in chief (sic) Sir
H. Parker.”97
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The serving officers in the U.S. Navy’s St. Domingue squadron shared the
frustration of the officials in Philadelphia and London as to the British seizures of
American merchantmen. Captain Alexander Murray succeeded Silas Talbot as
commodore of the St. Domingue station on 17 July 1800, returning to the Caribbean in
command of U.S.S. Constellation. 98 Murray had been known to hold Royal Navy
officers in the highest esteem as discussed in previous chapters. On his earlier visit to
Jamaica mentioned above, he had directed his officers and men to be on their best
behavior when dealing with the King’s Navy. But after two weeks on station, he was
already sufficiently frustrated with his British opposite numbers operating from Port
Royal and their oppression of American commerce that he had written Secretary
Stoddert:
I think Sir that we have no Enemy (sic) so much to be shunned in this quarter as
the British, for they blockade all the passages, & fair, or foul, let few of our
Vessels (sic) pass them, if they have Cargoes of Value, (sic) and send them for
Jamaica, where the venality of the Admiralty Court gives no quarter, how long we
are to bear with these aggravations (sic), I leave to wiser heads than mine to
determine, but I confess I think we stand upon very critical grounds with them;
but as Admiral Parker is now gone home, let us hope for a favorable change of
measures—99
It was obvious in American minds that Parker had been responsible for the rapacious
attitude that British men of war and cruisers had demonstrated towards their commerce
on the Jamaica station. Whether the view was expressed in London by Rufus King, or
serving sea officers in the Caribbean like Murray, the man behind the excessive captures
was always Sir Hyde Parker. Once he was gone, things were bound to improve.
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Americans, with good reason, had developed a consistently negative expectation
of Sir Hyde’s behavior. This was in contrast to the expectations Americans had for the
other British admirals they dealt with in the Caribbean or elsewhere. The positive
relationship forged in 1796 between Captain Talbot, then the U.S. agent for impressed
seamen in the West Indies, and Admiral Harvey, continued with Mr. Craig, Talbot’s
assistant in the Lesser Antilles, and eventually the U.S.N. station commodores at St Kitts.
When there were incidents on the station such as Captain Mattson’s order directing the
starting of an American merchant captain, Giles, in May 1799, Commodore Truxtun, and
Secretary of State Pickering, were willing to trust Admiral Harvey’s handling of the
matter, including crediting his captain’s account of the affair over the testimony of the
American skipper.100 The positive rapport built up over what was perceived to be
consistently fair treatment from the admiral helped convince them to give Captain
Matson the benefit of the doubt, a far cry from the hubbub resulting from Captain Pigot’s
starting of Captain Jessup described earlier on Parker’s Jamaica command. The matter of
H.M.S. Latona, serving on the Halifax station, which accidentally fired upon an
American trading vessel, had a similar conclusion. The positive relationship commanding
Admiral Vandeput had cultivated with Americans had to have helped the Secretary of
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State more easily accept the explanation for the accident of Frank Sotheron, Latona’s
captain, and let the matter drop.101
But it was Vice Admiral Sir Hyde Parker’s sabotage of Whitehall’s policy toward
General Toussaint l’Ouverture on St. Domingue which frustrated the one area where
there was supposed to be official cooperation between the United States Navy and the
Royal Navy in the Quasi-War. Some discussion of British, and then American,
involvement in St. Domingue is necessary to fully comprehend what mischief Parker’s
hostility would make for what was designed as a collaborative effort of both London and
Philadelphia to contain the revolutionary virus raging in that nominally French colony,
but at the same time commercially benefit from the situation. As discussed in chapter
one, the British experience in St. Domingue had been a disaster after some initial success.
Disease had decimated the British Army; tens of thousands of soldiers had died of yellow
fever. And the cost of maintaining the army and civil establishment in British occupied
territories was astronomical. The government had spent millions of pounds there. In
January 1797 alone, His Majesty’s Government would incur expenses of £700,000.102 By
late 1796, Britain’s economy was teetering on the brink of collapse due to the cost of the
war.103 February 1797 saw the Bank of England itself forced to suspend species payments
under the crush of obligations and bank runs fueled by invasion panic. There were simply
101
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no resources to continue conducting the war on such a scale in St. Domingue or
anywhere.
Consequently, the British cabinet had demanded a new policy of retrenchment on
St. Domingue, dispatching in November 1796, a new military governor, Lieutenant
General John Graves Simcoe, with the specific brief of pulling British forces back to
Mole St. Nicholas and limiting all costs to £300,000 per annum.104 After Simcoe had
returned to England in August 1797, having both failed miserably to live within this
budget or withdraw as directed, the responsibility of carrying out this policy had
devolved upon his aide, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Maitland.105 Ministers in Whitehall
had previously determined to withdraw British forces to the Mole St. Nicholas; they now
added the southern port of Jeremie, reflecting Maitland’s views. This, they believed,
would contain costs but still help secure Jamaica from a feared invasion from St.
Domingue.106 Arriving in March 1798, Maitland had carried out the directed evacuations
by 10 May.107 By July, in a letter to British War Secretary, Henry Dundas, Maitland was
questioning whether even maintaining a minimal presence with these coastal ports could
be done within the budget established by the government in London.108 Maitland soon
concluded that the answer was no; his best chance of success was to abandon St.
Domingue altogether with the least loss of life and treasure possible. To accomplish this,
Maitland opened negotiations with General Toussaint l’Ouverture, whom he cannily
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perceived as the most powerful of the three island warlords arrayed against him, forging
an agreement with Toussaint, allowing British forces to depart unmolested in exchange
for the exclusive surrender of these strong points to the General’s forces and the
General’s pledge not to invade Jamaica or the other British West Indies holdings. Also
comprehended was that British traders could help provision Toussaint in exchange for
island produce.109 After concluding arrangements for the removal of British forces,
Maitland returned to England to personally explain his new policy in Whitehall that had
exceeded even that of the ministers.110
In early December 1798, after Maitland arrived back in Britain, Rufus King in
London became aware of newspapers in England reporting upon a new British policy in
St Domingue that he feared might pose dangers for American trade in the Caribbean and
had written to Lord Grenville enquiring about it.111 Grenville had referred King to British
War Secretary, Dundas, who showed him a copy of Maitland’s “treaty” with Toussaint,
which the British Government had chosen to ratify.112 King soon wrote to Mr. Dundas
pointing out certain American fears that the agreement would allow St. Domingue to
continue to act as a base for French privateers preying upon American commerce in the
Caribbean and also promote the jealousy of American merchants by providing British
traders with an effective monopoly to those areas controlled by Toussaint. King proposed
that in the interests of amity with the United States the British Government consider
amending the agreement to require Toussaint to suppress privateers operating from his
territory against British and American merchantmen and also to allow American
109
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commerce to help provision Toussaint’s part of the island.113 Dundas responded the next
day, 9 December 1798, that he would advise the British representative to be sent out to
implement the agreement with Gen. Toussaint, Colonel Grant, that he propose an article
mandating Gen. Toussaint bar privateers sailing against American trade from territory he
controlled; British ratification of the treaty would be conditioned upon Toussaint
assenting to this item.114 This communication began a dialogue between Mr. King and the
British cabinet as to the merits of developing a joint Anglo-American policy as to St.
Domingue, regarding both trade and the protection of British and American territories
from any adventurism from that island.115 Talks quickly went far enough that His
Majesty’s Government soon decided to send Gen. Maitland himself to Philadelphia as a
specially accredited emissary to aid Mr. Liston in direct negotiations with the American
Government on the subject. The expectation of the British Cabinet was that after
concluding a convention with the Adams Administration, Gen. Maitland would then
proceed to St. Domingue where he would present the deal to Toussaint l’Ouverture.116
And so Maitland sailed for the United States, his mission carrying the hopes of
the inner circle of the British Government for an agreement above all securing Jamaica
from the evil influences posed by the St. Dominguan revolution, but also for establishing
a unity of purpose with the Americans in a critical realm of New World relations. Just as
the Jay Treaty five years before had tacitly recognized the critical role the Americans
would now play with respect to the security of British North America, His Majesty’s
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Government now acknowledged with the Maitland Mission that the Americans would
have such a similar part to play regarding the British West Indies. And the recent turn of
events in Europe had made finding common ground with the Americans even more
important. Coalition Armies in Italy had just suffered crushing defeats. The French
Republic was now in virtual control of that Peninsula, deflating British hopes that other
Coalition Armies might take the initiative on the Continent. Rufus King had spelled this
out in a private letter to Gen. Maitland before the latter had left for Philadelphia.117
Maitland arrived at the American capital on 2 April 1799. He quickly found he
had to abandon the written proposal—this had specified the creation of an AngloAmerican trading company which would have exclusive trading rights to St. Domingue
and that America would provide produce and Britain manufactured goods—that Lord
Grenville had sent with him as the template for any agreement he might reach with the
Americans.118 He discovered that the Americans had already begun direct negotiations
with Toussaint who had sent his emissary, Joseph Bunel, to Philadelphia the previous
December.119 As a result of those talks, Dr. Edward Stevens, the newly appointed Consul
General to St. Domingue was already en route to meet with Toussaint at Cap Français.120`
Also Congress had already enacted, and President Adams signed, legislation authorizing
the chief executive to lift the trade embargo to French territories where the trade would
be safe. Couched in vague terms, it was apparent this legislation was meant to open trade
117
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to St. Domingue and was known as “Toussaint’s Clause.”121 General Maitland also
learned that Secretary of State Pickering was a very able negotiator. As a result, he and
Robert Liston, the British resident minister, concluded that there was no alternative but to
improvise as best they could an accord that accommodated both British and American
views without negatively impacting the shared goals of containing the security threat
posed by the Revolution in St. Domingue and opening the colony for British and
American commerce.122 These apparently diametrically opposed ends of quarantining the
island and yet opening it for business, they would achieve by again exacting a solemn
pledge from Toussaint not to harass British and American shipping, nor to invade or
somehow foment slave rebellion in the British Antilles or the American South.
Additionally, Toussaint would need to agree to limit, and all commerce would be limited,
to British or American shipping calling at the ports of Cap Français or Port Au Prince.
From there these vessels could, by special passport issued by the American and British
consuls residing at those ports, proceed to the coasting trade. Consequently, under the
British/American proposal, Toussaint would neither be allowed to maintain a deepwater
merchant marine, nor a navy. Instead, the Anglo-American merchant navies would have
the monopoly of his trade and for seaborne security he would be obliged to rely upon the
Royal Navy and U.S. Navy patrolling his coastline.123 Thus it was that both the
Americans and British had concluded that acting in concert as to St. Domingue was more
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important than standing upon their separate principles. Indeed, President Adams would
from time to time give voice to this exact sentiment.124
General Maitland arrived off of Cap Français in the sloop of war, H.M.S. Camilla,
on 14 May 1799, wasting no time contacting Dr. Stevens. Stevens met Maitland aboard
Camilla, where Maitland told him of the joint Anglo-American proposal for relations
between the two powers and General Toussaint l‘Overture.125 Discussions with the St.
Dominguan general proceeded quickly after that. By 23 May, Maitland wrote Secretary
Pickering that negotiations with Toussaint were far enough along to discuss the actual
dates for opening the ports at Cap Français and Port Au Prince. Under the final version of
the agreement, Le Cap and Port Au Prince would open to British and American
merchantmen on 1 August 1799.126
Though the agreement reached with Toussaint was for the most part that
proposed jointly by the British and Americans, there were some minor adjustments made
to respond to altered conditions in St. Domingue upon which Toussaint had insisted.
These included authorization for Toussaint to arm “batiment d’etat,” or small coasting
vessels to protect that trade against the corsairs of his old rival, Rigaud.127 With the
Directory’s blessing, Rigaud had now commenced a civil war against his nominal leader;
the bloody War of the Knives had begun.128 Consequently, both Maitland and Stevens
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had seen the wisdom of this measure allowing Toussaint his batiment d’etat, with the
proviso that none of these small ships operate further than five leagues from the St.
Dominguian coast, present no threat to British and American ships and only sail under
the passport of Stevens and the British agent.129 Thus, for the British and Americans, the
coming of this civil war with Rigaud had added an unwritten provision to the tri-party
agreement: namely that the two powers would need to support Toussaint in this struggle.
Stevens in a letter to Pickering had sized up what a Rigaud triumph would mean to
American interests in St. Domingue: the end of any commercial accord and by
implication a likely export of the island’s revolution to the slave holding regions of the
British West Indies and the American South.130 Indeed, as early as 23 May 1799, Stevens
had supplied Maitland with intelligence he had received from Toussaint of a plot Rigaud
had already put in motion at the behest of the Directory to raise a slave rebellion in
Jamaica in anticipation of invasion. Rigaud, per this information, was already raising
troops.131 Stevens was later able to provide the British, including Maitland, and especially
Lord Balcarres, the Governor of Jamaica, with written plans detailing the invasion plot
obtained from Toussaint. Forewarned, Jamaican authorities were able to catch Rigaud’s
operatives on that island.132
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With the date set and the accord in place, it was essential that all the players be on
the same page, especially the navies of the two powers. The Royal Navy and the United
States Navy were obliged to police the agreement, protecting the American and British
merchantmen seeking to trade with Toussaint’s St. Domingue from French corsairs and,
with the latest turn of events, suppress any of Rigaud’s naval forces caught attacking
Toussaint’s coasters. It was apparent that the tripartite agreement would be dead in the
water without the crucial cooperation of Sir Hyde Parker and his large Jamaica based
squadron. As nominal enemy territory, Sir Hyde’s warships had placed St. Domingue
under blockade and were, of course, profiting from the lucrative prizes often seized in
those waters. Now, the tripartite agreement would necessitate the conditional lifting of
that blockade, at least for British and American deepwater traders and Toussaint’s
batiment d’etat. Accordingly, General Maitland had travelled to Jamaica to put the
Admiral in the frame so that he could issue the appropriate orders to his captains at sea.133
Dr. Stevens could see to squaring the much smaller United States Navy via the
commander on station and Navy Secretary Stoddert in Philadelphia.
The trouble with this eminently reasonable course forward was that Sir Hyde
Parker had reached his own opinions as to the merits of the Anglo-American agreement
with Toussaint and, for that matter, General Maitland’s original treaty with Toussaint
calling for the British evacuation of all of St. Domingue. And these opinions were in no
way favorable. He had especially been affronted by the order requiring him to withdraw
his squadron from St. Nicholas Mole, his unit’s strategic advanced-base, controlling the
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Windward Passage and the approaches to Jamaica.134 From that location, Parker’s
cruisers had the windward advantage of vessels returning to or arriving from Europe or
the United States. In August 1798, Sir Hyde had begun a series of carping letters to the
First Lord of the Admiralty, George, Earl Spencer, who as the civil head of the Admiralty
Board sat as a minister in Pitt’s cabinet. Parker desperately sought to convince the Earl to
get His Majesty’s Government to execute a full stop on the issue of withdrawal from the
Mole and completely disavow any secret treaty with Toussaint l’Ouverture.135 The
Admiral personally felt a deep sense of injury to his honor in that he was asked to deal
with Thomas Maitland as an equal, or worse yet as a subordinate, for Maitland, was not a
real general at all, but a mere brevetted lieutenant-colonel.136 Parker could not stomach
the fact that Maitland had taken his evacuation decision without consulting him, as a true
Vice-Admiral and the senior commander of all British naval forces in the Caribbean. He
was appalled that the cabinet in London would deign to listen to such a trumped up
nobody as Maitland, as opposed to himself, an officer of high rank and long term of
service. He felt the decision to evacuate the Mole was suicidal for Jamaican security. He,
of course, did not mention the direct negative effect the evacuation might pose to his
ability to continue securing lucrative prizes from the Mole.137 That fact, however, had not
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been lost on the First Lord in London.138 Finally, as to the Anglo-American compact with
Toussaint, Sir Hyde was aghast that Maitland was proposing to link His Majesty’s
Government with a black renegade like Toussaint, and with the Americans to boot.139
Parker’s letters to Earl Spencer reveal how out of sync he was with the British
cabinet’s thinking. After Maitland’s first agreement with Toussaint, the First Lord had
patiently replied to Sir Hyde’s letters attacking Maitland’s withdrawal from St.
Domingue.140 But by January 1799, he had firmly replied that the Brigadier’s St.
Domingue policy had “met with the approbation of his (sic) Majesty’s confidential
servants. . . .”141 It had, of course, saved Whitehall perhaps as much as one million
pounds per annum. And Lord Spencer’s January reply to Admiral Parker was also penned
during the time frame when the cabinet and Rufus King were discussing joint
British/American action with respect to Toussaint l’Ouverture. Trying to attach the
Americans more closely with Britain in its fight with the French, however accomplished,
was yet an important diplomatic goal for Pitt’s beleaguered government. Indeed, writing
to Parker on 4 August 1799 Lord Spencer had confessed that since General Maitland’s
recent return to England, he had not yet been apprized of the latest information
concerning the new treaty with Toussaint—the Americans were never mentioned as the
unsigned parties to the document—but suggested to Parker that if His Majesty’s
Government approved it, as they had General Maitland’s previous diplomatic foray on St.
Domingue, the Admiral would need to find a way to overcome his personal objections
138

Spencer would later remark to Sir Hyde that events might necessitate recalling him from the Jamaica
station “on which I have been much pleased to find you have derived so much advantage in point of prize
money.” Spencer to Parker, 10 April 1800, (marked private) in ibid., 3:285.
139
Parker to Spencer, 19 May 1799, in ibid., 3:275.
140
Spencer to Parker, 2 December 1799, in ibid., 3:271;
141
Spencer to Parker, 2 January 1799, in ibid., 3:272.

185

and embrace it.142 But instead of taking a hint from Spencer’s letters, the Admiral had
continued to verbally assail the new British St Domingue policy with Toussaint which
now encompassed the United States.143
Writing letters to London damning the policy was one thing. But Sir Hyde’s
opposition to the tri-party treaty would become overt. After initially issuing the orders to
his captains to tolerate the new commerce with St. Domingue comprehended by the triparty agreement,144 as well as reluctantly sanctioning an early shipment of supplies sent
to aid Toussaint in his struggle with Rigaud,145 Admiral Parker appeared to have begun
his own rear guard action to frustrate the treaty. While Toussaint’s forces had suffered
severe shortages of food, clothing and munitions due to the American embargo and
British blockade, Rigaud in the south of the French colony had prospered from an illegal
trade with surrounding islands and South America.146 Maitland had informed Sir Hyde,
when he had gone to visit him in May 1799, that the Jamaica squadron would need to halt
the illicit commerce sustaining Rigaud.147 Some of these supplies were even coming from
Jamaica, which Rigaud had vowed to invade.148 Maitland had written Sir Hyde once
more on 20 June 1799, asking the Admiral to impose the “strictest blockade” upon
Rigaud’s ports.149 But apparently the Royal Navy was still not getting the job done,
because on 7 August 1799 Toussaint felt the need to directly appeal to President Adams
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to order the U.S. Navy to commence its own blockade of the south.150 But this was not
due to lack of ships on station. Stevens would later remark that British men of war were
common on the south coast of Hispaniola.151 Professor Palmer in Stoddert’s War summed
up the situation: “Despite the continual reinforcement of his squadron, which had grown
to forty-three ships by October, the admiral (Sir Hyde Parker) had chosen not to
comply.”152
But Parker’s men did more than just fail to enforce the blockade of Rigaud’s
southern ports. His squadron had begun to take action against the Dominguian coasters
operating under the passports executed by Dr. Stevens and the various British agents
based in the colony. While Dr. Stevens could write in August to Secretary Pickering that
the Admiral’s cruisers were dealing with the American merchantmen coming to the
designated ports of Le Cap and Port Au Prince with discretion per the passport rules
agreed with Gen. Maitland,153 at least one American naval captain patrolling on the St.
Domingue station by November 1799 had noticed a decidedly different attitude these
British cruisers were now evidencing towards the St. Dominguian coasting fleet. Captain
George Little of the frigate, U.S.S. Boston, wrote Stevens on 12 November that he had
stopped a schooner sailing with what appeared to be Stevens’s protection heading into the
port of Jeremie in the Bight of Leogane. Uncertain whether it was really Steven’s
passport, he had put an American prize crew aboard and sent the vessel to Le Cap where
the document could be safely verified. He had added that there had been a British cruiser
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in sight at that moment which, unless he acted first, he did not doubt would have
immediately seized the schooner and sent her to Port Royal for condemnation.154
Some eight days later, Captain Little sent a boat in for supplies at Le Cap, bearing
a letter for Dr. Stevens. Little wanted some clarification from the Consul concerning the
status of the French-flagged ships bearing his (Steven’s) passports because he was aware
the British cruisers in the region were seizing all French-flagged ships whether or not
they had the requisite passports. He wanted to know if there had been some change in
official policy authorizing such seizures.155 In fact, there had been no such change. A
French flag at the mast head in the vicinity of St. Domingue did not necessarily denote an
enemy ship. Toussaint’s vessels, his “batiment d’etat,” being still nominally French—
Toussaint had not formally severed his ties with the French Republic—flew the French
flag but sailed with the Anglo-American countersigned passports per the tri-party accord.
And there were now more of these vessels on the water. Because of the circumstances of
Toussaint needing supplies transported by sea in his war with Rigaud, he had been forced
to expand his fleet to include larger, requisitioned French vessels. Indeed some of these
had been armed to protect his defenseless transports from Rigaud’s marauding barges in
the Bight of Leogane. Stevens and the resident British agents had acceded to these
alterations to the original terms of the Maitland/Toussaint accord in light of the fluid war
conditions;156 their goal was to keep Toussaint’s cause alive and, with it, the accord itself.
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However, the unsympathetic Admiral Parker apparently took no such liberal view
of these changing circumstances. Captain Little in his letter requesting clarification from
Dr. Stevens was very specific as to who had authorized British men of war to seize all
French-flagged ships. He wrote: “I will inform you that the British cruisers have now
orders from admiral (sic) Parker to take all vessels that wear a french (sic) Flag even
should they have yours and Gen. Maitland’s (sic) pasports (sic) on board. . . .”157 And
Little could report that these ships had not hesitated to carry out the admiral’s order. He
wrote Stevens: “I would inform you that there are two or three British Cruisers (sic) on
the Coast to the leeward which have made great depredations on the Coasting (sic)
vessels they have taken and plundered everyone they have met with. . . .”158 Little was in
a position to know what he was talking about as he had undoubtedly spoken some of
these ships. He could name the sloop of war that had threatened the French- flagged
schooner that he had sent into Cap Français the week before as the Diligence.159 Little
also mentioned that he had recently convoyed one of Toussaint’s French-flagged troop
transports into Mole St Nicholas which was afterward bound for the Bight of Leogane
where, he opined, it would have been fair game, not just for Rigaud’s barges, but also for
British private or public men of war.160
Unfortunately for Toussaint’s cause, this British seizure situation was shortly to
become even nastier. In November 1799, the General had gained the upper hand in the
War of the Knives and had invaded the southern province, Rigaud’s base. Critical to the
invasion’s success was the reduction of the port city of Jacmel through which much of
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Rigaud’s seaborne supplies came. Toussaint sent his army overland through the rough
terrain, but his baggage and artillery he sent by sea in six requisitioned, French, armed
ships, at least four of which were larger than his usual batiment d’etat.161 Before sending
off these vessels, Toussaint had made sure they carried the appropriate passports, “fully
expressing their destination and object,” and in this case issued by the British agent at
Port Au Prince, Hugh Cathcart, and countersigned by Dr. Stevens.162 Obviously the
Anglo-American authorities in charge of regulating the tri-party accord on St. Domingue
had understood the significance of the mission to Jacmel and signed off upon it.
Unfortunately, Sir Hyde Parker had not. On 24 November, the six vessels encountered a
frigate of the Jamaica squadron, H.M.S. Solebay, commanded by Captain Stephen
Poyntz, off of Cape Tiburon. The Solebay managed to capture four of them and sent them
as prizes to Jamaica. There the Admiralty court condemned them.163
Toussaint was livid when the news reached him. Robert Ritchie, the American
consul at Port Au Prince, wrote Secretary Pickering that he had personally spoken with
the General who had “express[ed] himself warmly on the subject.”164 Toussaint was
frustrated with good reason. His siege of Jacmel required artillery. He immediately sent
to Port Royal to see if he could have his vessels and weaponry released; the result was
negative. Lord Balcarres offered an indemnity for the ships and guns, but it was the ships
and guns that Toussaint required.165 Yet it was not just Toussaint and his commanders
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who were incensed with the British over this seizure. The American diplomats who had
forged this accord with Toussaint were also frustrated with their British partner. Dr.
Stevens, writing Pickering, opined that the move would “inevitably prolong the war” and
that if Toussaint’s pleas for return of the vessels, equipment intact, did not swiftly occur,
and British seizures of his ships continued, “the consequences . . . [were] evident—a
rupture between him and them.”166 Pickering writing to Rufus King in London, did not
bandy words: “This bad policy of the British (ascribable to individual rapacity—perhaps
to insidious views, that the two Chiefs may destroy each other,) I fear may prove
injurious to the commerce of the United States.”167 But the Americans did not just
complain among themselves about this perceived British perfidy, they took up the matter
with their British counterparts. Pickering sought an interview with Robert Liston in
Philadelphia, where he expressed his ire at the move, and that it might prove fatal to the
deal with Toussaint. Liston, in turn, wrote his chief, Lord Grenville, in Whitehall about
the “warm” American response to the matter and that it was the American view that the
seizures could be ‘attended with serious consequences” and “in all probability occasion a
rupture.”168 Once more Hyde Parker’s name had appeared in a diplomatic dispatch
involving events angering the Americans. Liston mentioned that a “part of the squadron
“under the command of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker,” had carried out the seizure of
Toussaint’s ships “on pretense that they were of a longer size than was permitted by the
convention entered into between Genl. Toussaint and General Maitland.”169
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The tenor of Liston’s communiqué to Lord Grenville hinted at what must have
now become obvious to His Majesty’s Ministers in London: Admiral Parker, and to a
lesser extent, Lord Balcarres, the two men entrusted with successfully carrying out the
British Cabinet’s St. Dominguian policy, the second Maitland-Toussaint convention
informally acceded to by the United States Government, were instead actively working to
undermine it. The chief tenet of the Cabinet’s new direction toward the nominally French
colony was that the security of Jamaica and the other British slave owning islands now
rested upon Toussaint’s promise not to export his revolution to those possessions, as well
as the Southern United States. To realize this benefit, Toussaint necessarily had to prevail
against Rigaud; ergo His Majesty’s Government needed to prop up the General. Sir
Hyde’s private foreign policy instead actively sought to prolong the war in the hope that
the two generals, Rigaud and Toussaint, would destroy each other and consequently
provide no threat to Jamaica. Perhaps, Sir Hyde had hoped that the cabinet would then
reverse course and occupy St. Domingue once more. This risky conception counted on
disorder in the island not producing some worse result such as a Rigaud triumph in the
War of the Knives, or a now hostile Toussaint prevailing and bent on revenge against the
British, or some alienated victor of the chaos who could not be anticipated. At any rate,
Parker’s was a policy antagonistic toward the United States and its desire to re-open a
lucrative St. Dominguian commerce as Secretary Pickering had perceived.
In fact, in a December 1799 letter to his superior at the Admiralty, Lord Spencer,
written to justify his squadron’s seizure of Toussaint’s tiny flotilla, Sir Hyde had actually
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admitted his goal of securing Jamaica by prolonging the War of the Knives.170 Sir Hyde
wrote of the seizure:
It therefore becomes politic for the security of this Island (sic) that that contest be
prolonged: for as long as Rigaud and Toussaint are carrying on the contest, no great
danger can be appreciated from either, as to the projected plan against Jamaica.171
In the same letter Sir Hyde had meant to implicate Toussaint in the recent clandestine
plan to invade Jamaica, by mentioning the intelligence gained by the confession of one of
the French spies recently caught in Jamaica, Saspartas. Saspartas, reported Parker, had
told Jamaican authorities that Toussaint had agreed to provide troops for that invasion.
This information, Parker argued, clearly vindicated the seizure of the St. Dominguian
general’s ships which “were part of the plan against this Island (sic) (Jamaica), than as
portended against Rigaud . . . .”172 This was entirely disingenuous by the admiral in light
of the fact that Toussaint had originally reported the plot to British and American
officials.173 And as Professor Palmer has recognized, the admiral had “contradicted his
own presumption of cooperation between the two rebels (Toussaint and Rigaud)” in
confessing his strategy of prolonging the war between them.174
Lord Spencer did not reply to Sir Hyde’s dispatch until 10 April 1800. While on
the surface the Admiralty backed Parker’s action in seizing Toussaint’s ships and their
subsequent condemnation, it was plain that the cabinet, at the same time, had not been
amused. Lord Spencer informed Parker that he was likely to be recalled from the most
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lucrative flag posting in the Royal Navy.175 Although the First Lord of the Admiralty
would be the mouthpiece for the action, the movement of key naval personnel in those
days was generally the prerogative of the inner circle of the cabinet, the very group which
had given its blessing to both of Maitland’s initiatives regarding Toussaint l’Ouverture.176
It is quite possible that Sir Hyde’s name had come up one too many times in diplomatic
dispatches connected with actions which did not reflect well upon him. He, or his
officers, had been the subject of complaints from the American government, almost from
the beginning of his service in Jamaica. Even British diplomats like Liston had
questioned his actions at times. He had set a tone on that station which had offended
personnel ranging from American agents stationed in the islands, such as Talbot or
Savage, to Anglophile naval officers like Captain Alexander Murray U.S.N., to the
American Minister to Britain, Rufus King, and even the Secretary of State himself,
Timothy Pickering. While the British government tolerated a certain amount of autonomy
with respect to British foreign naval postings in the eighteenth century due to the
practical reality of slow communications, there were limits. And with his blatant
disregard of the Maitland-Toussaint-Stevens convention, Parker had exceeded them. As
discussed previously, the only real power the Admiralty had over its flag officers on
distant stations was that of recall. Recall from such a plum appointment as Jamaica could
only be read as a significant demotion. And Spencer rubbed Parker’s nose in it by
specifically reminding the admiral that he had reaped much prize money from his
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Jamaican service.177 Spencer’s 11 May 1800 letter, transferring Vice Admiral Parker
home and delivered to him by Lord Hugh Seymour, his successor, had assured the
admiral that he was not being sacked, but merely being given “a change of service.”178
But the First Lord could not also resist writing:
[T]though in the course of your command a few circumstances have occurred in
which I could have wished you to act differently from what you did . . . I can,
however, assure you that it is not on that account that this arrangement is made.179
Sir Hyde’s next appointment would prove a shock to his system. After a hiatus in
England, the Admiralty would assign him as commander of the Royal Navy fleet being
sent to the icy Baltic to punish the Danes at Copenhagen for their policy of armed
neutrality. While Parker would remain the nominal commander of the expedition, there
was no question but that the real commander was his second officer: Admiral Horatio,
Lord Nelson, the victor of the Nile.180 The Admiralty would later recall Parker in disgrace
from that mission for his lackluster leadership; Nelson would return as the lionized victor
of the Battle of Copenhagen.181
However, during the Autumn of 1799 and Winter of 1799-1800, Admiral Parker
yet remained in command on the Jamaican station. The newly expanded St. Domingue
squadron of the U.S. Navy was then trying to determine how it would best fulfill its part
in enforcing the Maitland-Toussaint-Stevens convention. In October 1799, Captain Silas
Talbot had returned to the Caribbean in command of the U.S.S. Constitution as the
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station commodore based at Cap Français.182 Ironically, it would be Talbot’s brief to
jointly enforce the tri-party accord with his British opposite number, his old nemesis,
Admiral Sir Hyde Parker. Since May 1799, Dr. Stevens had implored the U.S.
Government to send the U.S. Navy to patrol the southern coast of St. Domingue to help
blockade Rigaud’s southern ports.183 Of course, Maitland had done the same with the
Royal Navy’s Jamaican squadron. But as it slowly became evident to American
proponents of the tri-party accord such as Stevens and Pickering, that Sir Hyde Parker
would not direct his captains to undertake this burden, the realization grew among them
that the American St. Domingue Squadron’s role in enforcing the tri-party accord would
have to change. After the Solebay’s seizure of Toussaint’s vessels bound for Jacmel, Dr.
Stevens certainly had begun to suspect that in actuality the involvement of the Jamaican
authorities, meaning Lord Balcarres and Admiral Parker, towards Toussaint’s survival
would be malignant, boding ill for American interests in that colony.184 The American
consul general eventually perceived that it would be up to the U.S. Navy to pick up the
slack in dealing with Rigaud, and also even to run scrimmage for Toussaint as against a
Royal Navy bent on seizing the general’s ships and otherwise disrupting operations
against his southern rival. He and Commodore Talbot would come to share this
understanding and then develop a close working relationship on this point which allowed
them to effectively marshal the tiny American squadron to greatly aid Toussaint in
defeating Rigaud.
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In January 1800, Commodore Talbot decided to send Captain Christopher Perry,
the father of War of 1812 naval hero Oliver Hazard Perry, on a mission to circumnavigate
Hispaniola in the frigate, U.S.S. General Greene, “paying more particular attention to the
South (sic) side of the Island (sic).”185 The Commodore wrote: “The number of American
vessels trading to Rigaud’s part of the island has become very considerable (sic) You will
therefore endeavor to intercept them as much as possible . . . .”186 Hence, Talbot had
directed Perry in the General Greene to perform the duty Hyde Parker’s cruisers had
steadfastly refrained from doing and which Toussaint’s forces still investing Jacmel so
desperately needed: a patrol of the southern coast of St. Domingue. Perry took this duty
very seriously. His one frigate, cruising off Jacmel, mounted a very effective blockade of
that port, cutting off the stream of supplies that had allowed Rigaud’s forces to endure the
siege.187 The cruise of Perry’s lone frigate put proof to the notion that Admiral Parker’s
men of war had simply not tried to stem the flow of illicit supplies to Rigaud.
But Perry was to do even more. He would soon exceed his Commodore’s orders
and directly take part in Toussaint’s struggle on land. With Perry’s blockade weakening
the port’s resistance, Toussaint was soon planning a final assault upon Jacmel’s defenses.
However, the general still lacked the artillery needed to finish the job thanks to the
Solebay’s untimely seizure of his artillery the preceding November. Meeting with
Captain Perry, Toussaint requested that perhaps the General Greene might sortie inshore
and supply the missing artillery barrage with its naval battery. The American captain
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agreed and with that the United States through the U.S. Navy frigate began its often
unfortunate history of direct gunboat intervention in Haitian affairs. The town’s three
forts soon surrendered following thirty to forty minutes of furious fire from the General
Greene’s 12 pounders.188 Toussaint’s forces then took the city.189
Perry’s military intervention at Jacmel on behalf of Toussaint’s forces would be the
most direct but certainly not the last for Talbot’s St. Domingue squadron. Toussaint’s
effusive praise for Commodore Talbot in dispatching the General Greene to the waters
off Jacmel and especially for Captain Perry’s timely involvement was soon followed by
additional requests for American naval assistance as Hyde Parker’s cruisers continued
their campaign of seizures of French flagged vessels.190 Toussaint was understandably
skittish about sending urgently needed food and medical supplies by armed ship to his
troops in Jacmel after the Solebay affair and asked that Stevens propose to Commodore
Talbot that Toussaint’s armed supply ships proceed under the American flag to avoid
British capture. Toussaint even specifically mentioned using the subterfuge that the
vessels were meant to supply the U.S. Navy brig, Augusta, now on patrol off Jacmel.191
Stevens wrote to Talbot that he deemed it “impracticable” to flag Toussaint’s transports
as American, but fully understood that something had to be done to avoid their capture.192
Commodore Talbot responded in a manner not unlike a co-conspirator with
Stevens and Toussaint in a stratagem to defraud the British. He was not outraged that
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Toussaint wanted to fraudulently flag his vessels as American ones, but was chiefly
concerned on a practical basis that the plan would not work because the Royal Navy
cruisers or British privateers would see through the disguise of a cargo obviously
inconsistent in amount and nature as to what would be wanted aboard the Augusta.
Instead he invited both Toussaint and Stevens out to the Constitution to discuss his
alternative proposal of instead “capturing” the French flagged ships and putting aboard
them American prize crews. The Constitution herself would then escort these “prizes”
into Jacmel.193 The Commodore was sure no R.N. man of war would challenge
“American” prizes escorted by a U.S. Navy super frigate. What is striking about this
exchange of letters is that Talbot had no qualms whatsoever about defrauding his
informal allies in the Jamaican squadron. It was as if he relished the idea of putting one
over on his old sparring mate Sir Hyde Parker, for whom certainly there was no love lost.
As far as Talbot was concerned, the British under Hyde Parker’s command had become
just another obstacle to overcome in achieving his mission. In the event, however,
Commodore Talbot would never consummate his plan to convoy the “prizes” to Jacmel
because he had become concerned with reports that the French Navy had sent out to the
region some frigates from Metropolitan France. He could not spare his super frigate from
the center of his command at Le Cap faced with such a potential threat.194 Presumably,
that time Toussaint’s batiment d’etat sailed only with the requisite passports and hoped
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for the best.195 However, the Commodore later went so far as to order the U.S.S. Herald
to take on board provisions bound for Toussaint’s army at Jacmel.196
The significance of Sir Hyde Parker’s personal impression upon British
Government policy in the Caribbean during the tenure of his service there cannot be
overstated. He had especially imposed his personality upon those matters directly
impacting relations with Americans, whether it was the impressments of American
seamen into his squadron, the seizure of Yankee merchantmen, or the joint undertaking
between the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government towards Toussaint
l’Ouverture on St. Domingue. The personal animus he engendered from serving U.S.
Navy officers, even Anglophilic ones such as Alexander Murray, is instructive.
But only after Sir Hyde’s recall and subsequent replacement with Lord Hugh
Seymour did the full measure of that influence become apparent. Admiral Seymour
arrived from the Windward and Leeward Islands station with a positive reputation as
regards working well with Americans.197 On that station he had replaced Admiral Henry
Harvey, a station commander who himself had earned the esteem of American agents and
naval officers. Many eagerly anticipated Lord Hugh’s arrival on station and expected he
would set a markedly different tone than had Sir Hyde. William Savage, the American
agent for seamen at Jamaica was one of these. In a letter soon after the change in
command had issued, he had expressed to the American Secretary of State that he hoped
that the change of admiral would herald a turn for the better. He voiced his belief that he
could present his case for relief of impressed Americans in the Jamaica squadron and
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Lord Hugh would actually listen to him and consider his evidence, a marked change from
Sir Hyde’s tendency toward perfunctory rejection of his arguments.198 By 1 November
1800, Mr. Savage could already write:
The conduct of the navy here, so far as respects the impressing of and detaining of
American seamen, is widely different on the score of humanity, from what was
pursued during the administration of Admiral Parker.199
Naval officers also stated their hope that the new station admiral would take a more
reasoned approach with his officers toward seizure of Yankee merchant vessels.200
Yet, it was Lord Hugh’s flexibility and willingness to work with unhappy parties
towards solutions which earned him his positive reputation with Americans. Whether he
in the end chose their side or not, those approaching him with a grievance felt they had
been properly heard. And the admiral was not afraid to come down upon abuses by some
of his officers still attuned to the earlier regime of Sir Hyde. The case of the Curaçao
incident with Captain Frederick Watkins of the frigate, H.M.S. Nereide was illustrative. It
involved a French attempt to seize the Dutch island of Curaçao in the southern Caribbean
from July to September of 1800. Landing 23 July, a French vanguard of 500 men had had
insufficient numbers to successfully attack. The French had sent a second force and
together with the first invaded on 5 September, besieging the capital of Willemstad. The
American consul present, Benjamin Hammell Phillips, perceived that American lives and
property interests were greatly endangered as open warfare had broken out between the
Dutch citizens bolstered by resident American merchants and seamen, and the 1,500
French irregulars seeking to control Willemstad. Fearing the worst, Phillips had sent for
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help from the American naval squadron based at St. Kitts. On 15 September, Acting
Commodore George Cross had dispatched the sloops of war, Patapsco and Merrimack to
aid the embattled Americans on Curaçao.201
As events at Willemstad deteriorated, a likely savior had appeared on 10
September in the guise of Captain Frederick Watkins of the frigate, H.M.S. Nereide, 36.
The Dutch governor soon sought help from the potent Royal Navy force now off
Willemstad. Going on board Nereide to meet with Watkins, he negotiated a surrender to
the British—the Dutch island was technically an enemy of Britain, being a colony of the
puppet Batavian Republic—to gain the aid of the frigate’s guns. But to the governor’s
chagrin, Watkins would not take his ship into the tight harbor to shell the French guns
and drive the enemy from their positions, or land his marines to relieve the citizens.202
All seemed lost until on 22 September Patapsco and Merrimack made a timely
appearance. The two U.S. navy captains commanding these warships quickly sized up the
situation and in violation of the letter of their terms of engagement with the French, sent
Patapsco into the narrow harbor under steady French bombardment. The American
warship gave much better than she got and within two hours had forced the French to flee
their forward positions. The next day Patapsco landed U.S. Marines to bolster the Dutch
burghers and Americans already under arms. The French had had enough and stole away
that night. With the harbor safe, Watkins now deemed it appropriate for H.M.S. Nereide
to enter the harbor. Watkins then effected the surrender of the island and established
himself as military governor. He requested that the two American sloops of war make a
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reconnaissance to windward to search for a feared return of the French with
reinforcements. When the U.S. Navy warships returned, they found that “Governor”
Watkins had detained the Yankee trading vessels in the harbor on various pretexts,
threatened at least one of their captains with a flogging, seized Consul Phillips’s own
coin entrusted to Watkins for safe keeping aboard Nereide during the troubles, and
demanded the fast sailing schooners of two of the American captains to use as his
personal dispatch boats.203
The Curaçao incident, at least for American naval officers, realistically could be
called the nadir of Anglo-American relations during the entire Quasi-War. It aroused
feelings of outraged injustice in maritime Americans of all stripes. The Yanks had done
the heroic heavy lifting and the Brits had received all the credit. Captain Watkins
conveniently failed to mention the role of the Merrimack and Patapsco in his
dispatches.204 To this day British naval histories of the Great French Wars in the West
Indies, if they cover the surrender of Curaçao at all, utterly ignore the role of the
American sloops of war in altering a dire military situation and snatching victory from
certain defeat.205 But then the rapacious Captain Watkins had sent the trusting American
naval officers on what proved to be a wild goose chase, while he “seized” the American
property they had come to defend. They felt utterly had. Naval officers such as
Commodore Thomas Truxtun, newly arrived back on the St. Kitts station in the brand
new super frigate, U.S.S. President, was perhaps the most vocal. He called Watkins’s
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seizures of American property on the island as “conduct preceeding (sic) from a weak,
and inconsiderate mind . . . .”206 He later wrote of the incident to Secretary Stoddert:
I must again repeat Sir, that I have been much mortified at the Management (sic)
of the Curracoa (sic) business, & hurt at the Sneers (sic) and horse laughs of some
[space] here, at our Giving (sic) an Island (sic) to a nation, whoe’s (sic) Officers
(sic) instantly set traps to get hold of all our property, that came into its Ports
(sic): that Protection (sic) might have been given our citizens without suffering a
change of Government (sic) at Curracoa (sic), no one in my opinion acquainted
with the circumstances can doubt.207
Watkins’s outrages had seemed too much to bear. But there would be some hope
regarding the worst of them because the Admiral in Jamaica was not pleased either.208 On
23 October 1800, roughly a month after the battle at Curaçao, Admiral Lord Hugh
Seymour arrived from Jamaica to assume command on the island. With him came
American hopes that he might address the worst of Watkins’s perceived excesses.209
Those situations within his immediate power to remedy, he did. The admiral restored to
Consul Benjamin Hammell Phillips the money that Watkins had inexplicably seized from
him.210 As for Watkins, in February 1801 he was returned to England and put “on the
beach” until 1808.211 When he did again see employment in the Royal Navy, it resulted in
him being dismissed from command following a court martial.212
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There were claims for salvage for some of the American vessels that had been at
Curaçao, and for others, condemnation as prizes for carrying the osnaburgs, the coarse
cloth, conveniently styled contraband of war. These had to proceed via Admiralty
jurisdiction. But Admiral Seymour never the less did entertain the complaints of those
who quite rightly felt wronged under the circumstances.213 That sympathetic tone and
willingness to try to redress perceived wrongs against Americans allegedly committed by
the Royal Navy’s Jamaica squadron did diffuse some of the tension that had built during
Sir Hyde Parker’s tenure. It even seemed to soften the attitude of American diplomats
with respect to Captain Watkins‘s Curaçao outrages. Perhaps the knowledge that Admiral
Seymour had taken prompt action in theatre convinced Secretary of State John Marshall
in Washington and Rufus King in London, not to immediately file a formal complaint
with His Majesty’s Government over the ship seizures and salvage demands but rather to
mention the matter informally and trust British Admiralty jurisdiction to handle these
claims fairly.214 Clearly, a change of personality in the commander on the Jamaican
station had been monumental in repairing some of the damage done over the years by Sir
Hyde Parker’s rigid stances. If Sir Hyde had yet remained at Port Royal during and
following the Curaçao incident, the situation between the two naval services might well
have become incendiary.
But in fact, the situation did not become incendiary. American and British
warships in the West Indies continued to speak each other, and cruise in company much
as they had since the U.S. Navy first made its appearance in those waters in 1798.
213

Joseph Foulke & the Captains of U.S. Merchant Ships, approx. ,25 October 1800, in U.S.N., Quasi-War,
6:499-500.
214
John Marshall, Washington, D.C. to King, 18 January 1801, in ibid., 7:98.

205

Commodore Truxtun’s operations at sea during the fall of 1800, after learning of the
debacle at Curaçao, are instructive. Truxtun, who had been a very pro-British officer,
would perhaps, register some of the most pointed opinions against the conduct of Captain
Watkins on that island. Yet the operational stance he continued to take toward Royal
Navy warships and their commanders demonstrated that it was business as usual.
While at St. Kitts on 2 October 1800 the Commodore began a routine dispatch to
Secretary Stoddert, discussing operations in the region and how if the British really have
taken Curraçao, he would not have to spare any of his warships to protect commerce in
that region. However, the text of the dispatch indicates that the arrival of the Merrimack
and Patapsco had interrupted his writing. The text next indicates that Truxtun had just
received and digested the series of dispatches marked “Curracao (sic) papers” from
Captain Moses Brown of the Merrimack. Truxtun next launched into a diatribe against
Captain Watkins and his seizures of American merchantmen, committed “under frivolous
pretenses . . . after the services of our ships of War (sic) in dislodging the french (sic)
from their strong holds . . . .”215 Only five days later, Turxtun was at sea, patrolling in the
vicinity of Dominica in his new super frigate, President, and giving chase to an unknown
vessel at night, ready for action, with “Battle Lantherns (sic)” lit, only to find her a brig
sailing out of the British possession of Martinique. At daybreak, only hours after this near
battle, and presumably after his blood had been up, Truxtun encountered and spoke
H.M.S. Hornet. The President’s log matter-of-factly records the event with no editorial
comment except that Truxtun had taken the time to enter the name of Hornet’s Captain,
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Dash. Also spoken and apparently sailing in concert with Hornet, was the U.S.S. John
Adams. Truxtun had not bothered to record the name of the American frigate’s captain.216
Commodore Truxtun continued to smolder all Autumn 1800 about the Curaçao
episode even as he remained the St. Kitts station chief. In October he had railed against
Watkins to Baltimore merchant William Patterson—Watkins had appropriated
Patterson’s schooner as a dispatch boat217—and in December written his letter to Stoddert
confessing that he was still “much mortified” by the affair.218 Yet when in port, the
Commodore continued to maintain a civil, professional relationship with the British
Governor on St. Kitts concerning French prisoners—this included even Rigaud, captured
by an American warship219—and legal disputes over prize jurisdiction.220 While at sea
and in port the President routinely encountered Royal Navy men of war without the
slightest recorded difficulty. Among these warships were: H.M.S. Regulus on 11 October
1800 (spoke her at midnight)221; H.M.S. Southampton, Captain Harvey, commanding, on
25 October 1800 (moored and sailed),222 8 December 1800 (moored),223 24 December
1800 (gave chase in company),224 31 December 1800-7 January 1801 (moored),225 9
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January 1801 (signaled),226 16-18 January 1801 (moored);227 H.M.S. Hornet, Captain
Dash (Nash), commanding, on 7 October 1800 (spoke), 8 December 1800 (moored),228
18-25 January 1801 (moored);229 H.M. Schooner Gipsey on 21 December 1800
(spoke);230 H.M.S. Andromeda on 12 January 1801 (signaled);231 and an unidentified
Royal Navy warship on 13 January 1800 (spoke or signaled).232
Alexander Murray was another American naval officer who had begun the war in
awe of the Royal Navy but whose opinion had indeed soured by the war’s end. Likely
this was partially due to his being foisted with a bad mast at the dockyard at Antigua
when captain of the U.S.S. Insurgente. But his experiences with the Jamaican squadron
soon after Admiral Sir Hyde Parker’s departure had apparently finished the job. Never
the less, while from time to time airing his newly acquired anti-British opinions home to
his superior, Stoddert, in the American capital—he would snipe at them into late
February 1801233—he ever appeared to maintain cordial relations with individual Royal
Navy Captains. In August 1800, now commanding Constellation, Murray wrote to
Stoddert bragging about his apparent connection with the captain of His Majesty’s
Frigate, “Lowestaffe” (H.M.S. Lowestoffe). He maintained that it was critical that he
should consequently escort a particularly valuable convoy because he had “but lately
prevailed upon the Commander of the Lowestaffe Frigate to let our Vessels (sic) pass
unmolested that were in Company (sic) with me, & hope to have the Same Courtesy (sic)
226
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paid to me now . . . .”234 In October 1800, Murray again wrote Stoddert in a similar vein
about his return from Havana to the United States:
I came off the next day with the convoy, and soon fell in with the Thunderer British
74 gun ship, having frequently met with the Commander (sic) before he gave us no
interuption (sic) but let all pass when I assured him they were under my protection .
. . .235
When Murray returned to the Caribbean in Constellation on his last cruise, in mid
January 1801 he experienced perhaps the only major exchange of gunfire between
American and British warships of the entire Quasi-War. Murray described the event to
Stoddert in a February 1801 dispatch:
[O]n a dark night . . . passed by a large ship, that fired several shot at us, which
we returned, as soon as possible, no signals having been made previous to their
fire, but it occurred to me we might be firing at a friend, & made the signal for the
night, which they replyed (sic) to in part, when we hailed, & found she was the
British Frigate (sic) Magnanime of 48 guns, fortunately no material damage was
done on either side, from her we learnt that the French were still capturing our
Vessels . . . .236
Professor Palmer has suggested that this event was a harbinger that Great Britain
and the United States were drifting toward war. As Palmer characterized it, Murray had
“put a broadside into a British ship on a dark night in late 1800 (sic), displaying no
remorse after the event.”237 This interpretation seems to ignore that soon after firing, it
was Murray who thought to raise the night signal and speak the Magnanime. Murray also
seemed relieved there had been no damage to either side. Finally, he was happy to gain
intelligence from his Royal Navy counterpart as American naval commanders had done
so many times before during the conflict when re-entering a war zone. More than
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anything else, this unfortunate encounter demonstrates not that the quasi-alliance was on
life support, but that it still lived on even in the bosom of an officer soured on it.
There were certainly to be more contacts between other warships of the two
services in the West Indies during the autumn of 1800 and winter of 1800-1801. Captain
Stephen Decatur, Sr., the commander who had made the U.S. Navy’s first capture back in
July 1798, was still a serving officer, but now commander of the big new frigate, U.S.S.
Philadelphia on the St. Kitts station. The log book of Philadelphia’s Lieutenant Thomas
Wilkey revealed that on her cruises on that station during this period, her captain or crew
would speak (H.M. Sloops of War, Surinam and Cyane),238 signal (unidentified “British
Ship of War,” and H.M. Brig Busy),239 and anchor (H.M.S Southampton and Hornet)240
with her Royal Navy counterparts. Royal Navy captains on occasion were entertained on
board (Captains of H.M. Sloops of War Daphne and Cyane, (Matson)),241 and the ship
chased in company with a Royal Navy frigate, H.M.S. Tamar.242The U.S. Sloop of War
Ganges, which had been the American navy’s first commissioned warship back in May
1798, was also one of the very last to remain on station in the Caribbean. The journal
kept by her commanding officer, Lieutenant John Mullowny, documents routine
professional contacts with Royal Navy vessels well into May 1801, including: speaking
(H.M.S. Tamar in company with H.M. Sloop of War Daphne, and the battleship, H.M.S.

238

Log Book Extract of Thomas Wilkey, U.S.N., of U.S. Frigate Philadelphia, Captain Stephen Decatur,
Sr. commanding ( hereinafter Wilkey), Monday, 17 November 1800, in U.S.N., Quasi-War, 6:536 for
Surinam; ibid., Friday, 2 January 1801, 7:68 for Cyane.
239
Wilkey, Sunday, 7 December 1800, in ibid., 7:19 for unidentified ship of war; ibid., 18 January 1801,
7:99 for Busy.
240
Ibid., Monday, 8 December 1800, 7:21; Log Extract , U.S.S. President, Saturday, 8 December 1800, in
ibid., 7:21.
241
Wilkey, Tuesday, 23 December 1800, in ibid., 7:44.
242
Ibid., Saturday, 27 December 1800, 7:50.

210

Cumberland in company with battleships H.M.S. Sans Pareil and Carnatic),243 and
signaling warships (unidentified R.N. warship).244 None of these recorded personal
conflicts or unprofessional behavior. Lieutenant Mullowny might have had cause to
resent the British. Sir Hyde Parker had haughtily snubbed his plea to free sailors from
impressments in the Jamaica squadron whom he personally knew to be Americans—they
had served with him previously. But nothing of that kind exists in the record. What does
exist paints a picture of the informal naval alliance much the same as before, even unto
May 1801. Only the number of American warships had dwindled.
In the months after the Curaçao incident, rumors had begun to circulate in
America concerning a hoped for peace treaty between the French Republic and the
United States ending the Quasi-War.245 President Adams had dispatched two peace
commissioners, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Oliver Ellsworth, and
former North Carolina Governor, William R. Davie, to France in the U.S.S. United
States, sailing 3 November 1799. Back channel diplomatic contacts with the French
through U.S. Minister to the Netherlands, William Vans Murray—he eventually became
the third of the three peace commissioners—had convinced Adams that the French
Government would now be willing to receive envoys from the United States with the
respect due to them as representatives of a “great, powerful, free, and independent
nation.”246 But the mission was star-crossed from the beginning. Bad weather had nearly
wrecked the United States and had landed Ellsworth and Davie in La Corunna. From
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Spain they had had to travel overland some 900 miles in winter and did not arrive in Paris
to join Vans Murray until 2 March 1800.247 But the negotiations in Paris had dragged on
through the summer with no word of a treaty.248 Finally, the American peace
commissioners and the new First Consul of the French Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte,
had reached an accommodation, executing the Convention of Mortefontaine on 3 October
1800.249 However, the document would not reach America for some months.250
The U.S. Navy Secretary would not officially learn of it until 13 December 1800;
word immediately went out to ships yet in American waters to remain in port. Although
President Adams had submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification 15 December
1800, the document remained unapproved when on 30 December Stoddert could wait no
longer and dispatched Captain Alexander Murray in the Constellation to the Caribbean
with specific instructions to call at St. Kitts with the news of the treaty for Captain
Truxtun and Commodore Barry. In light of the accord, American warships were now
only to convoy merchant vessels and cease hostilities against French armed ships unless
they or their convoys were attacked.251 While cruising in the West Indies, Murray learned
of an official French declaration ordering French privateers and national ships to seize the
guerre de course against American shipping and bravely chose to verify it by sailing to
Guadeloupe. There, on 29 January 1801, by invitation of the island government, he sailed
into port where he officially confirmed that French authorities had ended operations
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against American vessels. During February1801, Murray used his cruise to spread the
French peace proclamation throughout the Caribbean.252 While U.S. Navy warships
continued to convoy merchant shipping, effectively their war against the French was
over. But even as the last days of the Adams Administration approached, American
squadrons remained on station in the West Indies, perhaps because the Mortefontaine
Treaty yet remained un-ratified. In the event, the Senate would not ratify the treaty until
19 December 1801. However, long before that occurred, the Jefferson administration sent
the very aptly named U.S.S. Herald to the West Indies to call home the last squadrons.
She sailed 4 April 1801 with the glad tidings.253
And so the Quasi-War came to an end. The informal naval alliance that had begun
with Great Britain providing the United States with material aid to build its small fleet of
warships and had developed into an operational understanding in the Caribbean between
serving officers of both fleets on station, had survived the conflict intact. The relationship
had been under stress from the first. The United States and Great Britain were both
maritime nations with interests often at odds with the other. Both needed huge numbers
of sailors to operate their respective merchant marines and Britain also required vast
numbers of able seamen to man its Royal Navy. It could never fill its crews with
volunteers and had to resort to the random conscription known as impressment. Because
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Americans were often nearly impossible to distinguish from Britons, the Royal Navy
ended up impressing Yankee tars, an injustice which rankled maritime America. And the
British themselves believed the Americans were hiding Britons from the press by giving
them “protections” and calling them Yanks.
At the same time, Britain‘s wartime policies concerning neutral trading rights had
led to difficulties between the powers. The United States was making a killing trading
with the Caribbean colonies of Britain’s enemies, the Spanish and Dutch. Britain
employed her vast navy to seize those merchantmen carrying what they deemed
“contraband of war” or enemy property as they had in all their naval wars. She used a
system where Royal Navy men of war and privateers could capture neutral, most often,
American, trading vessels, and condemn them in local Admiralty courts where the local
admiral, the captain of the libeling vessel, and its crew, could all profit from the money
raised when the merchant ship was sold as a prize. Even admiralty court judges in the
islands had a motive to uphold the libels. These magistrates received a fee for each case
heard. Since the captains of the capturing corsairs or R.N. men of war could present their
prizes at any Admiralty jurisdiction that they wished, they tended to favor the judges
disposed toward condemnation. This led to frequent abuses which might take years to
redress in the English appellate courts in London. Even American ships that had in no
way offended Britain’s wartime navigation laws never the less suffered condemnation,
certainly not endearing that Island nation and its navy to United States commercial
interests and the politicians beholden to them. Thus, the institutions of the Royal Navy
press and the seizure of neutral American shipping under the prize system had threatened
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the amity forming between the two maritime powers and their fleets now fighting the
same French foe in the West Indies.
But in the end, it had been the loose nature of naval command in the eighteenth
century which had held the key as to how these institutional stressors would impact the
American-British naval relationship. The lax institution of eighteenth century naval
command, a vestige of the medieval warrior heritage still extant in the British officer
class, combined with the practical issues of woefully slow communications to create a
level of independence in admirals and commodores on distant stations that would be
inconceivable in today’s blue water navies. Within parameters that were often farreaching, they called the shots in places like the Caribbean. This meant that whoever
inhabited the seat of command could either palliate or exacerbate the negative factors
working upon the British/American informal naval alliance. Admirals like Henry Harvey
or Lord Hugh Seymour could, with their positive personalities, smooth over many of the
difficulties dividing the two quasi-allies. The good will they engendered made it easier
for disgruntled Americans to overlook or endure minor vexations to the relationship. An
Admiral like Sir Hyde Parker had had quite the opposite effect. Under his leadership, the
Royal Navy’s Jamaican Squadron, in many ways, became estranged from its American
cousin, the U.S. Navy’s St. Domingue station. The admiral had sown the seeds of that
estrangement for years even before the Quasi-War had begun by antagonizing its future
commander, Commodore Silas Talbot, when Talbot had been the American Agent for
Impressed Seamen in the West Indies.
Whitehall had left Parker to largely set his own course with respect to both
impressments and the seizures of merchantmen on his station. In each case, his position
215

had been much harsher than that practiced or condoned by their Lordships of the
Admiralty in the home seas and this despite the pointed protests of the American
Government. Finally, Parker had ignored the British Cabinet’s policies of cooperating
with the Americans in an accord with Toussaint l”Ouverture and had struck out with his
own policy directly hostile to it by seizing Toussaint’s ships bound for the siege of
Jacmel. Under the Maitland/Toussaint/Stevens Accord, the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy
were to provide security around St. Dominguian waters for American and British trading
vessels, but also those of Toussaint. The U.S. Navy successfully carried out this mission;
Hyde Parker’s Jamaican Squadron did not. Instead of acting to protect Toussaint’s
commerce, Parker’s cruisers persecuted it. And Commodore Talbot found himself
working around or even against his British counterparts to fulfill this mission.
When Hyde Parker’s antipathy toward his own government’s policy on St.
Domingue finally brought about his recall to England, his replacement, Lord Hugh
Seymour, an admiral already well thought of by Americans in the Lesser Antilles where
he had replaced in command the also respected and esteemed Admiral Henry Harvey, set
an altogether different tone on the station. He worked hard with the American Agent at
Port Royal, William Savage, to see released those impressed Yankee seamen who could
reasonably prove their American status. He did what he could to redress the abuses of
rapacious, skippers he had inherited from Parker’s regime such as Frederick Watkins,
who at Curaçao had turned a very successful joint Anglo-American naval operation
against the French into the quasi-alliance’s ebb tide. Even an Anglophilic officer like
Commodore Truxtun had been soured on the British after that. But Seymour’s swift
action had softened the blow. In the end, for the diplomats in Washington and London
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and the navies in the Caribbean, the matter was left to blow over, instead of exploding.
Lord Hugh’s mitigation of the Curaçao affair had allowed cooler heads like those of John
Marshall and Rufus King to prevail, rather than the original angry rhetoric of U.S
captains and commodores in the Antilles. Thus, in the months that followed the Curaçao
matter, the Anglo-American naval alliance was able to continue much as it had to the
war’s end, remaining functional and professional, despite minor, day to day vexations,
often the residue of the unresolved disputes yet smoldering between the two nations.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The Quasi-War is now a forgotten conflict. If remembered at all by nonhistorians, it is for the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts promulgated by a Federalist
Congress and the Adams Administration. But the war produced so many firsts in
American history. The United States Navy had its true birth during the conflict. While
there had been a Continental Navy during the War of Independence, it had ended with the
war itself. Its last ship, the frigate, Alliance, after sale, had lain abandoned on a mud flat
in the Delaware River near Philadelphia. The Navy Act of 1794 had authorized the
construction of six frigates, but only three were actually begun before the Quasi-War and
the work had proceeded at a snail’s pace until the troubles with France had rushed their
completion. It was the Quasi-War which had given Congress the stomach to build the
other three. And the Quasi-War motivated the national legislature to found a separate
navy department to administer and direct their operation. The Quasi-War marked the
young Republic’s first foreign war. The undeclared conflict would be fought entirely at
sea, and mostly in the Caribbean. This war would also begin the lengthy involvement of
the United States in what was then St. Domingue and would become known as Haiti.
Finally, the Quasi-War witnessed the “first rapprochement” between the United States
and its former mother county and enemy, Great Britain. Of course, Bradford Perkins
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entitled his admirable monograph on the subject of the softening of relations between the
two nations during the years 1795-1805, as The First Rapprochement.
This thaw in the dealings between the island kingdom and the infant republic, as
manifested in the informal naval understanding which developed between them as they
both fought the French in the years 1798-1801, has been the topic of this thesis. In doing
so, this work has occupied one area of an already sparse historiography. Although,
historians have largely ignored the Quasi-War, some history has been done. In the mid1960s, Professor Alexander DeConde wrote a diplomatic history of the war.
Eponymously titled, it briefly touched upon the naval war. But as mentioned previously,
only two authors have dedicated entire works to the subject of the conflict at sea:
Gardner’s Our Naval War with France and Professor Palmer’s Stoddert’s War. Allen’s
work, did little more than tell the story of the war as a series of stirring ship to ship
actions, pitting the heroic men of the U.S. Navy against the French. Except for one
fleeting reference to use of shared signals, there was no mention of contact with the
Royal Navy whatsoever. Stoddert’s War, in contrast, provided what its author termed
“unrattling history.” Palmer styled his an operational study of the U.S. Navy during the
Quasi-War. Necessarily, he wrote of the material aid supplied by the British Government
to found the American navy and certainly its dealings with the Royal Navy in the
Caribbean, the American service’s primary theatre of operations. But his treatment of the
subject was brief. The Royal Navy made only cameo appearances in the work.
Bradford Perkins, as described above, studied the warming of relations between
Britain and America during the years 1795-1805. The First Rapprochement certainly
covered the Quasi-War, devoting two chapters to it. In those chapters, Perkins wrote of “a
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common action and mutual assistance in the military [naval] field that was not equaled
for more than a century.”1 But Perkins was a student of diplomatic history. Naval
cooperation, although the most concrete manifestation of the new, growing connection
between the two maritime nations, was but one facet of the story even in the two chapters
covering the war. There have been recent popular histories published, describing the
founding and early years of the U.S. Navy.2 These have covered the years of the Quasi
War. Their well-written narratives devote some chapters to re-telling the story
surrounding Joshua Humphreys’s building of the Six Frigates, John Adams’s swift
assembly of the Federal Navy, and the exploits of Thomas Truxtun and his fellow
captains in the West Indies against the French, but ignore the British connection. Only
one article has appeared devoted to the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy in the years of the
Quasi-War: Palmer’s, “Anglo American Naval Cooperation, 1798-1801.” This seven
page piece was meant only as a brief sketch. In short, no scholar has attempted a major
study of this subject; the topic of Royal Navy and U.S. Navy cooperation during the
course of the Undeclared War has virtually remained an unplowed field.
The aim of this thesis has been to begin filling in this gap in the naval
historiography of the Quasi-War. Or in other words, it has been to begin creating a
historiography of the British/American naval relationship in that war. But where does one
set the plow when beginning to furrow a field others have left essentially untilled? The
answer lies with the little that has been done already. Hence, the works of Professors
Palmer and Perkins have suggested the focus of this study. On one side, Professor Palmer
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has minimized the significance of the relationship between the navies, because it never
blossomed into a formal alliance. He also believed the two services never even
cooperated “as closely as might have been expected.”3 On the other, Perkins has
concluded that “[o]nly formal allies could have done more for one another than did the
United States and England at this time.”4 This thesis has set out to answer the question as
to whose perception was correct. What was the significance of the naval understanding
that did develop between the two countries within the context of its times?
Secondly, Palmer and Perkins differed as to the nature of the relationship between
the two navies at the end of the Undeclared War. Palmer was the pessimist, believing that
the relationship was heading for a “rupture,” to use the language of the times; the two
nations “were drifting, however slowly, toward war.”5 Perkins, on the contrary, had
concluded that the informal naval entente had survived the conflict and that the cordial
relationship between the nations would remain through the early years of Jefferson’s
Administration. This thesis has also sought to provide the answer to that question as well.
Was the naval quasi-alliance still intact at the war’s close? By answering these two
questions, this author hoped to develop some insight into the nature and qualities of the
informal alliance, what was working to erode it from the beginning and what if anything
helped sustain it.
In attempting to resolve these two questions, this thesis has also utilized a
different approach to basically the same primary sources examined by Palmer and
Perkins: the Quasi-War, the naval document collection assembled by the U.S. Navy
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Department during the 1930s. This study is built upon an examination of the day to day
contacts between the serving units of the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy in the West Indies
during the relevant years, no matter how mundane. The reason for this choice forward
was a simple one. It was plain that whatever relationship existed between the two navies
was informal. As both Palmer and Perkins acknowledged, there was no treaty or other
protocol between the two governments or between the British Admiralty on one side and
the U.S. Navy Department on the other, establishing a formal understanding between the
two services in the Undeclared War. Therefore, evidence of whatever naval relationship
did exist was not likely to be found in the orders emanating from their Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty in London, nor those coming from Secretary Stoddert in
Philadelphia. Neither would they come from the station Admirals at Jamaica or the
Lesser Antilles, or the commanding American commodores at St. Kitts or Cap Français.
Little, if anything, of an informal alliance would be reflected in those formal lines of
communication. Instead, evidence of any impromptu arrangement that might exist
between the fleets would likely be found between the cracks in the command structures:
namely in the records of the various ships and officers serving on station. The ship’s logs,
journals of officers, and letters written home by officers and men might contain
information referencing contacts with brother officers and tars serving in the other navy.
As a practical matter, the author did not have access to Admiralty records kept at the
Public Record Office in Kew, England nor those contained in the offices of their
American counterparts in the United States. But the author did have access to the QuasiWar, the collection of U.S. Navy documents describing the day to day operations of the
service mentioned above and produced in the Roosevelt years as a New Deal project.
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Hence, the research grounding this study involved a careful examination of any records in
that collection in any way referencing or describing contacts between American ships of
war or naval personnel and their British counterparts, no matter how fleeting, seemingly
insignificant, or routine. The nature and quality of those everyday contacts would tell the
tale, as to what kind of relationship existed on station between the serving units of the
two fleets.
The focus to the research involved in this thesis differed substantially to that taken
in Stoddert’s War, which Professor Palmer had based upon his doctoral dissertation.
Palmer had called his work an operational history, meaning it was “primarily a study of
command.”6 He was chiefly concerned with the navy as directed from the top, from its
commander, Navy Secretary Stoddert. If his work dealt with local units and captains at
sea, it was as to how they carried out the secretary’s orders and saw his plans through to
success or failure. In Professor Palmer’s study, “[t]he central figure is . . . Benjamin
Stoddert.”7 In contrast, the central figures of this study were the serving officers and men
of the two navies as they sought out practical solutions together to fight the French at sea
thousands of miles from Philadelphia and London.
This research design has indeed proven fruitful. It has uncovered evidence
establishing that the individual commanders of the various men of war of both navies in
the Caribbean Theatre of War did develop an informal naval understanding which, on the
whole, served them well to the end of that conflict. British and American warships shared
coded signals to identify each other as friendly, sailed in concert, and sometimes chased
the enemy together. The commanders often entertained their opposite numbers aboard
6
7
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their ships, and shared intelligence on enemy strength, and disposition. Without
compunction, they convoyed the other nation’s merchantmen. The British governors
allowed American men of war to use their islands as bases of operations and to board
prisoners of war captured in theatre. The evidence unearthed reflects that to serving
officers and even British island governors, the relationship was a practical reality that in
general increased the security and effectiveness of both navies, but also shielded British
possessions in the West Indies. At least one governor formally had expressed his hope to
the local American station commander that the latter would aid in defense of his island.
Occasionally, the informal relationship even benefitted strategic decisions reached
by the authorities above. The significant American presence on the “Guadeloupe Station”
based at St. Kitts certainly enabled the Royal Navy to remove warships from the Lesser
Antilles and send them west for the defense of Jamaica. This friendly American presence
aided the security of both the remaining R.N. men of war and merchantmen plying those
waters by reducing the effect of privateers and the few French national frigates
occasionally sortieing from Guadeloupe.
Certainly, examination of records referencing British/American naval contacts
also revealed that as time wore on, Americans were not always pleased with their quasiallies. Even originally Anglophilic officers, such as Captain Alexander Murray, after he
became commodore on the St. Domingue Station, and Thomas Truxtun after the Curaçao
incident, expressed disillusion with their British quasi-allies in their letters to Stoddert
and others. Never the less, their professional actions indicated that the informal naval
alliance was functioning as before. They still shared signals with British warships and
spoke them, maintaining cordial relationships with their R.N. counterparts. Their letters
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home to Stoddert may have expressed inner misgivings, but their deeds revealed what the
real situation was. It was not what they said, so much as what they did, which was critical
to understanding the status of the informal alliance. While these disgruntled mariners
might express frustration and anger towards their British “cousins,” there was no real
enthusiasm to pursue conflict at this period of time. This was true even at the highest
levels of the American government. Even after frustrations with British policy toward
merchantmen seizures, impressment and following evidence of Hyde Parker’s perfidy
regarding St. Domingue, President Adams had expressed no desire to join the
Scandinavians in their League of Armed Neutrality against Britain; to Adams, the League
was folly.8 And as the war with France ground to a halt, Secretary Stoddert had expressed
his belief that the time was ripe to cement relations with England.9
This thesis also has brought to light the significant role that Great Britain played
in the founding of the United States Navy. Both Palmer and Perkins had mentioned the
copper and ordinance Britain had supplied the U.S. Navy. Without the copper supplied,
then impossible to procure in the United States, no American fleet would have been able
to keep the sea in the Caribbean’s worm infested waters. Without the cannon, that
American fleet would have been weakly armed. This thesis certainly has argued that such
British aid with naval administration was, taken in context, the sine qua non for the U.S.
Navy’s existence in the Quasi-War.
However, this study also has revealed another side of British aid to the foundling
American fleet, most likely given unconsciously: the transference of Britain’s naval
culture to the U.S. Navy. The Royal Navy had played the part of mentor to the infant
8
9
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Yankee fleet. The Americans borrowed their diet, uniforms, disciplinary regulations, and
even fighting style, whole scale from their R.N. cousins. While Navy Secretary Stoddert
might express frustration at Royal Navy attitudes from time to time, it was always to
Britain’s Senior Service that he turned to set the standards for his young fighting force. In
fact, a near reverential attitude towards the King’s Navy and its personnel seemed to
permeate the young American service. This much was evident in the way U.S. Navy
skippers referred to the Royal Navy captains and, especially, the admirals they
encountered from time to time at sea. They were ever aware that they, the protégés, had
to appear absolutely ship shape and Bristol fashion when in the presence of their ideals.
As late as February 1800, Captain Alexander Murray, upon approaching the British navy
base at Port Royal, Jamaica had reminded his officers of the wardroom:
Sirs As (sic) we are now about to enter a Port where the eyes of the Multitude.
(sic) both in the Private (sic) as well as the Public (sic) line, will be full of
scrutiny with regard to the discipline, order & cleanliness of our Ship (sic) &
Crew. (sic) as well as to every part of our private deportment. Let us all unite in
our exertions to shew (sic) them that we know how to conduct ourselves with that
decorum & regularity, that will do credit to the Navy of the United States, for
there will be many people at Jamaica who will be very fond of drawing
comparisons between us & their own Navy (sic) to our discredit if they can see
cause so to do. therefore (sic) let us all be upon our guard & convince them, that
tho’ (sic) young in our profession, we will not yield to any Nation whatsoever in
dignity, honor, or any other accomplishment that stamps the Character (sic) of a
Nation (sic).10
Murray was mortified at somehow being found inadequate in Royal Navy eyes. At the
same time, he was vigilant to repel any British slight to the American nation or character.
Perhaps the over sensitivity displayed in Murray’s comment was to be expected
from a naval officer of a country yet forming its national consciousness. At the time this

10
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thesis covers, it was debatable as to what the American character amounted. Were
Americans essentially still English, as Talleyrand had expressed after spending two years
in exile in the United States during the Terror? Or was there already a sense of an
American national culture emerging despite the almost smothering effects of omnipresent
British influences in the country? The American decision to model the nation’s new navy
after that of its mother country, England, rather than that of its most recent ally, the
French, can be seen as part of this debate. This thesis has argued that the decision was a
conscious, logical step in light of the Royal Navy’s century of success. Yet, it can be
understood instead in another context, that of the tendency of a recent colony to replicate
the institutions of its mother country.
The relation of Great Britain to the growth of an American national consciousness
in the early days of the republic is a topic recently explored in Sam W. Haynes’s
Unfinished Revolution.11 Britain, Haynes argues, had remained a kind of bogeyman in the
early Republic. Americans often felt a compulsion to emulate their mother country and
craved her acceptance, yet also suffered from a deep sense of inferiority to her and
resented her ubiquitous presence in the life of the nation. Slowly, he maintains, the
American response to Britain as a kind of foil created a self-confident, national
consciousness which was apparent as the Civil War approached. Is Haynes’s analysis
relevant to the Anglo-American relationship of the Quasi-War era? Something of this
conflicted response to England is already exhibited in Murray’s address to his officers
cited above. However, Unfinished Revolution begins its narrative following the end of the
War of 1812, when the memory of Redcoats again on American soil was very fresh. How
11
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the informal Anglo-American naval rapprochement might fit into such a discussion
translated to the late Federalist period perhaps merits further work. There is the grist for a
subsequent historian’s mill.
Finally, this thesis has looked at the informal naval relationship existing in the
West Indies during the Undeclared War from the vantage of the largely American naval
records contained within the Quasi-War collection assembled in the 1930s. As this author
expressed in the introduction to this work and earlier in this conclusion, the scope of the
research accomplished here has been defined by the parameters of that collection. Again,
it is doubtful that the Quasi-War editors missed much, if anything at all, when they made
their compilation. But the viewpoint contained within its documents is largely the
American one. To better understand the nature of the Anglo-American naval relationship,
it would be distinctly advantageous to have more of the British perspective. As
previously suggested, that would involve examining the Admiralty records maintained by
Her Majesty’s Public Record Office at Kew in England. No doubt such a document
search would necessarily produce further insights and raise additional questions wanting
answers. And that is as it should be. This thesis was truly meant only to begin the
discussion.
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